Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in January, 2012
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Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the United States on her claim seeking money damages for alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000aa. Plaintiff, a photojournalist who claimed a special interest in covering protests, political demonstrations, and grassroots activism, was identified on a security camera as being present during a protest demonstration during the International Monetary Funds' annual spring meeting. Police officers executed a search warrant, believing it likely that plaintiff's residence contained evidence of suspected criminal activity that occurred during the protest. Plaintiff was never arrested or charged with any crimes relating to the incident. Plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the United States under the PPA and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. The court agreed with the district court that there was probable cause to believe plaintiff conspired with a group of vandals or aided and abetted the offenses committed by the group. Accordingly, the court concluded that the United States was entitled to summary judgment based on the "suspect exception" to the PPA and affirmed the judgment. View "Sennett v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native of El Salvador who had been granted LPR status, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to dismiss his appeal from an IJ's decision classifying him as an alien subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The order of removal was based upon the IJ's determination that petitioner previously had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court concluded that the moral turpitude provision of the INA was not ambiguous and did not contain any gap requiring agency clarification, the court held that the procedural framework established in Matter of Silva-Trevino was not an authorized exercise of the Attorney General's authority. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and vacated the BIA's decision and the order providing for petitioner's removal. View "Prudencio v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was hired as a medical technologist on December 24, 2007. On May 6, 2008, plaintiff and others met with the chief operating officer to discuss plaintiff's belief that her supervisor willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by altering time sheets to eliminate overtime. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on May 12. Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected activity (FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)). The district court dismissed, finding that an employee's complaint lodged within her company, as opposed to with a court or government agency, does not trigger the protection of the FLSA antiretaliation provision. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that intracompany complaints may constitute protected activity. View "Minor v. Bostwick Lab., Inc." on Justia Law

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An officer in the backseat of a marked car claims that he observed a car with a cracked windshield. The officers followed and pulled the car over. They observed defendant, a passenger in the rear, moving around in his seat and trying to climb over the front seats, despite commands to stop. During a pat-down, the officer felt a gun and yelled "gun." Defendant then struck an officer in the face with his elbow and turned to flee. Another officer clearly observed a silver firearm with a black handle in defendant's waistband. Defendant then punched an officer. They placed him under arrest and seized a .380 semi-automatic pistol. He was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court suppressed the evidence of the gun. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant's subsequent illegal acts did not purge the taint of the illegal stop. The gun was discovered as a result of the stop, not as a result of that conduct. View "United States v. Gaine" on Justia Law

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Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Turkson v. Holder" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from an unsuccessful Title VII action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Great Steaks, Inc. The EEOC accused Great Steaks of subjecting female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. Although at the start of the case the EEOC asserted its claim on behalf of multiple claimants, that number diminished to one by trial. After a three-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict in Great Steaks' favor. Great Steaks subsequently moved for an award of attorneys' fees, maintaining it was entitled to such an award under three statutory provisions. The district court denied the motion for attorneys' fees in its entirety. On appeal, Great Steaks contended that the district court erred in doing so. Upon review of Great Steaks' claims of error and the laws it cited as grounds for relief, the Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision. The Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant, an inmate at Hazelton, appealed his convictions and sentence for two counts of assaulting a correctional officer. On appeal, defendant raised several challenges. The court held that neither of the asserted indictment errors were grounds for reversal; the district court did not improperly sustain hearsay objections to defendant's testimony; and having concluded that defendant was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. 111(b), the court also concluded that he was properly sentenced under U.S.S.G. 2A2.2. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

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Defendant was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion and defendant entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to raise the Second Amendment defense on appeal. As part of defendant's sentence on the section 922(g)(1) conviction, the district court ordered that he repay the incurred court-appointed attorneys' fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3006A(f). The court held that section 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to defendant and the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held, however, that because the district court did not comply with the statutory mandate here, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment requiring defendant to repay his court-appointed attorneys' fees and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed from the district court's holding that her common law tort claims against Medtronic were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), as interpreted by Riegel v. Medtronic. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because the device in question allegedly failed to operate in accordance with the terms of its premarket approval, her claims paralleled federal requirements and therefore should avoid preemption. Because the medical pump at issue was undisputedly designed, manufactured, and distributed in compliance with its FDA premarket approval, and plaintiff's common law claims exceeded or differed from, rather than paralleled, federal requirements, the court held that each of her specific claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty were preempted. View "Walker v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant, the CEO of Maryland's Prince George's County Public Schools (PGCS), was convicted of several counts of honest-services fraud, tampering with evidence, and obstruction of justice. Defendant's convictions involved securing two public contracts for school products and services. On appeal, defendant raised several claims of error. The court held that, in light of the evidence and the general verdict, it could not conclude that the erroneous jury instruction at issue was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions of honest-services fraud (counts 6, 7, and 10). The court addressed each of defendant's challenges to his tampering and obstruction convictions, affirming convictions of evidence and witness tampering (counts 19 and 20) and obstruction of justice (count 22). The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing on counts 19, 20, and 22. View "United States v. Hornsby" on Justia Law