Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant G. Martin Wynn, a professional engineer with the engineering firm of Talbert & Bright, Inc., was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation based on his performance of services to Oconee County, South Carolina, in connection with its project to extend the runway at the Oconee County Regional Airport. Instead of procuring a required permit for the runway extension project from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC"), Defendant cut a valid permit off of an older set of plans prepared for a previous airport project and fraudulently attached that permit to the plans for the runway extension. He then mailed the fraudulently permitted plans to Oconee County and later emailed them to the DHEC. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to 12 months and 1 day in prison and ordered him to pay Oconee County $118,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the offenses had they been properly presented to the jury. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of the amount of loss found for purposes of sentencing and ordering restitution. Finding no abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented against him was sufficient to support his conviction, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United State v. Wynn" on Justia Law

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment." View "Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of Defendants-Appellees WIlliam Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph 10(b) of their indictment, which alleged that they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign in violation of federal election laws. The district court reasoned that in light of "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)), section 441b(a) of the Election Campaign Act of 1971 was unconstitutional as applied to Appellees. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, finding that the lower court misapplied "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont," (539 U.S. 146 (2003)) as the basis for its dismissal of count four. View "United States v. Danielczyk" on Justia Law

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments ("LFRDs") and several of their former administrative employees brought suit against Defendants Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials contending that Defendants eliminated part of their funding in retaliation for opposing to legislation supported by Defendants. The district court dismissed the LFRDs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Kensington Volunteer Fire v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Wheeling Hospital and Belmont Hospital along with other medical providers, filed this putative class action in West Virginia state court against the Ohio Valley Health Services and Education Corporation, Ohio Valley Medical Center and East Ohio Regional Hospital, (collectively, the "OV Health System Parties"), and Appellant The Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. The plaintiffs sued in order to collect amounts allegedly owed to them by employee benefit plans established by the OV Health System Parties, for which The Health Plan acted as administrator. After pretrial activity, The Health Plan moved to dismiss the claims brought against it by the hospital plaintiffs pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties. The district court denied this motion, holding that The Health Plan had defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Health Plan appealed. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its determination that The Health Plan defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of The Health Plan’s motion to dismiss. View "Wheeling Hospital, Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments. View "Huggins v. Prince George's County, MD" on Justia Law

Centro Tepeyac a filed suit against Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County Council, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, and Marc Hansen, the acting County Counsel, challenging the constitutionality of Montgomery County Resolution No. 16-1252. In its complaint, it contended that in compelling speech, the resolution violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The resolution required "limited service pregnancy resource centers," such as Centro Tepeyac, to display a sign on their premises stating (1) "the Center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff"; and (2) "the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider." Violation of the resolution was punishable as a "Class A civil violation." For relief, Centro Tepeyac sought a declaratory judgment that Resolution 16-1252 was unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against its enforcement. Applying strict scrutiny, the district court entered an order denying Centro Tepeyac’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the first statement required by Resolution 16-1252 (regarding the medical professional on staff) and granting its motion as to the second mandated statement("the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider.") Montgomery County appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second mandated statement, and Centro Tepeyac cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for an injunction with respect to the first. For the reasons given in "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore," (___ F.3d ___, No. 11-1111 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012)) the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction and reversed its denial of the preliminary injunction requested by Centro Tepeyac with respect to the first mandated statement. The Court concluded that the goals of the "no licensed medical professional" disclosure could readily be achieved through less speech-restrictive methods. "Such methods might include a more vigorous enforcement of laws against practicing medicine without a license." View "Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Archbishop Edward F. O'Brien, St. Brigid's Roman Catholic Congregation, Inc., and the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. ("the Pregnancy Center") filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, challenging the constitutionality of the City’s Ordinance 09-252, which required that "limited-service pregnancy centers," such as the Pregnancy Center, post signs disclaiming that they "do[ ] not provide or make referral for abortion or birth control services." The complaint alleged that the ordinance, both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs, violated the plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the plaintiffs' rights under the Conscience Clause of Maryland's health law. The district court granted summary judgment to the Pregnancy Center on its freedom of speech count, dismissed the Archbishop and St. Brigid's as plaintiffs for lack of standing, and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, in view of its free speech ruling. The court held that the disclaimer required by Ordinance 09-252 is "a form of compelled speech" that "alters the course of a [pregnancy] center’s communication with a client or prospective client about abortion and birth-control" and "is based, at least in part, on disagreement with the viewpoint of the speaker." The court entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. Upon review of the briefs submitted by both the parties and numerous amici briefs in this case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the ordinance in question was not narrowly tailored to promote the City's interest so as to justify its intrusion on the Pregnancy Center's speech. View "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Having pled guilty in the District of South Carolina to eight counts of a superseding indictment, Defendant Chadrick Evan Fulks was sentenced to death. The capital sentence was imposed on his convictions of carjacking resulting in death, and kidnapping resulting in death. The federal charges in South Carolina related to the abduction and murder of Alice Donovan on November 14, 2002, in the course of a multistate crime spree engineered by Defendant and his cohort Brandon Basham, following their escape from a Kentucky jail. Three days prior to Donovan being carjacked, kidnapped, and killed, Samantha Burns suffered the same fate in West Virginia at the hands of Defendant and Basham. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2004, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for certiorari. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, and requested a new trial. The motion listed thirty-three claims for relief; the district court issued an "exhaustive" memorandum opinion and rejected each claim. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's allegations of error by the district court and affirmed the denial of his motion. View "United States v. Fulk" on Justia Law

Deputy James Elliott stopped Defendant Sean Sowards for speeding along North Carolina’s Interstate 77 after visually estimating that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 mph in a 70-mph zone. Although the deputy's patrol car was equipped with radar, he had intentionally positioned his patrol car at an angle that rendered an accurate radar reading impossible. During the traffic stop, Deputy Elliott had a canine trained in drug detection, Ringo, sniff the outside of Defendant's vehicle. When the dog signaled the possible presence of a controlled substance, Deputy Elliott, along with other officers, searched Defendant's vehicle and discovered approximately 10 kilograms of cocaine. Subsequently, a grand jury charged Defendant with possession of at least 5 kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based exclusively on the deupty's visual estimate --uncorroborated by radar or pacing and unsupported by any other indicia of reliability-- that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 miles per hour in a 70-mph zone. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. View "United States v. Sowards" on Justia Law