Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In January 2013, Stanislav “Steven” Yelizarov robbed a jewelry store after a series of serious events, including home burglaries and kidnapping. He received a thirty-year sentence for kidnapping and conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. Over eight years, Yelizarov agreed to two plea deals, filed two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was sentenced twice, and had three judges decide parts of his cases. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially sentenced Yelizarov to 360 months based on a plea agreement. After learning of a potential murder charge, Yelizarov renegotiated a plea deal, which included a waiver of appeal. He later filed a § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney failed to advise him properly about the murder charge and its implications. The district court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the attorney’s actions, as Yelizarov was aware of the potential murder charge and chose to plead guilty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Yelizarov was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. The court found that Yelizarov knowingly waived his right to appeal his sentence, including claims of procedural and substantive unreasonableness. The court dismissed his appeal regarding the reasonableness of his sentence, enforcing the waiver of appeal in his plea agreement. The court emphasized that a failure to mention specific sentencing factors does not constitute procedural unreasonableness. The decision was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "US v. Yelizarov" on Justia Law

A group of current and former pretrial detainees filed a putative class action against Prince George’s County, Maryland, and 11 state court judges, alleging that their detentions and the policies leading to them were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and the Maryland Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the judges and the county had absolute immunity from the plaintiffs’ claims for damages and an injunction, and that a declaratory judgment could not provide meaningful relief. The district court dismissed the judicial defendants based on absolute judicial immunity and dismissed the claims against the county based on quasi-judicial immunity. Additionally, the district court dismissed seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention, reasoning that they would not benefit from any available remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the judicial defendants but concluded that the dismissal should have been for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of an Article III case or controversy. The court held that the judicial defendants were acting in an adjudicative capacity, not as adversaries, and thus there was no justiciable controversy. The court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the county, holding that municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, including the reinstatement of the claims of the seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention. View "Frazier v. Prince Georges County" on Justia Law

Four individuals aged 18 to 20 sought to purchase handguns but were prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), which restricts the commercial sale of handguns to those under 21. They filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), claiming that the statute violated their Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court applied the text, history, and tradition test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, determining that the Second Amendment protections apply to 18- to 20-year-olds and that the right to purchase a gun falls within the Amendment’s plain text. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of firearm regulation supporting the constitutionality of § 922(b)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that § 922(b)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that historical traditions, including the common law infancy doctrine, supported restrictions on the sale of firearms to individuals under 21. The court found that both the infancy doctrine and § 922(b)(1) imposed similar burdens on minors' ability to purchase firearms and were motivated by concerns about the judgment and maturity of individuals under 21. The court concluded that § 922(b)(1) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation and is therefore constitutional. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

Three defendants, Jose Ordonez-Zometa, Jose Hernandez-Garcia, and Jose Ortega-Ayala, were convicted in the District of Maryland for their involvement in a racketeering enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), murder in aid of racketeering, and conspiracy to destroy and conceal evidence. The case centers around the brutal murder of a 16-year-old gang member, John Doe, by members of the Los Ghettos Criminales Salvatruchas (LGCS), a branch of the MS-13 gang. The defendants were implicated in the planning, execution, and cover-up of the murder, including the disposal of the victim's body and the destruction of evidence.In the lower court, the defendants filed several motions to suppress evidence obtained from traffic stops, custodial interrogations, and searches of residences, cell phones, and social media accounts. The District Court for the District of Maryland denied these motions, finding that the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Ordonez-Zometa were lawful, the search warrants were supported by probable cause, and the defendants' statements were voluntary. The court also denied Hernandez-Garcia's motion for a new trial, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The appellate court held that the traffic stop and arrest of Ordonez-Zometa were justified by an outstanding arrest warrant and probable cause. The court also found that the search warrants for Ortega-Ayala's residence, cell phones, and Facebook account were supported by probable cause and were not overly broad. Additionally, the court ruled that Hernandez-Garcia's motion for a new trial was properly denied, as the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions. Finally, the court concluded that the government had presented sufficient evidence to establish that the LGCS enterprise's activities affected interstate commerce, satisfying the requirements for RICO and VICAR convictions. The defendants' convictions and sentences were thus affirmed. View "US v. Ordonez-Zometa" on Justia Law

Following the September 11 attacks, Kellogg Brown & Root International (KBR) contracted with the U.S. Army to provide logistics support in Iraq and Kuwait. KBR subcontracted with First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting W.L.L. (First Kuwaiti) to provide trailers for troops. First Kuwaiti incurred significant unanticipated costs and sought additional payment from KBR. Disputes arose, leading to arbitration before the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR). The ICDR Panel issued a final award denying First Kuwaiti’s claim for payment and resolving all disputes. First Kuwaiti’s request for changes to the award was rejected by the ICDR Panel.First Kuwaiti filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to vacate the arbitration award, which KBR opposed as untimely. KBR also filed a cross-motion to confirm the award. The district court denied First Kuwaiti’s motion to vacate as untimely and granted KBR’s motion to confirm the award. Additionally, the district court denied First Kuwaiti’s request for prejudgment interest on two other claims unrelated to the trailer damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that First Kuwaiti’s motion to vacate was untimely as it was filed more than three months after the final arbitration award was delivered. The court also held that the district court had the authority to confirm the arbitration award under Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, which applies to arbitrations involving foreign parties and does not require consent for judicial confirmation. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest, as the stipulations did not explicitly provide for such interest and the circumstances did not warrant it. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. View "First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting W.L.L. v. Kellogg Brown & Root International, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Donald Ferguson was convicted by a jury of sexually abusing his adopted daughter, Jane Doe, under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5). Ferguson appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted the first nine and a half minutes of Doe’s forty-five-minute forensic interview. This portion of the interview included rapport-building and rule-explanation segments conducted by NCIS Agent Hannah Gottardi.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia admitted the entire video recording of the forensic interview, including the first nine and a half minutes, over Ferguson’s objection. The court found the evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Ferguson was subsequently convicted based on the evidence presented, including the forensic interview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the first nine and a half minutes of the forensic interview. The appellate court found that the initial segments of the interview were relevant as they demonstrated that the interview followed the National Children’s Advocacy Center protocol, which is designed to elicit accurate recall from the child. The court also determined that the statements made during these segments were not hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show the interview’s adherence to the protocol.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its discretion under Rule 403, finding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed Ferguson’s conviction. View "US v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Steve Kovachevich, a homebuyer, was required to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) when he took out a mortgage with a down payment of less than 20%. After a year, he requested his mortgage servicer, LoanCare, to cancel his PMI. LoanCare initially denied the request, stating he had not paid down enough of his mortgage to qualify for cancellation under the Homeowners Protection Act (HPA). However, LoanCare agreed to voluntarily cancel the PMI upon meeting certain conditions, which Kovachevich fulfilled. Subsequently, he sought a refund of the prepaid PMI premiums from the mortgage insurer, National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (NMIC), but was denied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Kovachevich’s claim under the HPA, ruling that he was not entitled to a refund of unearned premiums under § 4902(f) because his PMI was canceled voluntarily and not under the statutory benchmarks of the HPA. The court also dismissed his state-law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion, stating it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kovachevich’s HPA claim, agreeing that § 4902(f) only mandates refunds for PMI canceled under the statutory benchmarks, not for voluntary cancellations. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded them to the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Kovachevich v. National Mortgage Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

West Virginia filed a complaint in state court against CaremarkPCS Health, LLC, a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), alleging that Caremark unlawfully drove up the cost of insulin, causing financial harm to the state. The complaint included state law claims of civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract. Caremark removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its conduct in negotiating rebates, which is central to the complaint, was performed under the direction of the federal government as part of its work for federal health plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia found that removal was unwarranted and remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that Caremark failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal and noted that West Virginia had disclaimed any federal claims in its complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Caremark was entitled to remove the case to federal court under § 1442(a)(1). The court found that Caremark acted under a federal officer because it administered health benefits for federal employees under contracts with FEHBA carriers, which are supervised by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The court also determined that Caremark had a colorable federal defense, specifically that federal law preempted West Virginia's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the charged conduct was related to Caremark's federal work, as the rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's remand decision and returned the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C." on Justia Law

E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law

Rodney Crawley was sentenced in December 2016 to 188 months in prison for a federal drug-trafficking conviction, with an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) for being a career offender due to two prior felony convictions: a 2007 Virginia drug distribution conviction and a 2009 Virginia robbery conviction. Without the enhancement, his sentencing range would have been 84 to 105 months. In 2022, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. White that Virginia robbery did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).Crawley filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the White decision meant he no longer qualified as a career offender, creating a significant sentencing disparity. He also cited a medical condition increasing his risk for COVID-19 complications and his rehabilitation efforts. The district court denied his motion, finding that the change in law, his medical condition, and his rehabilitation did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, effective November 1, 2023, applied to Crawley’s motion. The court agreed that the White decision created a gross disparity between Crawley’s original sentence and the sentence he would likely receive now. However, Crawley had not served at least 10 years of his term of imprisonment, as required by § 1B1.13(b)(6). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Crawley’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Crawley" on Justia Law