Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In April 2010, the government jointly tried Anthony Fleming and Tavon Mouzone, members of the gang "Tree Top Piru" (TTP), in an eight-day jury trial. The grand jury charged both Fleming and Mouzone with conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise (RICO conspiracy), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). It additionally charged Fleming with committing two drug offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base; and (2) distribution of and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base. The jury convicted both Fleming and Mouzone of the RICO conspiracy charge, finding that distribution of crack cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and robbery were conspiracy objectives. It declined to find that murder or conspiracy to commit murder was a conspiracy objective. The jury also convicted Fleming on both drug charges. The district court sentenced Mouzone to 240 months' imprisonment, running concurrent with a previous Maryland state court sentence, and it sentenced Fleming to three concurrent sentences: 240 months' imprisonment on the RICO conspiracy charge and life imprisonment on each drug-related charge. Mouzone and Fleming alleged several district court errors on appeal. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no reversible error and therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Mouzone" on Justia Law

In April 2010, Mike Miller resigned from his position as Project Director for WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, Inc. (WEC). Twenty days later, he made a presentation to a potential WEC customer on behalf of WEC's competitor, Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc). The customer ultimately chose to do business with Arc. WEC contended that before resigning, Miller, acting at Arc's direction, downloaded WEC's proprietary information and used it in making the presentation. Thus, it sued Miller, his assistant Emily Kelley, and Arc for, among other things, violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed WEC's CFAA claim, holding that the CFAA provided no relief for Appellees' alleged conduct. Upon review of the trial court record, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the court's opinion and therefore affirmed. View "WEC Carolina Energy Solutions v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David McCorkle and William Pender appealed a district court order dismissing two of their class action claims against Bank of America Corporation for alleged violations of certain provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Their claims centered on the Bank's use of a normal retirement age (NRA) that allegedly violated ERISA in calculating lump sum distributions and further ran afoul of ERISA's prohibition of "backloading" the calculation of benefit accrual. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it affirmed the district court's judgment to dismiss those claims. View "Pender v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law

Defendant William Davis pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon for which he received a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). Both in his plea agreement and at his plea hearing, Defendant was advised incorrectly that he faced a maximum sentence of only ten years. Defendant contended on appeal that this error constituted a breach of his plea agreement and asked the Fourth Circuit to order that he receive the ten-year sentence described incorrectly as his statutory maximum. Defendant also challenged the district court’s conclusion that he qualified for the ACCA sentence enhancement. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit held that the failure to properly advise Defendant of his statutory maximum sentence was not a breach by the government. Under these circumstances, however, the Court was unable to conclude that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his fifteen-year sentence. The Court therefore declined to enforce Defendant's appeal waiver and considered his alleged sentencing errors. Finding no merit in those claims, the Court affirmed. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Randstad" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry, Defendant Francisco Bonilla received an enhanced sentence based on a prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his state conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) did not satisfy the definition of generic burglary under "Taylor v. United States," (495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

The government initiated civil commitment proceedings against Respondent-Appellee Sean Francis. The government certified that Respondent, who had numerous criminal convictions based on his repeated conduct of placing threatening and obscene telephone calls, was a "sexually dangerous person." After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Respondent was not eligible for commitment because the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct if released. On appeal, the government argued that the district court erred by failing to make necessary factual findings regarding Respondent's prior sexually violent conduct and by failing to determine whether Respondent suffered from a qualifying mental condition under the relevant statutes. After reviewing the record, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, because the court appropriately considered the elements required for civil commitment and did not clearly err in determining that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that Respondent was a sexually dangerous person. View "United States v. Francis" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jermaine Mobley pled guilty to possession of a prohibited object in prison. The sentencing court thereafter found Defendant to be a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a sentence of thirty-seven months. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sentence, maintaining that the court erred in ruling that his offense of conviction constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement of the Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's contention and affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Appellant David Michael Worley appealed his 100-month sentence for (methamphetamine manufacture and distribution) and special conditions imposed on supervised release, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain its imposition of the conditions. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 100-month sentence, but reversed the district court's imposition of special conditions one, six, and fourteen. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings on all remaining special conditions. View "United States v. Worley" on Justia Law