Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four candidates for federal office challenged a Public Notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that interpreted federal law to require broadcasters to offer the lowest unit charge (LUC) advertising rates not only to candidates for public office but also to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members during pre-election periods. The candidates argued that this expanded interpretation unlawfully diluted their statutory right to LUC rates by extending it to entities whose spending cannot be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate under campaign finance law.Prior to seeking judicial review, the candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC, urging the Commission to set aside the Media Bureau’s Public Notice as a novel and unlawful interpretation of the LUC requirement. The Commission took no action on the application for several months, even as the relevant election period approached. The candidates then filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, seeking expedited consideration. While the case was pending, the FCC Chairman circulated a proposed order to the other commissioners to dismiss the candidates’ application as an improper vehicle for review, and the Media Bureau denied a similar reconsideration petition from another party, maintaining that the Public Notice merely reiterated existing guidance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the Public Notice was a final order of the Commission and that the Commission had constructively denied the candidates’ application by failing to act. On the merits, the court concluded that the LUC statute unambiguously limits the lowest unit charge to legally qualified candidates for public office and does not extend this benefit to political parties or joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members. The court granted the Petition for Review and set aside the FCC’s Public Notice as unlawful. View "Brown v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

After police responded to a theft report at a convenience store in Chesterfield County, Virginia, Markel Trevon Smith and another individual were detained. A search of their vehicle revealed four firearms, including a Glock pistol equipped with a device converting it into a machinegun. This Glock bore three serial numbers: two had been scratched, leaving only partial digits visible, while one serial number remained fully legible. The firearm was traced using the unaltered serial number.Smith was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Smith then pled guilty. At sentencing, the court adopted the Presentence Report’s recommendation to apply a four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i), which increases the offense level if any firearm has a serial number modified so that the original information is illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye. The district court reasoned that altering any serial number on the firearm warranted the enhancement, and sentenced Smith to 57 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction, holding that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to Smith, because machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in applying the serial number enhancement. The court held that the enhancement only applies where modifications render the firearm as a whole untraceable, which was not the case since one serial number remained fully legible. The appellate court therefore reversed the application of the enhancement, vacated Smith’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "US v. Smith" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated to the United States as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in North Carolina state court of two counts of common-law forgery and, in a separate proceeding, possession of marijuana. Years after serving her sentences, she was placed in removal proceedings when reentering the U.S. after a trip to Mexico. She conceded that her convictions made her inadmissible but sought a discretionary waiver that could allow her to remain in the country. While her removal case was pending, she successfully moved in state court to have her marijuana conviction vacated and the charge dismissed.The Immigration Judge denied her application for a waiver, concluding, among other things, that she could not show her marijuana offense involved 30 grams or less, did not prove extreme hardship, and was not entitled to relief as a matter of discretion. The judge did, however, grant her voluntary departure. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) independently determined that, under its established framework from Matter of Pickering, a conviction vacated for reasons other than substantive or procedural defect—such as to avoid immigration consequences—still counts for immigration purposes. The BIA found her vacated conviction still disqualified her from a waiver and denied her motion to remand for further proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), a person whose state conviction has been vacated and the charge dismissed is not an “alien convicted of” that offense for immigration purposes. The court rejected the BIA’s Pickering framework as inconsistent with the statute. The petition for review was granted in part regarding the vacated conviction but denied as to the challenge to voluntary departure regulations, which the court found reasonable. View "Piedra v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A senior employee at a major financial institution managed a significant medical disability for nearly thirty years. Initially, he did so without formal accommodations and excelled, rising to a top leadership position. After a serious health setback in 2017 required him to adopt a new medical protocol, his need for flexibility at work increased, particularly in terms of immediate and unpredictable bathroom access. During the COVID-19 pandemic, remote work made this manageable. He moved back to the company’s headquarters in 2020, relying on assurances from his then-manager that he could work from home when needed. In 2021, with management changes and a planned return to office, he formally requested a permanent remote-work accommodation. Senior management, who were aware of his disability, reacted with skepticism and ultimately included him in a reduction in force, terminating his employment before the office fully reopened.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina heard his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation, as well as a claim for wrongful discharge under North Carolina law. A jury found for the plaintiff on all claims, awarding substantial damages, including back pay, front pay, emotional distress, and punitive damages. The district court denied the employer’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict, later remitting punitive damages under the ADA to comply with statutory caps and awarding prejudgment interest under state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the verdict only as to the ADA retaliation claim, holding that substantial evidence supported a finding that the employee’s request for accommodation was a but-for cause of his discharge. However, the court reversed the verdicts on the failure-to-accommodate and disability-discrimination claims, finding insufficient evidence that any reasonable accommodation was denied or that the discharge was because of the disability itself. The court remanded for entry of judgment as a matter of law on those claims, vacated certain damages, and ordered adjustment of the back-pay award unless the plaintiff accepted a remittitur. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Billesdon v. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

A former underground coal miner developed severe respiratory problems, including chronic cough and significant limitations in daily activities, following nearly 12 years of employment in West Virginia coal mines. After his symptoms worsened post-employment, he filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act in 2020. Medical testing revealed persistent lung function impairment, and four pulmonary specialists—two for the miner and two for his former employer—offered differing opinions on the cause of his disability. The miner’s experts attributed his impairment to legal pneumoconiosis resulting from coal mine dust exposure, while the company’s experts diagnosed asthma unrelated to mining.A United States Department of Labor administrative law judge (ALJ) heard the case. The parties stipulated to the miner’s work history, and the company was named the responsible operator. The ALJ found the miner’s experts’ opinions more persuasive, particularly because they addressed the regulatory definitions and considered the possibility that coal dust exposure worsened his condition. The ALJ concluded the miner had legal pneumoconiosis arising from his coal mine employment, was totally disabled, and that pneumoconiosis substantially contributed to his disability. The company’s experts were found less persuasive for not adequately addressing the regulatory definition or the potential contribution of coal dust. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed the ALJ’s decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported all findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the company’s petition. The court held that the ALJ and BRB did not err in their factual findings or legal analysis. It found sufficient evidence that the miner had legal pneumoconiosis caused by coal mine employment and that the disease substantially contributed to his total disability. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, affirming the award of black lung benefits to the miner. View "Central Appalachian Coal Company v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Police in Montgomery County, Maryland, responded to a high-priority call reporting that a Black male had placed three children into the trunk of a black Tesla, possibly indicating a kidnapping. Officers quickly traced the vehicle and address to Fareed Hayat. Upon arriving at his home, they found Hayat and his wife on the porch and initiated questioning. Hayat acted evasively, did not answer whether he had been at the location in question, cut off his wife’s conversation with officers, and attempted to retreat into his house, insisting the police could not enter. The officers prevented him from closing the door, entered the front hall, handcuffed Hayat, and checked on the children’s welfare. After confirming no kidnapping had occurred, the officers released Hayat.Hayat subsequently filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the officers, the Chief of Police, and Montgomery County. He alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed most claims and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, finding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop prior to Hayat’s retreat into his home. The court also held that the officers were justified in entering the home to complete the stop and to confirm the children’s welfare, given the exigency created by Hayat’s conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop based on corroborated eyewitness accounts and Hayat’s suspicious behavior. The court further held that entry into the home was justified to complete the Terry stop and to ensure the safety of the children, under both the exigent circumstances and “hot pursuit” exceptions to the warrant requirement. The court concluded that Hayat’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Hayat v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Two South Korean citizens, Dr. Sung-Chul Jung and Ms. Hyo Jung Kim, were passengers in a Virginia taxicab driven by Amoah Gyimah when it collided head-on with a Volkswagen on the George Washington Memorial Parkway. The crash killed Gyimah and Kim and severely injured Jung. Both Jung and the Volkswagen driver, Eric Jewett, were left with no memory of the event. No witness could identify which car crossed the center line. The United States Park Police concluded Jewett was at fault, but Jung and Kim’s estate nonetheless sued Gyimah’s estate for negligence and also sued Fairfax Taxi, the company under whose certificate Gyimah operated, on several theories of derivative liability.Initially, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. That court dismissed some claims and denied others, finding, among other things, that operating a taxi was not an activity posing an unreasonable risk, and thus not a non-delegable duty. Plaintiffs then nonsuited and refiled in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which granted judgment on the pleadings for Fairfax Taxi and later excluded plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert for procedural and evidentiary deficiencies. The district court also granted summary judgment for Gyimah’s estate, holding the plaintiffs could not show, without resort to speculation, how or why the accident occurred, as Virginia law requires.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction, that exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert was within its discretion, and that summary judgment was warranted because plaintiffs had not produced sufficient evidence to show Gyimah’s negligence caused the crash. As a result, the derivative claims against Fairfax Taxi also failed. View "O'Connor v. Fairfax Taxi, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of registered voters in South Carolina, all under the age of sixty-five, challenged a provision of state law that restricts “no excuse” absentee-by-mail voting to voters sixty-five years of age or older. These plaintiffs argued that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against them on account of age, in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law at issue allows voters sixty-five and older to vote absentee by mail for any reason, while voters under sixty-five can only do so if they meet specific, narrow criteria such as disability, military service, or certain employment conflicts.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants—the South Carolina State Election Commission and related officials—on both constitutional claims. The district court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a violation of either the Twenty-Sixth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. This court held that the plaintiffs have standing and that South Carolina’s age-based absentee-by-mail voting scheme violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment because it abridges the right to vote on account of age by providing greater ballot access to older voters. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Equal Protection claim, as age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause and the plaintiffs did not challenge the law under rational basis or Anderson-Burdick scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, affirmed the Equal Protection ruling, and remanded the case for appropriate remedy. View "Grant v. Belangia" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by several houses of worship from Quaker, Sikh, and Cooperative Baptist Fellowship religious traditions to a new policy adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2025. This policy rescinded longstanding guidelines that limited immigration enforcement actions at or near houses of worship, replacing them with a directive that left the decision to conduct enforcement actions largely to the discretion of immigration officers without specific guidelines or required supervisory approval. The plaintiffs alleged that the new policy has already caused, and will continue to cause, a decline in attendance at their worship services and ministries, thereby impeding their ability to exercise their religion communally and to minister to immigrant communities.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering DHS to follow its prior 2021 guidelines that limited immigration enforcement at or near the plaintiffs’ houses of worship. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that they would suffer irreparable harm without interim relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had met the requirements for standing, including injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability, based on evidence of actual and likely future declines in attendance linked to the new policy. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim, as the new policy substantially burdened their religious exercise. The government’s arguments under strict scrutiny were found to be waived, as they were not properly raised below. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. View "Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves several married couples, each consisting of a U.S. citizen and a noncitizen spouse who is subject to a final order of removal. The noncitizen spouses are seeking lawful permanent residency through a process that requires them to first file a family-based petition, then seek special permission to reapply for admission, and finally apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver. The waiver, if granted, would allow the noncitizen to leave the country to complete consular processing without triggering a lengthy inadmissibility bar. Several noncitizen plaintiffs were arrested by ICE at their immigration interviews, causing others to avoid or delay their own interviews out of fear of arrest and removal.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of similarly situated couples and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court held that the government lacked authority to arrest or remove noncitizens during the provisional waiver process, finding this violated the relevant regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Due Process Clause. The court issued class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief, barring the government from interfering with plaintiffs’ participation in the waiver process through arrest or removal.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Fourth Circuit held that the relevant regulations do not bar the government from arresting or removing noncitizens during the provisional waiver process and that the plaintiffs do not have a protected interest in accessing the process without risk of removal. The court also found the factual record insufficient to support the alternative theory that the government uses the waiver process to target noncitizens for removal. Thus, the award of summary judgment to the plaintiffs was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Mullin" on Justia Law