Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maryland enacted legislation regulating how retail electricity suppliers may market “green power” to consumers, seeking to address concerns that consumers were misled by claims about renewable energy. The statute prohibits suppliers from using terms such as “clean,” “green,” or “100% renewable” unless at least 51% of the energy is backed by renewable energy credits (RECs) from within a specific regional grid (the PJM region). Additionally, suppliers are required to include disclosures explaining the nature of RECs and their relationship to renewable electricity, with the exact disclosure language later specified by the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC).Retail Energy Advancement League and Green Mountain Energy Company brought a facial First Amendment challenge against these provisions and sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court denied the injunction, applying intermediate scrutiny to the speech restriction and concluding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits. The court also found that the statute’s disclosure requirements likely survived constitutional review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success in showing the speech restriction was unconstitutional even under intermediate scrutiny, because the restriction did not materially advance Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing consumer deception and was not adequately tailored. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the speech restriction and ordered an injunction against enforcement of that provision. However, regarding the compelled disclosure requirement, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to review the constitutionality of the new PSC-promulgated disclosure language in the first instance. View "Retail Energy Advancement League v. Brown" on Justia Law

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Two children from the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska were forcibly taken from their homes in the late 1800s and placed in a federal Indian boarding school on a United States Army base. Both died at the school, allegedly because of abusive conditions, and were buried on the grounds without the consent of their families or the tribe, contrary to their tribal and religious customs. Decades later, the Army relocated the remains, along with others, to the Carlisle Barracks Post Cemetery, again without consent. The Winnebago Tribe sought the return of the boys’ remains for proper reburial, invoking the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Tribe’s action for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement only applies to Native American remains that are part of a federal agency’s or museum’s “holdings or collections,” and concluded that remains interred in a cemetery do not qualify. The court found that the relevant statutory and regulatory language, as well as the legislative history, supported this interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s interpretation. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the ordinary meaning of “holdings or collections,” as well as the applicable statutory context and regulatory definitions, the remains of the two boys, purposefully accumulated and held by the Army in the cemetery, are covered by NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement. The court emphasized that its holding does not extend to consensually buried remains or require agencies to inventory unknown remains. The judgment of the district court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Jonathan Lewis was injured when he slipped and fell on a painted line in the parking lot of a convenience store in South Carolina. The fall occurred after a store employee had cleaned the area using water and a powdered concrete cleaner, but no warning signs, cones, or safety vests were present, despite company policy. Lewis injured his right leg, undergoing surgery and incurring significant medical expenses. He had a prior history of injury to the same tendon, but the circumstances of the fall were undisputed: he slipped immediately after stepping on the wet surface as he exited the store.Lewis filed a premises liability suit against the store, alleging negligence in failing to warn about or remedy the hazardous condition. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the store. It held: first, that the wet and cleaned surface was an “open and obvious” hazard, removing the store’s duty to warn; second, that there was no evidence the store could have foreseen the specific risk; and third, that Lewis failed to offer expert testimony establishing causation for his injury. The district court also denied Lewis’s Daubert and spoliation motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether the hazard was “open and obvious” and whether expert testimony was required to establish causation. The court vacated the district court’s Daubert and spoliation rulings, remanding for further proceedings. The main holding is that, under South Carolina law, questions of breach and causation in slip-and-fall cases with these facts are for the jury, and expert testimony is not always required for causation in such cases. View "Lewis v. Circle K Stores Inc." on Justia Law

A Virginia college student applied for a state tuition grant program that provides financial assistance to residents attending accredited private, nonprofit colleges in Virginia. The program disqualifies students whose primary major falls under “religious training or theological education,” as classified by certain federal instructional codes. After enrolling at Liberty University as a Music Education major and being notified of her eligibility for the grant, she changed her major first to “Youth Ministries” and later to “Music & Worship”—both considered religious vocational programs under the state’s rules. As a result, she was found ineligible for the grant for two academic years.The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the grant program’s exclusion of her religious vocational major violated her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The defendant, the director of the state higher education council, moved to dismiss, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey directly controlled and foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed, finding her situation essentially identical to the plaintiff’s in Locke, and concluded that subsequent Supreme Court decisions—Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin—had not overruled Locke. The court dismissed her claim with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Locke v. Davey remains binding precedent, and that the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions reaffirmed rather than abrogated it. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of the grant program’s exclusion of religious vocational majors. View "Hall v. Fleming" on Justia Law

AAC, a company that finances motorcycle purchases and holds security interests in the vehicles, acquired installment contracts for two motorcycles owned by individuals involved in a criminal case. After one owner, Brock, was killed during a gang shootout, and the other, Andrzejewski, was arrested and charged in connection with the incident, the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department seized both motorcycles as evidence. AAC was not notified of the seizures or the motorcycles’ location and learned about the events through news reports. AAC contacted the Sheriff’s Department seeking information and access to the motorcycles but was told that the vehicles would not be returned until the criminal proceedings concluded.AAC initially filed claim and delivery actions in the Lexington County Circuit Court, but the court dismissed these actions for improper service, noting it would not order release of evidence during a pending murder case. AAC then brought suit in the Lexington County Court of Common Pleas under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging procedural due process violations. The Sheriff’s Department removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which dismissed AAC’s federal claim, holding that the seizure was lawful and that AAC’s property interests must yield to the state’s duty to preserve evidence for criminal proceedings. The district court remanded the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that when property is seized in connection with a criminal investigation, the Fourth Amendment defines the process that is due, and compliance with its requirements satisfies procedural due process. The court found the seizures lawful and determined that no additional process was required for AAC as a lienholder. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "American Acceptance Corporation of SC v. Gietz" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in March 2021 for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a police encounter outside a convenience store. During the arrest, he resisted and threatened officers, and was found in possession of a loaded ghost gun and distributable amounts of fentanyl. He was charged with possession of ammunition as a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, ultimately pleading guilty to the ammunition charge. At sentencing, the court weighed the seriousness of his offense and history, including his mental health issues and young age, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 70 months' imprisonment.After sentencing, a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Amendment 821) reduced the impact of "status points," lowering the defendant's criminal history category and decreasing his advisory Guidelines range from 57-71 months to 51-63 months. In March 2024, he moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The government opposed, documenting three disciplinary violations by the defendant in prison, including threatening prison staff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the defendant eligible for a reduction but denied the motion, concluding that the relevant § 3553(a) factors and his disciplinary record weighed against a reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that a sentence reduction motion does not trigger a plenary resentencing or require a detailed explanation for retaining a sentence above the amended Guidelines range. The district court’s acknowledgment and consideration of relevant factors sufficed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion and that the presumption of judicial consideration was not rebutted. View "US v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment. View "US v. Mhana" on Justia Law

A woman sued a North Carolina town, alleging that a police officer employed by the town had sexually assaulted her while on duty. She claimed that the officer coerced her into sexual acts during visits to her home, sometimes in exchange for leniency regarding traffic violations. The officer had previously passed a background check, though some concerns were raised about his temperament and integrity, and a domestic violence complaint had been filed against him but was dismissed. The police department had no specific written policy prohibiting sexual misconduct, but did have general rules regarding officer conduct. During the officer’s employment, he was disciplined for minor infractions, but no complaints of sexual misconduct were received. The plaintiff reported the alleged assault more than a year after the officer resigned.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the town. The court found there was insufficient evidence to show that the town’s police department was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by its officers, or that any failure in its policies, training, or supervision caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The court also granted summary judgment on state law claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, concluding there was no evidence that the town knew or should have known that the officer was unfit for employment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by policymakers. The court also affirmed the dismissal of state law claims, finding no evidence that the town was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining the officer. View "Mullen v. Town of Sunset Beach" on Justia Law

A man born in Cote d’Ivoire to Liberian refugee parents entered the United States as a child but did not acquire lawful permanent resident status. After being convicted of certain crimes in Pennsylvania, he faced removal proceedings to Liberia, a country he had never visited and where he feared persecution due to his bisexual identity and lack of family connections. Throughout his removal proceedings, he was incarcerated and unrepresented, which limited his understanding of the legal process and his ability to submit evidence supporting his claims for relief, including asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.During his hearings, the Immigration Judge (IJ) provided confusing instructions about where to submit evidence, leading the petitioner to send supporting documents to the wrong court. He was not properly informed of his right to present witnesses and was not clearly instructed on the legal standards for his claims. The IJ denied all relief and ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) dismissed his appeal, holding that he had either waived certain claims or failed to meet legal requirements. The Board also denied his motions to reopen, finding them untimely and concluding that equitable tolling was unwarranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJs and the Board failed in their statutory duty to develop the record, especially given the petitioner’s pro se and detained status. The court found that the petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of guidance and opportunity to present evidence and witnesses and that procedural deficiencies amounted to a denial of a fundamentally fair hearing. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diahn v. Blanche" on Justia Law