Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Mission, on her hostile work environment claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to establish that she had suffered a tangible employment action. The court also concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Mission satisfied both elements of its affirmative defense. Mission could not be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's alleged harassment of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Mission. View "Crockett v. Mission Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several crimes stemming from his participation in a scheme to arrange fraudulent marriages between Navy sailors and foreign nationals. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. Because the court was satisfied that the statements made by two witnesses on the prison telephone were not testimonial, their admission did not violate the Confrontation clause; because defendant failed to cast doubt on Juror No. 42's assurance that she could set aside any opinion she may have had on the case, the court deferred to the district court's determination that she could serve impartially; the offense underlying the witness tampering counts was the aiding and abetting of false claims and, therefore, the obstruction counts were eligible for grouping only with those counts; and the district court reached a reasonable estimate in its loss calculation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine. The cocaine was found in the gas tank of a Ford Explorer as the vehicle was being transported on a commercial car carrier. The court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the government that defendant failed to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. View "United States v. Castellano" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed the underlying action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the witness residency requirement on nominating petitions impermissibly burdened their rights to free speech and free association under the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Board's motion premised entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and thus lacked standing. The district court denied the Board's motion as to standing and granted plaintiffs' motion on the merits. The district court declared the witness residency requirement unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Although the Board's witness residency requirement served the Commonwealth's interest in policing fraud potentially permeating the electoral process and therefore meeting the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, the Board produced no concrete evidence of persuasive force explaining why plaintiffs' proposed solution, manifestly less restrictive of their First Amendment rights, would be unworkable or impractical. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects the judgment of the district court. View "Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd" on Justia Law

HomeAway filed suit in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, against Eye Street and others, asserting, inter alia, state law claims for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Eye Street did not attempt to remove HomeAway's Texas suit to federal district court but, instead, filed its own action against HomeAway and others in federal district court. After HomeAway moved to dismiss Eye Street's action for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, the district court stayed the action pending the resolution of HomeAway's Texas lawsuit. On appeal, Eye Street challenged the propriety of the stay. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying Eye Street's action. Given the strong case for a stay under the United Capitol Insurance Co. v. Kapiloff factors and Eye Street's deliberate choice to forego removal, the district court's decision would be an appropriate exercise of discretion under either Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America/Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. or Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc." on Justia Law

Painter's Mill Grille, the owner and operator of a restaurant, and its principals filed a complaint against the restaurant's landlord and its agents. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, motivated by racial animus, interfered with plaintiff's business and its opportunity to sell the restaurant, including its leasehold interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, and 1985(3), as well as state tort principles. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's principals did not have standing to be plaintiffs and that Painter's Mill Grille did not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner initiated this action for wrongful removal under the Hague Convention, seeking the return of his son to Switzerland. The district court found that respondent breached no rights of custody in removing the child and denied the petition for return. Respondent had sole custody of her son when she traveled with him to the United States and Swiss law gave her a unilateral right to remove the child while he was in her sole custody. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent's removal of the child abused her rights under Swiss law or breached any rights of custody petitioner held at the time of removal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

This is an adversary proceeding arising out of the bankruptcy of debtor (Derivium). Plaintiff (Grayson), assignee of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to grant summary judgment for defendants (Wachovia). The court concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Customer Transfers claim; summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Cash Transfers claim; the bankruptcy court's determinations that the stockbroker defense applied to commissions; and the bankruptcy court's ruling that in pari delicto barred Grayson's tort claims against Wachovia. View "Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the widow of the insured, filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), after AUL, the insurer, refused to pay accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) benefits. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits on the grounds that the death was not accidental because the fatal crash was an "anticipated and expected" result of driving while intoxicated. The insurance policies did not define the term "accident" despite its critical importance for determining eligibility for AD&D benefits. Because "accident" was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court construed it against AUL, the drafting party, and concluded that a reasonable plan participant under similar circumstances would have understood the insurer's alcohol-related crash to be an "accident" under the policy language. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Johnson v. American United Life Ins." on Justia Law