Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from the district court's grant of a motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In granting the motion, the district court reduced defendant's sentence for distribution of child pornography from 96 months imprisonment to one day. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) because it did not base its grant of the motion on defendant's assistance to the government, but instead grounded the reduction solely on the court's concern that defendant would not receive his preferred medication while in prison. The court held that the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) by granting the motion based on factors other than the defendant's cooperation with the government. The court also held that the mere possibility that a change in treatment of the defendant's ADHD, based on the professional judgment of a prison's medical team, simply did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court further held that, because reconsideration of the motion by the original sentencing judge would inevitably invite speculation as to whether the medical issue continued to play a role in the ultimate ruling, the court ordered the case reassigned to a new judge on remand.

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The under seal appellant ("Company 1"), a foreign company, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to quash the government's grand-jury subpoenas served on the under seal intervenor ("Company 2") where the subpoenas sought documents that Company 1 delivered to Company 2 in response to discovery requests that arose during the course of civil litigation between the two companies in district court. The court affirmed the denial of Company 1's motion to quash the government's subpoenas and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the subpoenas passed muster under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Company 1 provided no basis for the court to craft a new procedural rule in support of its position. The court also held that there were no clearly erroneous rulings by the district court in resolving the factual issue regarding the nature of Company 2's interaction with the government and Company 1 failed to show that the issue merited any further investigation or an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected Company 1's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Company 1's motion to quash.

Appellants challenged the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 to appellee where appellants served an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) on appellee, which she timely accepted. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the amount appellants offered to settle the dispute did not include her attorney's fees and costs. The court affirmed and held that the district court properly enforced the offer of judgment as drafted and served by appellants because the offer contained no language limiting appellant's liability for appellee's recoverable pre-offer costs, including attorney's fees.

Petitioner requested innocent spouse relief from her tax liability under I.R.C. 6015(f) more than two years after the IRS began its efforts to collect the deficiency from an audit of the petitioner and her husband's joint income tax return for the year 2000. At issue was whether Treasury Regulation 1.6015-5(b)(1), 26 C.F.R. 1.6015-5(b)(1), establishing a two-year limitations period within which to request equitable innocent spouse relief from joint and several income tax liability under I.R.C. 6015(f), was a valid regulation. The court held that a two-year time period for requesting relief under section 6015(f) was a reasonable approach to filling the gap left in section 6015. Therefore, because section 6015(f) was ambiguous as to an appropriate limitations period and Regulation 1.6015-5(b)(1) was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, the court held that it was a valid regulation. Per petitioner's request, the court remanded the case to the Tax Court for determining whether petitioner was entitled to an extension under Treasury Regulation 301.9100-3. The court finally rejected petitioner's request for innocent spouse relief under the doctrine of equitable tolling where she waived the issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a motion to avoid defendant's judicial lien under 11 U.S.C.A. 522(f) after plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. At issue was whether the district court erred in ruling that the Bankruptcy Code did not require a debtor to claim an exemption in the property subject to the judicial lien sought to be avoided under section 522(f). The court affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's denial of plaintiff's motion to avoid defendant's judicial lien because the district court correctly concluded that a debtor was not required to list her property as exempt in order to avoid a judicial lien that was impairing that exemption.

Appellee, trustee for the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of debtor, brought suit against various defendants to avoid a series of transfers of an 11.8 acre parcel of real property in Maryland originally owned by the debtor. By consent orders, the trustee accomplished avoidance of the property's initial and second transfers but trial proceeded against the third transferee, appellant. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the trustee and avoided the transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 550(b). At issue was whether appellant took in good faith and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer, thereby satisfying the section 550(b)(1) defense. The court held that the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard of objective good faith and affirmed its findings that facts known to appellant would have lead a lender under the circumstances to inquire as to the public record. The court found that appellant did not have knowledge of the voidability of the transfer because it was willfully ignorant in the face of facts which cried out for investigation and such a transferee could not have taken in good faith. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's order was affirmed.

Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, filed this action on behalf of herself and similarly-situated employees to recover wages and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 201, et. seq., for time spent donning and doffing protective gear during the workday at defendant's poultry processing plants. At issue was whether the district court properly held that the activities identified by the employees were compensable as "work" under the FLSA and that defendant's failure to pay the employees for these activities constituted a violation of the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court in substantial part and held that the time spent donning and doffing protective gear at the beginning and end of each workday was compensable as "work" under the FLSA. The court held, however, that based on the court's decision in Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., decided after the district court entered judgment in the present case, the court was required to hold that the mid-shift donning and doffing of protective gear at the employees' meal break was not compensable. The court additionally affirmed the district court's holding that defendant's violations of the FLSA were not "willful" and, accordingly, a two-year statute of limitations was applicable to the employees' claims for "back pay." Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that defendant acted in good faith and its resulting decision declining to award liquidated damages to the employees.

Petitioner sought habeas relief from his capital sentence for convictions of murdering a husband and wife, as well as robbing the husband. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the State of North Carolina violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those presented in the trials of his co-defendants. The court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas relief and held that, in light of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, the federal district court correctly determined that the state court's decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting; possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's convictions; whether the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence; and whether the court erred in continuing to poll the jury after one juror indicated that the verdict was not unanimous. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the government presented substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions on all three counts; that appellant's Rule 404(b) argument was without merit where there was no error in admitting the evidence of a prior arrest when the evidence was relevant to prove his knowledge and lack of mistake, as well as necessary to prove the element of intention; and that the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error where there was no objection to the continued polling, the district took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive, and the district court gave a fair and balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further.