Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in June, 2013
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Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State Board, alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights by causing him to self-censor certain speech on his website wherein he offered both free and fee-based dietary advice to website visitors. The court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in not analyzing plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment standing framework where, under that analysis, plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by showing that the State Board's action had an objectively reasonable chilling effect on his speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Futrell" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of firearms by a felon and was sentenced to 105 months' imprisonment. At issue on appeal was the district court's application of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), which provided for a four-level enhancement if a firearm "had an altered or obliterated serial number." Defendant contended that the serial number at issue was legible even though the district court was unable to read the serial number correctly at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, defendant contended that U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) did not apply because no material change was made to the serial number. The court concluded, however, that when a serial number was made less legible, it was altered but not obliterated. Therefore, while the possession of a firearm with a serial number that was no longer legible and conspicuous was covered by 18 U.S.C. 922(k) and U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), a serial number that was less legible or less conspicuous, but not legible, was also covered by section 922(k) and U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

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The Fund filed this garnishment proceeding against the Department to collect monies owed to a debtor construction company. The district court denied the Department's motion to quash the writ of garnishment on grounds of sovereign immunity and Maryland public law. The court concluded that a federal proceeding that seeks to attach the property of a state to satisfy a debt, whether styled as a garnishment action or an analogous common law writ, violated the Eleventh Amendment. Because the Department was immune from suit, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to quash the writ of garnishment. View "Carpenters Pension Fund v. Maryland Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

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Defendant, convicted of robbery, objected to the district court's career offender enhancement, arguing that he received a "consolidated sentence" for his prior state offenses and thus did not have "at least two prior felony convictions" as defined by the Guidelines. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying the career offender enhancement because defendant had only one prior qualifying sentence, not two. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction and death sentence for killing the victim while engaging in a drug trafficking conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court concluded that section 848(e)(1)(A) did not apply only to substantive drug offenses and was applicable to a drug conspiracy such as the one in this case; the government presented sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict defendant on the section 848(e)(1)(A) charge; there was no error in the jury instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an anonymous jury was necessary and it took reasonable steps to protect defendant's rights; given the high deference the court gave to the district court in the matter of jury disqualification, the court was unable to say that the district court's decision not to seat Juror 144 was a manifest abuse of discretion; and the district court did not err in excluding certain mitigating evidence from his two daughters. After addressing defendant's remaining claims, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hager" on Justia Law

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Defendant, convicted of illegal possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's application of a cross reference and substitution of the offense level for attempted second-degree murder because defendant had used the firearm on the day of his arrest to shoot another person. The court rejected the government's plain error argument and reviewed defendant's first claim of error de novo; the district court properly imposed a cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1) because defendant's substituted offense of attempted second-degree murder clearly occurred "during the commission" of the offense of conviction; and the district court did not clearly err in imposing a cross reference to attempted second-degree murder. View "United States v. Ashford" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against Sudan after the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and the district court found Sudan liable under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. 30301 et seq. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's conclusion that the DOHSA action precluded their subsequent federal cause of action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605. The court concluded that the various provisions of section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, were inapplicable here and, therefore, the court declined to consider the constitutionality of NDAA section 1083; the district court did not abuse its discretion when, as part of a close look, considered sua sponte whether res judicata barred plaintiffs' claims; but the court concluded, however, that res judicata should not apply here. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law

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Defendant, convicted of charges stemming from his involvement in a scheme to defraud Bank of America, appealed his convictions and sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence found in defendant's backpack; the court affirmed defendant's conviction for aggravated identity theft based on the plain meaning of the statute; and there was no sentencing error in imposing a twelve-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) on the ground that defendant's offense involved an intended loss amount in excess of $200,000, a four-level enhancement for a crime having fifty or more victims under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B), and a three level-enhancement for defendant's aggravated role as a manager or supervisor of the offense under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Otuya" on Justia Law

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Defendant, guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine, appealed the district court's order granting, only in part, his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In ruling on defendant's motion, the district court used a form document. The court held that the district court's explanation was sufficient and affirmed the judgment because United States v. Legree governed and the facts of defendant's case failed to overcome its presumption that, absent a contrary indication, a court had considered the relevant factors in deciding a section 3582(c)(2) motion. View "United States v. Smalls" on Justia Law

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The FDIC, acting receiver for the Bank, filed an action to recover the deficiency owed on a promissory note executed by defendant and payable to the bank. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment in favor of the FDIC. The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the FDIC's status as holder of the Note; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to strike defendant's surreply and an affidavit; the court concluded that filing a Form 1099-C was a creditor's required means of satisfying a reporting obligation to the IRS, not a means of accomplishing an actual discharge of debt, nor is it required only where an actual discharge had already occurred; and, in this case, the district court did not err in granting the FDIC's motion for summary judgment because defendant had not come forward with evidence that created a genuine issue of material as to whether the Note had been cancelled or assigned. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "FDIC v. Cashion, III" on Justia Law