Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Eugene Brunson, an inmate in North Carolina, filed a § 1983 action against the North Carolina Attorney General and other state officials, seeking various forms of relief. Brunson acknowledged that he had previously filed four § 1983 suits that were dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, which bars federal courts from entertaining § 1983 suits for damages that would undermine the legality of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated. Despite these dismissals, Brunson moved to proceed in forma pauperis.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially granted Brunson’s request to proceed in forma pauperis but later vacated that order, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) three-strikes rule. The district court determined that Brunson’s prior dismissals under Heck counted as strikes for failure to state a claim. Consequently, Brunson prepaid the filing fee, but his § 1983 complaint was eventually dismissed for reasons not relevant to the current appeal. Brunson then appealed and applied to proceed on appeal without prepaying fees, arguing that Heck dismissals should not count as PLRA strikes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case to determine whether a dismissal under Heck constitutes a strike under the PLRA. The court held that a Heck dismissal is necessarily for failure to state a claim because it denies the existence of a cause of action unless the plaintiff can prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Therefore, such dismissals count as strikes under the PLRA. As Brunson had at least three prior Heck dismissals, the court denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. View "Brunson v. Stein" on Justia Law

In April 2024, Russell Richardson Vane, IV, was arrested and charged with attempting to produce a biological agent or toxin, specifically ricin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a). The FBI found castor beans and equipment for producing ricin in his home. Vane had previously been involved with a militia group, the Virginia Kekoas, and had shared information on making explosives. The group expelled him, suspecting entrapment, and reported him to the FBI. Vane was detained pending trial based on the government's evidence, including proffered information.A magistrate judge granted the government's motion for pretrial detention, and the district court affirmed this decision. Vane argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) only allows the defendant, not the government, to introduce information by proffer. The district court disagreed, noting that other circuit courts have allowed the government to use proffers in detention hearings. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the proffered evidence, justified Vane's detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 does not prohibit the government from making evidentiary proffers during detention hearings. The court emphasized that the statute's text and context support allowing both parties to present information by proffer, promoting efficiency in detention proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order, concluding that the government met its burden to justify Vane's pretrial detention. View "US v. Vane" on Justia Law

Marco Fernandez applied to rent an apartment, and RentGrow, Inc. provided a tenant screening report to the property owner. The report inaccurately indicated that Fernandez had a "possible match" with a name on the OFAC list, which includes individuals involved in serious crimes. However, the property manager did not understand or consider this information when deciding on Fernandez's application. Fernandez sued RentGrow, alleging that the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by not ensuring the accuracy of the OFAC information.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of individuals who had similar misleading OFAC information in their reports. The court rejected RentGrow's argument that Fernandez and the class lacked standing because they did not demonstrate a concrete injury. The district court held that the dissemination of the misleading report itself was sufficient to establish a concrete injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The appellate court held that reputational harm can be a concrete injury, but only if the misleading information was read and understood by a third party. In this case, there was no evidence that anyone at the property management company read or understood the OFAC information in Fernandez's report. Therefore, Fernandez failed to demonstrate a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fernandez v. RentGrow, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Makel Elboghdady, who was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (e). The conviction stemmed from an undercover operation where a West Virginia State Police officer posted an ad on Craigslist to attract child predators. Elboghdady responded to the ad and engaged in a series of communications with the undercover officer, which led to his travel from Ohio to West Virginia for a face-to-face meeting. Upon arrival, he was arrested and charged.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Elboghdady was denied an entrapment defense and subsequently convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment, applying an enhancement and cross-reference for crimes involving a victim under the age of 12. Elboghdady appealed, arguing that he was entitled to an entrapment defense and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the entrapment defense, finding no evidence of government overreach or inducement. However, the appellate court vacated Elboghdady’s sentence, determining that the district court improperly applied sentencing enhancements that required evidence of intent to engage with a minor under 12 years old. The appellate court found that the district court’s factual findings did not support the application of these enhancements. Consequently, the case was remanded for resentencing without the improper enhancements. View "United States v. Elboghdady" on Justia Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition. View "Lumumba v. Kiser" on Justia Law

Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of preferred stockholders in Cedar Realty Trust, sued Cedar and its directors, alleging that a series of transactions culminating in Cedar's acquisition by Wheeler Properties devalued their preferred shares. Cedar delisted its common stock and paid common stockholders, but the preferred stock remained outstanding and its value dropped significantly. Plaintiffs claimed Cedar and its directors breached contractual and fiduciary duties by structuring the transactions to deprive them of their preferential rights. They also alleged Wheeler tortiously interfered with their contractual rights and aided Cedar's breach of fiduciary duties.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the complaint. It found that the transactions did not trigger the preferred stockholders' conversion rights under the Articles Supplementary because Wheeler's stock remained publicly traded. The court also ruled that Maryland law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, the court held that the fiduciary duty claims were duplicative of the breach of contract claims, as the rights of preferred stockholders are defined by contract. Consequently, the claims against Wheeler failed because they depended on the existence of underlying breaches of contract and fiduciary duty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the transactions did not constitute a "Change of Control" under the Articles Supplementary, as Wheeler's stock remained publicly traded. The court also agreed that Maryland law does not support an independent claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore, the court found that the fiduciary duty claims were properly dismissed because the directors' duties to preferred stockholders are limited to the contractual terms. Finally, the claims against Wheeler were dismissed due to the absence of underlying breaches by Cedar and its directors. View "Kim v. Cedar Realty Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

Tonya Anderson was terminated from her position at Diamondback Investment Group, LLC after failing two drug tests. She filed a lawsuit against Diamondback, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a violation of North Carolina law that prohibits discrimination against employees for using lawful hemp-derived products containing THC during nonworking hours.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of Diamondback on all claims. The court found that Anderson failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that she was disabled under the ADA. Even if she had, the court concluded that Diamondback had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination—failing drug tests. The court also found that Anderson did not request a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Regarding the state law claim, the court determined that Diamondback’s drug policy was a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably related to its employment activities, thus falling under an exception to the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Anderson did not provide adequate evidence to show she was disabled under the ADA or that she requested an accommodation. The court also upheld the district court’s finding that Diamondback’s drug policy was a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably related to its employment activities, which justified the restriction on Anderson’s use of hemp-derived products. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Diamondback on all claims. View "Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC" on Justia Law

G.M., a second-grade student with dyslexia and ADHD, was deemed ineligible for special education by Howard County Public Schools (HCPS) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). His parents, disagreeing with this determination, pursued the IDEA’s dispute resolution process, which included a state administrative hearing. The administrative law judge (ALJ) sided with HCPS, leading G.M.’s parents to file a lawsuit in federal district court. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision, prompting an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The ALJ conducted a six-day hearing, considering evidence from both sides. G.M.’s parents presented private evaluations indicating deficiencies in reading and writing, while HCPS provided assessments showing average performance. The ALJ found HCPS’s evidence more persuasive, concluding that G.M. did not exhibit a pattern of strengths and weaknesses necessary to qualify as having a specific learning disability (SLD) under the IDEA. The ALJ also determined that although G.M. had an other health impairment (OHI) due to ADHD, he did not need special education because he was performing adequately relative to grade-level standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the ALJ’s factual findings and credibility determinations were regularly made and thus entitled to deference. The court agreed that G.M. did not qualify as a “child with a disability” under the IDEA because he did not exhibit the necessary pattern of strengths and weaknesses in reading and writing, and his ADHD did not necessitate special education. The court also found that G.M. received a free appropriate public education (FAPE) without special education services, as he was achieving passing marks and advancing from grade to grade. Consequently, HCPS did not substantively violate the IDEA, and G.M. was not entitled to the requested relief. View "G.M. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The case involves Izzat and Tarik Freitekh, who were convicted of various offenses related to a fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan scheme. They received $1.75 million in PPP loan funds through false representations and fabricated documents. Izzat owned several businesses, and with Tarik's help, they submitted fraudulent loan applications. The funds were deposited into accounts controlled by Izzat, and he distributed some of the money to family members under the guise of payroll.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. Both defendants were indicted for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and other related charges. During the trial, the court admitted testimony from their former attorneys, who had received and submitted falsified documents to the government. The jury found Izzat guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and making false statements, while Tarik was found guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and falsifying material facts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including emails and checks, was enough to prove Izzat's involvement in the money laundering conspiracy. The court also upheld the district court's reliance on acquitted conduct to calculate the sentencing enhancements, noting that the evidence presented at trial proved Izzat's participation in the fraudulent scheme by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found no error in the district court's application of the "intended loss" definition in the sentencing guidelines. Tarik's arguments regarding the calculation of the loss amount and the application of the sophisticated means enhancement were also rejected. The court concluded that the district court had properly considered the relevant sentencing factors and affirmed the sentences imposed. View "United States v. Freitekh" on Justia Law