Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2011
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Plaintiff, an unincorporated association made up of homeless and formerly homeless people that advocated for their rights, sued defendants, alleging that defendants had conspired to establish the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way, a site removed from Richmond's downtown community, for the purpose of reducing the presence of the homeless population in the downtown area by providing services for them in a remote location. Plaintiff claimed that the relocation of homeless services to the Conrad Center violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3); the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. The court held that plaintiff did not state a valid section 1985(3) conspiracy claim; plaintiff's 1983 and equal protection claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations; plaintiff's FHA claims were barred by the two-year statue of limitations and, more fundamentally, they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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Retirees filed suit in district court contending that their retiree health benefits were vested and that defendant's intended modification would violate both the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). Retirees subsequently appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction seeking continuation of certain healthcare benefits. The court held that the district court issued a thorough and well-reasoned opinion explaining in detail that the retirees failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for preliminary injunction.

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Defendant was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the first count while retaining his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to 120 months of incarceration. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's determination that the police acted legally when they entered his home. The court held that the district court erred in finding that the police's initial entry into the house was valid, but that it properly found defendant's girlfriend's consent for the second search was valid. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether the taint from the initial illegal entry into the house was dissipated by the girlfriend's consent.

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After defendant pled guilty to federal drug trafficking, the district court held that his prior state convictions for marijuana possession, for which he faced no possibility of imprisonment, was for an offense "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," triggering a sentencing enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841. This enhancement doubled defendant's minimum sentence. The court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the court for "further consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder." A panel of the court then held that Carachuri did not require any change in the court's prior holding. The court voted to rehear the case en banc and subsequently vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

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The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) petitioned for review of a final rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) setting forth energy conservation standards for electric induction motors ranging in power output from .25 to 3 horsepower (Final Rule). In promulgating the Final Rule, the DOE invoked its authority to establish energy conservation standards for "small electric motor[s]," a term defined by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6311(13)(G). NEMA contended that the relevant statutory definition unambiguously excluded all such motors exceeding 1 horsepower, as well as certain motors rated at and less than 1 horsepower, from being regulated as small electric motors. The court held that the Final Rule embodied a permissible interpretation of the statutory definition and therefore, denied the petition for review.

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Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a drug user and one count of possession of marijuana where he had moved to suppress the gun and drugs on the ground that the officer's frisk was unlawful. At issue was whether evidence seized during a street encounter between law enforcement and citizens was properly admitted into evidence during a subsequent criminal prosecution. The court held that the seizure of the evidence did not comport with settled Fourth Amendment principles, and therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings.

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Plaintiff commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), against defendant, alleging that defendant retaliated against her by refusing to hire her after learning that she had sued her former employer under the FLSA. At issue was whether an applicant for employment was an "employee" authorized to sue and obtain relief for retaliation under section 216(b) of the FLSA. The court held that, based on the statutory text, the FLSA gave an employee the right to sue only his or her current or former employer and that a prospective employee could not sue a prospective employer for retaliation. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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Defendant pled guilty to maintaining a place at his residence for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using cocaine base. The United States subsequently appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), arguing that the district court lacked the authority to grant such relief because defendant's sentence was not "based on" a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered but, rather, on his plea agreement entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The court held that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Freeman v. United States, defendant's agreement did not satisfy the limited exception recognized in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence. Consequently, the plea agreement was the foundation for the term of imprisonment imposed and the district court lacked the authority under section 3582(c)(2) to grant defendant's motion for a reduced sentenced. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order granting defendant's motion.

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Appellant challenged the grant of summary judgment for her employer when her boss forcibly kissed her, fondled her leg, propositioned her, asked sexually explicit questions, described sexual activities he wished to perform, and then, after she spurned the advances and filed a harassment complaint, fired her. The court held that because those allegations were sufficient to make out claims of hostile work environment, quid pro quo harassment, and retaliation, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

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Defendant was convicted of armed robbery and, after a renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court overturned his conviction based on insufficient evidence. At issue was what constituted a proper inference for a jury to draw when making determinations of guilt. The court held that the government failed to produce sufficient "identity" evidence placing defendant at the robbery and relied on unsubstantiated, unscientific inferences to bolster its minimal evidence. Therefore, the court held that no reasonable jury could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.