Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's refusal to enforce a settlement agreement between plaintiff and his former employer, a government contractor, after plaintiff brought an action against his employer under the False Claims Act. At issue was whether the district court erred by not enforcing the settlement agreement, whether the district court made various errors during trial entitling plaintiff to a new trial, and whether the district court erred by awarding attorneys' fees to the employer. The court held that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement where the agreement died when the government rejected it and was not revived by a subsequent agreement between plaintiff and the government. The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial where the district court committed no reversible error during trial The court further held that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the employer where plaintiff's claims were not clearly frivolous.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, Virtual City Vision, Inc. ("VSV") and Van James Bond Tran ("Tran"), alleging federal, state, and common law claims when defendants' newportnews.com domain name was confusingly similar to plaintiff's Newport News registered trademarks and its newport-news.com domain name. VCV raised numerous issues on appeal: the magistrate judge's failure to recuse; the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Tran, the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") claim; the district court's denial of VCV's request to file a counterclaim; the district court's award of statutory damages and attorney's fees to plaintiff and sanctions against VCV's counsel; and the district court's finding that VCV was not the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the circumstances would not cause a reasonable observer to question his impartiality, the district court found sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil and exercise jurisdiction over Tran, and the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ACPA claim was proper. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying VCV's motion for leave to file a counterclaim. The court further held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that VCV's infringement was exceptional or abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, that VCV's attempt to profit from plaintiff's mark by creating a website focused on women's fashion was sufficiently egregious to merit the statutory damages award, that the award of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion, and that plaintiff's abandonment claim did not make VCV a prevailing party.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant was violating the Clean Air Act ("Act") by constructing a coal-fired power plant without a determination that the power plant would achieve a level of air pollution control that satisfied the Act's Maximum Achievable Control Technology provisions. At issue was whether the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs based on the merits of an order that granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The court held that attorneys' fees were properly awarded based on plaintiffs' success in the litigation where defendant was subject to state administrative proceedings as a consequence of plaintiffs' suit. The court also held that defendant's merits argument was irrelevant to the court's determination where plaintiffs achieved success supporting the fee award.

Defendant, while on federal supervised release, absconded and remained a fugitive for 13 years. After his apprehension, the district court found that defendant had committed multiple supervised release violations from the time he absconded until he was retaken and thus, revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to separate concurrent custody terms. At issue was whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the violations associated with the sentences where the sentences were not charged in a warrant or summons before the scheduled expiration of his supervised release term. The court affirmed the order of revocation and the concurrent sentences and held that defendant's supervised release terms were tolled during the 13 years he was a fugitive and it recommenced when the district court was able to exercise supervision over him. Therefore, because defendant had approximately three years remaining on his supervised release term, the court had the authority to revoke his supervised release for the violations set forth in the addenda.

Plaintiffs, a West Virginia coal sales company, sued Mountain State Carbon, LLC ("Mountain State")and its member companies, on of which was Severstal Wheeling, Inc. ("Severstal Wheeling") in federal district court alleging that Mountain State wrongfully refused to accept coal deliveries in breach of a coal supply agreement with plaintiffs. At issue was whether the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia for diversity jurisdiction purposes under Hertz Corp. v Friend. The court held that the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia where the touchstone for determining a corporation's principal place of business for diversity purposes was "the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Therefore, Dearborn, Michigan was Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business where seven of its eight officers, including its chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer, set corporate policies and oversaw significant corporate decisions out of Dearborn, Michigan.

Plaintiff, on her child's behalf, applied for survivorship benefits under the Social Security Act where the child was conceived by in vitro fertilization after the child's biological father, plaintiff's husband, passed away a number of years before the child was conceived. At issue was whether natural children, such as plaintiff's child, plainly fell within 42 U.S.C. 416(e)(1)'s basic definition of "child," and therefore making their intestacy rights irrelevant. The court held that the Social Security Administration's denial of survivorship benefits best reflected the statute's text, structure, and aim of providing primarily to those who unexpectedly lose a wage earner's support and that this view fell well within the range of permissible readings entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.

Defendant appealed two convictions related to the mailing of communications containing threats against various persons, including the President of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c). At issue was whether Counts Two and Seven of the seven-count indictment were fatally defective for failure to properly allege section 876(c) offenses, whether the evidence was sufficient to prove either offense, and whether both charges were constructively amended such that defendant was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. The court held that Count Two sufficiently alleged a violation of section 876(c) where the person or entity to whom the threatening communication was addressed was not an essential element of the offense and that Count Seven sufficiently alleged a violation of section 876(c) where it sufficiently alleged the Enhancement Element. The court also held that there was no defect in the proof of either offenses where the jury was entitled to find that the envelope was "addressed to" the Marshals Service, but that the "threat to injure" was "addressed to" the President and others. The court further held that the court's ruling on the propriety of the charges and the supporting evidence rendered defendant's contention, that the charges were constructively amended, as meritless.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant asserting six common law claims, individually and on behalf of a class of customers of the Parkersburg City Water Department, related to the contamination of their municipal water supply and the resulting presence of perflurooctanoic acid in their blood. At issue was whether plaintiffs demonstrated an injury sufficient to survive summary judgment on certain West Virgina common law tort claims. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in denying class certification. Further at issue was whether plaintiffs, who obtained voluntary dismissals in the district court of their individual claims for medical monitoring, have standing to pursue an appeal of the district court's denial of class certification of those claims. The court held that summary judgment was proper on all plaintiffs' traditional common law tort claims, namely, the claims of negligence, gross negligence, battery, trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance. The court also held that it did not need to address the separate matter of the district court's denial of class certification as these issues were now moot. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the district court's denial of plaintiffs' class certification regarding their medical monitoring claims.

Plaintiff appealed an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, each of whom was related to plaintiff's employer, where plaintiff alleged religious and speech-based discrimination claims, as well as retaliation claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's rights were violated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the First Amendment, and the equal protection clause where defendants did not promote plaintiff to the position of full professor. The court held that the district court properly determined that the record lacked evidence to support plaintiff's allegations of religious discrimination under Title VII. The court also held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claims and that the proper course was to remand these claims for further consideration under the second and third prong of the McVey v. Stacey test. The court further held that the district court properly determined that plaintiff's evidence created no issue of disputed fact that defendants' decision to deny his promotion was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination based on his religious beliefs or that he was treated differently from others with whom he was similarly situated.

Plaintiff sued defendants when defendants stopped reviewing the additional signatures that had been submitted for a referendum due to a pending legal challenge filed by a third party which was unrelated to defendants' signature validating methods. At issue was whether defendants denied plaintiff's rights to freely associate, petition the government, and vote; whether defendants had denied plaintiff due process and equal protection; and whether defendants had violated plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The court held that plaintiff's right to freely associate, petition the government, and vote were not violated where there was no fundamental right to initiate legislation by means of a referendum as there is a fundamental right to vote. The court also held that plaintiff was not denied due process or equal protection where the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's right to equal protection had not been denied upon a rational basis review and where defendants provided adequate notice to invalidate petitioner signatures and adequate opportunities for review of the invalidation of plaintiff's petition signature. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to state a claim for denial of any of plaintiff's constitutional rights was proper and therefore dismissal of his § 1983 was also proper.