Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff alleging, inter alia, discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. According to the court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required Plaintiff to exhaust both the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and an additional remedy, particular to prison discrimination claims, administered by the Department of Justice’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was only required to exhaust the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff asserted in the alternative that the Department of Justice remedies were not “available” to him.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PLRA’s exhaustion provision is plain. It requires prisoners to utilize all “available” administrative remedies. For Rehabilitation Act claimants, these remedies include both the BOP’s ARP and a separate EEO process administered by the DOJ. Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies despite them being “available” to him under the PLRA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice to his ability to exhaust the EEO remedies “available” to him within the meaning of the PLRA. View "Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (‘‘MVP’’) submitted an application requesting both a Virginia Water Protection individual permit (“VWP Permit”) from Virginia’s Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) and the State Water Control Board (the “Board”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) and a certification from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to build a pipeline. After an extensive review of MVP’s application, the Board adopted DEQ’s recommendation to approve MVP’s application. Petitioners filed this action against the Agencies and several individuals associated with the Agencies (collectively, “Respondents”), asking the court to review the Agencies’ decision.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that Agencies’ decision to grant MVP’s application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court explained that Petitioners’ argument that the Agencies failed to consider whether the Pipeline will comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard is belied by the record. DEQ addressed this issue in its responses to the public comments, in which it listed a host of conditions that it placed on the VWP Permit to “ensure that Virginia’s water quality is protected both during and after construction.” The court further explained that the DEQ described the indicators it uses to measure water quality, which Petitioners have not challenged. Accordingly, the court found it is clear from the record that DEQ considered a variety of factors in determining that the construction and operation of the Pipeline would comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard. View "Sierra Club v. State Water Control Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a now-retired Special Agent with the United States Secret Service, filed a civil suit against two United States Park Police officers (“officers”) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff asserted that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing him during two traffic stops. A jury found the officers liable for Plaintiff’s emotional injuries resulting from the constitutional violations and awarded him a total of $205,000 in compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages. The district court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and later denied the officers’ post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff presented a cognizable Bivens claim because his claim is not meaningfully different from the claim asserted in Bivens. Both cases involved allegations of unjustified, warrantless seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment committed by federal “line” officers conducting routine police work. Also, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. They violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by significantly prolonging the initial stop without justification and by initiating a second, unjustified stop. This constitutional right to be free from such unlawful seizures was clearly established at the time the seizures occurred. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional injury to support the compensatory damage award, and the punitive damages award was not excessive. View "Nathaniel Hicks v. Gerald Ferreyra" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it chose to retain his original sentence despite reducing his Guidelines range to account for his erroneous designation as a career offender.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the First Step Act does not permit a district court to recalculate a defendant’s benchmark Guidelines range “in any way other than to reflect the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2402 n.6 (2022). Arguments based on other changes in law must be considered after determining the benchmark Guidelines range that will “anchor” the proceeding. Here, the Fair Sentencing Act did not affect Defendant’s original Guidelines range. The district court considered Defendant’s arguments and provided an adequate explanation for retaining his original sentence. The court explained that given that starting point, the district court’s retention of his original sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "US v. David Troy, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two firearm possession offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). In determining Defendant’s sentence, the trial court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentence enhancement, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1), based on Defendant’s prior state felony convictions. Defendant moved to vacate and correct his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2255, challenging the sentencing court’s application of the ACCA enhancement. After concluding that Defendant’s three Virginia robbery convictions qualified as predicate “violent felonies” under Section 924(e), the district court denied his motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that while Defendant’s appeal of that decision was pending, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia common-law robbery is not a violent felony for purposes of Section 924(e). Thus, the court concluded that White controls this case and precludes Defendant’s robbery convictions from qualifying as valid ACCA predicates. View "US v. Joseph Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, as well as one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. At sentencing, the district court deemed these offenses “controlled substance offense[s]” under Sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2—the career offender provisions—of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also had past convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 846 and assault. The district court considered the former to be a controlled substance offense and the latter to be a crime of violence under the career offender provisions. The district court applied the career offender enhancement to his sentence. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, he moved for a new trial based on newly discovered. The district court granted the motion, and the government appealed. On remand, the government moved to reinstate the judgment of conviction and Defendant’s sentence, to which Defendant’s counsel consented. Defendant now argues that, on remand, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to make this objection. This failure resulted in prejudice to Defendant, whose 16-year sentence far exceeded the high end of what the Guidelines range would have been without the career offender enhancement. View "US v. Germaine Cannady" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United Stated without authorization in 2004. He was then convicted of malicious wounding in Virginia and was deported back to El Salvador. Defendant later re-entered the United States before being convicted of another crime in 2020. He was indicted for illegal entry. moved to dismiss that indictment, arguing that the five year statute of limitations on his prosecution had run and that his crime of malicious wounding was not a deportable offense. The district court rejected Defendant's claims.On appeal, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's collateral attack of his removal order, finding that Defendant entered the United States without authorization, committed a deportable offense, re-entered again illegally, and then committed another crime. The court explained that Defendant's "case falls right at the heart of what Congress sought to criminalize and the executive branch seeks to stop with the illegal reentry statute of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326." View "US v. Omar Alas" on Justia Law

The Town of Chapel Hill, North Carolina (the “Town”) requires housing developers seeking a special use permit to set aside a portion of their developments for low-income residents or pay a fee in lieu of that condition. In 2015, Epcon Homestead, LLC (“Epcon”)  initiated its purchase of property subject to the fee-in-lieu. Epcon paid the requisite fee installments, commenced the development project, and sold each parcel. After Epcon satisfied its final fee installment in March 2019, it brought this lawsuit under a state cause of action to recover the whole sum it had paid to the Town and alleged federal takings and due process violations. The district court dismissed the case under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Epcon promptly appealed, asking this Court to hold that the statute of limitations on Epcon’s federal claims began instead when it paid the fee installments.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Epcon’s federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations because it bought the property subject to the special use condition more than three years before it finally filed this lawsuit. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Epcon’s state-law claims. The court explained that the fact that the special use permit did not require and simply permitted Epcon to develop the land for the use described in the application is hardly noteworthy—permitting a particular use is an essential feature of any permit. Thus, when Epcon learned of the special use permit condition on its recently acquired land, its takings claim became actionable. View "Epcon Homestead, LLC v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, raising constitutional challenges to his death sentence in South Carolina state court. In 2021, the Fourth Circuit held that Defendant’s death sentence was constitutionally defective because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied in part on evidence from an evidentiary hearing a magistrate judge conducted during federal habeas proceedings. Both Defendant and the State of South Carolina (“the State”) asked the court to consider that evidence when evaluating Defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the State’s petition for certiorari, vacated the court’s 2021 judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).   The Fourth Circuit reaffirm its prior decision, holding that Defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court directed the district court to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the State grants Defendant a new sentencing hearing within a reasonable time. The court vacated and remanded the district court’s order dismissing Defendant’s habeas petition. The court explained that nothing in Shinn requires the court to excuse the State’s forfeiture here. Here, the State abandoned the Section 2254(e)(2) argument as soon as the magistrate judge recommended denying Defendant relief on the merits and actually relied on the new evidence when arguing that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. This “suggests that the State ‘strategically’ withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it.” View "Sammie Stokes v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The sentencing court later agreed to transfer Defendant’s supervision to South Carolina so long as he consented to new conditions. When the probation officer told Defendant’s treatment provider, the provider responded that Cohen’s behavior violated the program’s pornography rules and would be raised at an upcoming group therapy session. The district court directed probation to issue a warrant for Defendant’s arrest for violating the terms of his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted trading photos of his erect penis for pictures of undressed women during sexually explicit conversations but argued his behavior did not violate his supervised release conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s release. The district court sentenced Defendant to time served followed by lifetime supervision, during which he would be subject to various special conditions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release and the imposition of lifetime supervision. The court vacated the first clause of special condition eleven and remanded for entry of a modified judgment striking that clause. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that because the district court identified no other basis for concluding Defendant violated the participation condition, its determination on that point was legally erroneous. View "US v. Marshall Cohen" on Justia Law