Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While incarcerated at a North Carolina women’s correctional facility, the plaintiff learned she was pregnant and, due to her history of opioid use disorder, was prescribed medication for opioid withdrawal (MOUD) under a prison policy that restricted such treatment to pregnant inmates. When she went into labor, she was transported to the hospital and was shackled at various stages during labor, delivery, and her return to prison. After giving birth, the facility denied her further MOUD because she was no longer pregnant, instead providing a short course of alternative pain medication. She experienced significant withdrawal symptoms as a result. The plaintiff brought claims against various prison officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment for the shackling and for denial of MOUD, as well as disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding no constitutional violations and that qualified immunity protected the officials. It also concluded that the plaintiff was not discriminated against under federal disability law because the MOUD program was limited to pregnant inmates.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Fourth Circuit held that, as to certain officials, there was a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether shackling the plaintiff during labor and postpartum, without evidence of a security or flight risk, violated the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that the denial of MOUD following pregnancy, pursuant to a categorical policy, could constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, and that summary judgment was inappropriate for the medical officials involved. The court further vacated the lower court’s disposition of the plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, remanding for further proceedings. Summary judgment for other defendants was affirmed. View "Edwards v. Witherspoon" on Justia Law

Two individuals who had lived in the United States for many years after entering without inspection were detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in October 2025. Both were apprehended while living and working in the Washington, D.C. area, and had established significant ties to the community. Removal proceedings were initiated against them on the basis that they had entered the country without authorization. Following their detention, neither was given an opportunity for a bond hearing, a process that, prior to July 2025, would have typically been available to noncitizens in their circumstances unless they posed certain risks or had committed specific crimes—none of which applied to these individuals.After the Department of Justice adopted a new interpretation of the relevant immigration statute in July 2025, mandating detention for all noncitizens who entered without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), the individuals filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They argued that they were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that their continued detention violated due process. The district court agreed, granting habeas relief and ordering bond hearings under § 1226(a). During these hearings, immigration judges found neither individual posed a danger or flight risk, and both were released on bond. The government appealed, and the cases were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that § 1226, not § 1225, governs the detention of noncitizens who have been present in the United States for years, regardless of their manner of entry. The court concluded that the statutory text, structure, history, and longstanding interpretation all supported this reading, and that detaining such individuals without bond hearings raised significant constitutional concerns. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, requiring bond hearings for the petitioners. View "Lopez Garcia v. Guadian" on Justia Law

On New Year’s Day 2024, a Franklin County sheriff’s lieutenant attempted to stop a speeding Kia driven by Isaac Martinez-Chavez, who was a convicted felon. The vehicle accelerated, turned off its lights, and stopped in a yard. Upon approaching the car, the officer saw Martinez-Chavez reaching into the passenger area. After detaining him, officers found a sawed-off .22 rifle, a .22 revolver, and .22 caliber ammunition inside the vehicle. Martinez-Chavez claimed he was unaware of the firearms, presenting testimony from Olman Vallejos, who said he hid the guns without Martinez-Chavez’s knowledge. However, Vallejos’s credibility was severely undermined at trial.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia presided over the trial. Before trial, Martinez-Chavez requested an adverse-inference jury instruction because dispatch recordings of the arrest had been deleted in accordance with a routine records-retention policy. The district court denied this motion, finding no evidence of bad faith or willful conduct by the government and noting comparable evidence remained. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made two improper remarks, one referring to a witness as a “liar” and another appealing to the jury to convict for the sake of law enforcement. The court overruled defense objections but instructed the jury that statements by lawyers were not evidence and that law enforcement testimony was not to be given extra weight.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that although the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, they did not prejudice Martinez-Chavez’s right to a fair trial, given the overwhelming evidence against him and the curative jury instructions. The appellate court also found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the adverse-inference instruction, as there was no showing of willful destruction or governmental knowledge of the recordings’ relevance before their deletion. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Martinez-Chavez" on Justia Law

Richard Rund, a U.S. citizen and businessman, failed to report his interest in multiple foreign bank accounts over several years, specifically from 2003 to 2008, 2013, and 2014. He maintained accounts in his own name and in the names of various businesses and entities, including FOB Instruments Ltd., York Luen, and Far East Ventures Ltd. Despite knowing about his obligation to file annual FBARs (Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts), Rund omitted many accounts from his filings or failed to file altogether. He later participated in the IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program but was removed from it. Throughout the period, Rund experienced personal and health challenges, but continued to work with tax professionals.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the government’s civil suit to reduce IRS-assessed penalties to judgment after Rund did not pay the $2,915,633 assessed for his willful FBAR violations. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that Rund had a financial interest in the accounts, knew of his reporting requirements, and intentionally or recklessly disregarded them. The court also held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil FBAR penalties and, even if it did, the penalties were not excessive. Judgment was entered against Rund for the full penalty plus interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that Rund’s FBAR violations were willful as a matter of law under the civil recklessness standard set out in United States v. Horowitz, 978 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 2020). The court further held that the $2.9 million penalty did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause, as it was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of Rund’s willful, repeated violations. The judgment was affirmed. View "US v. Rund" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2019, a series of violent crimes occurred in Woodbridge, Virginia, involving multiple murders linked to members of the Sitios Locos Salvatrucha (STLS) clique of MS-13. After investigations, a group of defendants was indicted on charges including racketeering, violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR), murder, witness tampering, and drug-related offenses. Several defendants pled guilty and cooperated with authorities, while others, including three individuals central to this appeal, proceeded to trial. The prosecution relied heavily on testimony from a cooperating witness who described the structure of the gang and detailed the defendants’ involvement in four murders.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia severed the trial due to complexity, ultimately trying three defendants together. After closing arguments, the district court found one defendant’s closing argument improper and instructed the jury to disregard it entirely. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts for two defendants and on most counts for the third. The convicted defendants raised various challenges, including claims of improper jury instructions, limitations on cross-examination, alleged due process violations related to evidence preservation and witness deportation, and the propriety of certain special jury findings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the entire closing argument of one defendant was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, vacated the conviction as to that defendant, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of the other two defendants, finding that the curative instruction was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice and rejecting the remaining challenges to the trial court’s rulings. View "US v. Arevalo Arias" on Justia Law

The plaintiff applied for supplemental security income, asserting that a combination of physical and mental impairments, including obesity, blood clots, migraines, high blood pressure, agoraphobia, anxiety, and depression, rendered her unable to work. She had received special-education services in high school and subsequently attempted, but did not complete, a cosmetology program. Her anxiety and agoraphobia were managed with medication, and treatment records frequently noted normal mental status. In connection with her claim, she was evaluated by a psychological consultant who diagnosed agoraphobia and opined severe impairment in her ability to interact and tolerate work-related stress. State-agency consultants reviewed the record and found moderate or lesser limitations, concluding she could perform simple, repetitive tasks with limited social interaction.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied her claim following a hearing, finding she retained the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light, unskilled work, and relying on testimony from a vocational expert. The ALJ found the psychological consultant’s opinion less persuasive than those of the state-agency reviewers, and determined the plaintiff could stand and walk for more than four hours per workday. The ALJ identified jobs she could perform even with a four-hour standing and walking limitation. The Appeals Council denied review, and the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the Commissioner.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment under a deferential substantial-evidence standard. The court held that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, adequately explained her evaluation of medical opinions and educational findings, and that substantial evidence supported those conclusions. Any error in the standing-and-walking finding was deemed harmless because the occupations identified at step five accommodated a four-hour limitation. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Calhoun v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

A woman employed as a Sales Administrator at a global hygiene company in North Carolina was terminated after refusing to comply with her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The company had instituted a policy requiring all U.S. office and sales employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualified for an exemption. The employee, citing her religious beliefs, requested a religious accommodation to abstain from vaccination, and communicated her objections to the company’s Human Resources department. Her request was denied, with the company characterizing her reasons as secular and stating that granting an exemption would pose an undue hardship. After she confirmed she would not comply, her employment was terminated.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the employer on all claims. The court found that while the employee’s beliefs were sincere, they were not religious in nature, and did not “go to an essential part of a religious faith.” The court also found that the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981, holding that there were no valid comparators to support her claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the employee’s refusal to be vaccinated was plausibly connected to her religious beliefs and constituted an essential part of her faith within her own scheme of things, thus satisfying Title VII’s requirement that beliefs be “religious in nature.” The court reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment on the religious discrimination claim for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the race discrimination claim, finding the employer’s stated reason for denial was not pretext for racial discrimination. View "Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Four candidates for federal office challenged a Public Notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that interpreted federal law to require broadcasters to offer the lowest unit charge (LUC) advertising rates not only to candidates for public office but also to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members during pre-election periods. The candidates argued that this expanded interpretation unlawfully diluted their statutory right to LUC rates by extending it to entities whose spending cannot be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate under campaign finance law.Prior to seeking judicial review, the candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC, urging the Commission to set aside the Media Bureau’s Public Notice as a novel and unlawful interpretation of the LUC requirement. The Commission took no action on the application for several months, even as the relevant election period approached. The candidates then filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, seeking expedited consideration. While the case was pending, the FCC Chairman circulated a proposed order to the other commissioners to dismiss the candidates’ application as an improper vehicle for review, and the Media Bureau denied a similar reconsideration petition from another party, maintaining that the Public Notice merely reiterated existing guidance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the Public Notice was a final order of the Commission and that the Commission had constructively denied the candidates’ application by failing to act. On the merits, the court concluded that the LUC statute unambiguously limits the lowest unit charge to legally qualified candidates for public office and does not extend this benefit to political parties or joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members. The court granted the Petition for Review and set aside the FCC’s Public Notice as unlawful. View "Brown v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

After police responded to a theft report at a convenience store in Chesterfield County, Virginia, Markel Trevon Smith and another individual were detained. A search of their vehicle revealed four firearms, including a Glock pistol equipped with a device converting it into a machinegun. This Glock bore three serial numbers: two had been scratched, leaving only partial digits visible, while one serial number remained fully legible. The firearm was traced using the unaltered serial number.Smith was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Smith then pled guilty. At sentencing, the court adopted the Presentence Report’s recommendation to apply a four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i), which increases the offense level if any firearm has a serial number modified so that the original information is illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye. The district court reasoned that altering any serial number on the firearm warranted the enhancement, and sentenced Smith to 57 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction, holding that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to Smith, because machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in applying the serial number enhancement. The court held that the enhancement only applies where modifications render the firearm as a whole untraceable, which was not the case since one serial number remained fully legible. The appellate court therefore reversed the application of the enhancement, vacated Smith’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "US v. Smith" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated to the United States as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in North Carolina state court of two counts of common-law forgery and, in a separate proceeding, possession of marijuana. Years after serving her sentences, she was placed in removal proceedings when reentering the U.S. after a trip to Mexico. She conceded that her convictions made her inadmissible but sought a discretionary waiver that could allow her to remain in the country. While her removal case was pending, she successfully moved in state court to have her marijuana conviction vacated and the charge dismissed.The Immigration Judge denied her application for a waiver, concluding, among other things, that she could not show her marijuana offense involved 30 grams or less, did not prove extreme hardship, and was not entitled to relief as a matter of discretion. The judge did, however, grant her voluntary departure. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) independently determined that, under its established framework from Matter of Pickering, a conviction vacated for reasons other than substantive or procedural defect—such as to avoid immigration consequences—still counts for immigration purposes. The BIA found her vacated conviction still disqualified her from a waiver and denied her motion to remand for further proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), a person whose state conviction has been vacated and the charge dismissed is not an “alien convicted of” that offense for immigration purposes. The court rejected the BIA’s Pickering framework as inconsistent with the statute. The petition for review was granted in part regarding the vacated conviction but denied as to the challenge to voluntary departure regulations, which the court found reasonable. View "Piedra v. Blanche" on Justia Law