Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the county, alleging that the December 17 prayer at the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners (Board) meeting represented one instance of the Board's broader practice of sponsoring sectarian opening prayers at its meetings. After conducting a thorough review of the factual record, the district court concluded that the Board's legislative prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause by advancing and endorsing Christianity to the exclusion of other faiths. The court held that the district court's ruling accorded with both Supreme Court precedent and the court's own precedent where those cases established that in order to survive constitutional scrutiny, an invocation must consist of the type of nonsectarian prayers that solemnize the legislative task and seek to unit rather than divide. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. At issue was whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of evidence obtained by a police officer who conducted a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that was later overruled. The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Davis v. United States, holding that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." Because the district court's decision in this case granting the motion to suppress by defendant was inconsistent with Davis, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that in disciplining her for a MySpace.com webpage, which was largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student, defendants violated her free speech and due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendants were not justified in regulating her speech because it did not occur during a "school-related activity," but rather was "private out-of-school speech." The court held that defendants' imposition of sanctions was permissible where plaintiff used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a classmate and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the school environment as to implicate defendants' recognized authority to discipline speech which "materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and collid[ed] with the rights of others." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision.

This case stemmed from a federal grand jury indictment charging defendant with possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone where defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized following a search and certain statements he made to law enforcement officers. At issue was whether the district court properly granted the motion to suppress. The court held that reasonable suspicion was not present to turn a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. Furthermore, under an extremely deferential standard of review, the court rejected the government's challenge to the district court's finding that defendant's consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Employees of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services filed suit against defendants, alleging principally that the searches conducted on them as a result of a portable ion scanning machine, which was capable of detecting minute amounts of controlled substances, violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the suit. The court affirmed and held that, although it was clearly established that intrusive prison employee searches required reasonable suspicion, it was far from clear that the devices at issue could not meet that standard. The court further held that because no clearly established federal law placed the officers on notice that fighting contraband in the prison environment in this manner was unlawful, the district court correctly held that immunity attached.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned the court to review the decision of the BIA denying his petition for cancellation of removal and his motion to reopen removal proceedings so that he could pursue cancellation of removal after adjustment of status for which he had an application pending. As a preliminary matter, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss or transfer the matter on the basis of improper venue. The court held, however that petitioner raised no constitutional claims or questions of law and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal. The court further held that because the BIA based its denial of petitioner's motion to reopen on a determination that petitioner did not merit the discretionary relief of cancellation, the court also lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

A 1997 coal supply contract provided that "[a]ll disputes under" the agreement would be referred to arbitration in Charleston. The parties extended the 1997 Agreement until 2006, but disagree as to whether a series of emails effectuated extension through 2008. In July 2008, buyer and supplier signed a new contract with an increased price, providing for arbitration in Richmond and containing a merger clause. Buyer paid the higher price under protest, claiming that the 1997 agreement remained in effect and filed for arbitration in Charleston; supplier filed for arbitration in Richmond under the 2008 agreement. The Charleston panel found that the parties had extended the 1997 agreement and that the 2008 agreement was "a glaring breach" of the extension. The Richmond panel stayed proceedings. A Virginia district court dismissed supplier's suit. A West Virginia district court granted summary judgment for buyer. The Fourth Circuit upheld the West Virginia award under the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. 10(a). The issue of which panel should decide the validity of the 2008 agreement was procedural, not jurisdiction, and did not require a decision in court. The Charleston panel based its jurisdiction on a plausible reading of the 1997 agreement.

An officer shot an unarmed man wanted for failure to pay child support, when he started running away. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the parties stipulated that the officer intended to use his Taser rather than his gun. The district court granted him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, analyzing the shooting as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and applying an objective standard of reasonableness. The use of force could be viewed by a jury as objectively unreasonable. The officer knew he carried his Taser in the holster on his thigh, about a foot lower than the holster on his hip; he knew that the gun weighed twice what the Taser weighed; and he knew that the Taser had a thumb safety that the gun did not have. The shooting was not a split-second decision; well-established precedent prohibits shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious physical threat. A reasonable jury could also find that the officer was grossly negligent and not protected by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code State Govt, 12-101.

Plaintiff, formerly a colonel in the North Carolina Army National Guard, commenced this action against his former colleagues alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by wrongfully intercepting, reading, and forwarding his e-mails while he was deployed in Kuwait. Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The court held that the district court reasonably found that plaintiff had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to justify granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court also rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that the district court should have treated plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a new complaint. Accordingly, under the circumstances of the case, the court could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's March 31, 2008 motion to reopen the September 14, 2007 judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).