Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment in which the district court found him guilty of four counts of aiding in the preparation of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At issue was whether the district court unlawfully based its verdict on the guilty pleas of co-defendants, which were not evidence in the case, thereby depriving defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; whether the district court improperly credited testimony by the government's key witness that defendant contended was false; and whether the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant knew that the tax returns he prepared were fraudulent and that he willfully violated section 7206(2). The court held that the district court's erroneous references to the unadmitted guilty pleas of his co-defendants constituted harmless error where the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that defendant deliberately avoided learning of materially false representations on the tax returns at issue. The court also held that the district court did not err in its consideration of a key witness' testimony where the the testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant purposefully "closed his eyes" to large accounting discrepancies, which strongly indicated that the tax forms he prepared during the years in question contained materially false financial information.

The government filed a complaint for forfeiture of the money claimant consolidated into a single bank account at Bank of America pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5317(2), 5324, after claimant made eight separate currency transactions at two banks and deposited a total of $79,650 in cash. At issue was whether the government was required to prove that claimant had actual knowledge of the banks' obligation to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000 to the government and whether the magistrate judge erred when it issued an order reducing the forfeiture amount on Eight Amendment grounds from $79,650 to $50,000. The court held that the totality of the circumstances, and in particular the compelling evidence of prior structuring activities, was more than sufficient to justify the court's findings in support of the section 5324 offenses. Therefore, the court rejected claimant's cross-appeal and affirmed the judgment that he committed the offense of currency structuring. The court vacated the order reducing the forfeiture judgment and remanded, holding that the magistrate judge's proportionality analysis was erroneously conducted where it predicated the proportionality analysis on an incorrect understanding that the authorized penalty was the advisory fine of $60,000 when the correct authorized penalty was the statutory maximum fine of $500,000.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base ("crack") under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)-(b). At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress, whether the disparities in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine offenses violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("FSA"), Pub.L.No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, should be applied to defendant. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress where, under the independent source doctrine, the police officers' search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The court also held that the disparities between crack and cocaine sentences contained in 21 U.S.C. 841 did not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses where defendant had not identified any subsequent controlling precedent compelling the conclusion that the court's prior decisions upholding the sentencing disparities have been overruled. The court further held that the FSA did not apply retroactively and rejected defendant's claim that he was entitled to resentencing where the FSA plainly would not be rendered effective if it applied only prospectively.

Defendants appealed convictions on charges stemming from a 2007 conspiracy and murder of a witness to prevent him from testifying against the first defendant in an upcoming state murder trial. Defendants challenged several evidentiary rulings by the district court. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that the first defendant shot a certain individual on the same street block where the witness was killed when, in light of the strong evidence that suggested that the first defendant planned the murder-for-hire against the witness, the court could say with "fair assurance" that the evidence of the individual's non-fatal shooting was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting and failing to give a curative instruction regarding the witness' girlfriend's testimony that she warned him that his involvement as a witness would get him killed where, even assuming that the district court committed plain error, the error did not affect the first defendant's substantial rights given the volume of evidence supporting his convictions. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the government to call a certain rebuttal witness where, considering the overwhelming evidence of the second defendant's direct involvement in the plot to murder the witness, the testimony played no role in the outcome. The court finally held that the district court's denial of the second defendant's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements on involuntariness grounds did not violate his constitutional rights where there was no coercion.

Appellee, as personal representative for her son's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against a tugboat owner, appellant, and sought contribution from the United States as co-tortfeasor, when her son was killed during a Navy training exercise where his rigid-hull inflatable boat collided with the tug boat when it was pushing an eight-barge flotilla up the James River. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that appellant was negligent for failing to post a proper lookout on the night of the accident and whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's third-party claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court declined to disturb the district court's findings as to liability for the collision and apportionment of fault where the district court understood and properly applied the appropriate legal standard pursuant to Inland Navigation Rule 5 and where appellant's additional arguments were unavailing. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the government's motion to dismiss appellant's third-party claim where the district court found that the Feres-Stencel Aero doctrine applied to appellant's action and barred its attempt to obtain contribution from the United States for damages when the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.

The Secretary of the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") petitioned the district court to enforce administrative document subpoenas after a DOL investigation into the management of respondents (collectively, "Funds"), which arose out of a $10.1 million loss of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1134(a)(1), plan assets, as a result of the Funds' investments in entities related to Bernard L. Madoff. At issue was whether the attorney-client and work product privileges protected some of the materials requested by the Secretary from disclosure and whether the district court erred in applying the fiduciary exception to override these privileges. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the Secretary's petition and held that the fiduciary exception applied to the Funds' claims of attorney-client privilege and no good cause showing was required in the ERISA context. The court also held that the Funds have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate the applicability of the work product doctrine.

Defendant was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Defendant sought and was granted certiorari and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the court for reconsideration of defendant's United States v. Batson claim in light of the Court's intervening decision in Miller-El v. Dretke. The court remanded to the district court and the district court found that, even in light of the elucidation of Batson's principles in Miller-El, defendant had not met his burden of proving that the prosecution engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised peremptory strikes against five African-American members of the jury venire during jury selection for the sentencing phase in 2002. At issue was whether the district court's order denying relief of defendant's reconsidered Batson claim was proper. The court affirmed and held that there was no merit to defendant's contention that the district court committed prejudicial error in the manner in which it conducted the proceedings or in its findings of fact and legal conclusions on the merits of defendant's Batson claim.

Plaintiffs appealed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss their petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on grounds of abuse. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court erred in its finding that plaintiffs were able to pay their creditors based on the totality of the circumstances of their financial situation. The court affirmed and held that the evidence amply supported the bankruptcy court's findings of abuse where the court need not depend on the additional amount in Social Security benefits to determine that plaintiffs' excessive budge and unjustifiable expenses were an abuse of Chapter 7.