Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Volvo Group North America, LLC (Volvo) and the union representing workers at Volvo's New River Valley assembly plant (NRV). At issue was whether the CBA permitted Volvo to make unilateral changes to the health benefits of retirees from its NRV assembly plant after the agreement expired. The court held that Volvo was not permitted to make unilateral modifications to the retirees' health benefits after the expiration of the CBA unless it followed the mechanism agreed to by both parties in that agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court where Volvo could not employ that mechanism in this case.

Plaintiffs in these three cases prevailed in district court on their appeals from the Social Security Administration's denial of their claims for disability benefits, and then, as prevailing parties, filed motions under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), for "fees and other expenses." On appeal, plaintiffs contended that their attorney's retention of out-of-state attorneys for assistance in brief writing did not preclude reimbursement for their fees under the EAJA, nor did it violate the District of South Carolina's local rules, and therefore, they argued, there were no "special circumstances" to justify the out-of-state attorneys fees. The court held that even though the District of South Carolina appropriately regulated the practice of law in its court, the court concluded that the use of non-admitted lawyers for brief writing services did not present a "special circumstance" sufficient to deny a fee award as "unjust" under the EAJA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the fee applications.

West Virginia sued pharmaceutical manufacturers, claiming that the defendants artificially inflated the reimbursement values of certain drugs, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101, and a state statute prohibiting fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program. The complaint alleged that the defendants inflated the average wholesale price of certain drugs and caused the state to pay an artificially inflated amount of reimbursement for the drugs. One company agreed to pay West Virginia $850,000. After learning of the settlement in 2007, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services notified West Virginia of a disallowance in federal funding for the state’s Medicaid program for failure to credit the federal government its share of the settlement proceeds. The Appeals Board sustained the disallowance. The district court upheld the decision. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396b(d)(2)(A), authorizes a disallowance only when the state has recovered from a "provider."

In 2010, plaintiff's application for ballot placement as an independent candidate for Congress was denied due to his failure to comply with the state’s requirement that each petition signature be witnessed by a district resident. The district court dismissed a challenge to the requirement, relying in part on a 1985 Fourth Circuit case. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that its rationale in the earlier case has been superseded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The district court should determine whether the in-district witness requirement is justified by a state's desire to gauge the depth of a candidate's support. Plaintiff's supporters lack standing, but the plaintiff's challenge is not moot. There is a reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will be applied against the plaintiff again during future election cycles.

The trustee of a bankruptcy estate filed objections to the requested priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. 507 of a portion of severance compensation claims filed by the debtor's former employees (claimants). The bankruptcy court overruled the objections. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the claimants "earned" their severance compensation on the date they became participants in the debtor’s severance plan immediately after their termination from employment.

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine where he signed an acceptance of responsibility statement but declined to sign a plea agreement waiving certain rights to appellate review and collateral attack. Solely because defendant would not waive these rights, the government refused to move for an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's failure to compel the government to move for the U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) reduction. The court held that the government retained discretion to refuse to move for an additional one-level reduction, but only on the basis of an interest recognized by the guidelines itself. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, if the government could not provide a valid reason for refusing to move for an additional one-level enhancement reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) and continued to refuse to move for such a reduction, the district should order the government to file the motion.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of aggravated felony theft where she posed as a bail bondsman at a North Carolina jail and secured identifying information, cash, and the title of two properties from an octogenarian attempting to post bond for his granddaughter. At issue was whether an abuse-of-trust enhancement was properly applied to defendant's sentence where defendant contended that a bail bondsman did not occupy a position of public or private trust. The court held that the Guidelines simply required that a position of trust "significantly facilitate[] the commission or concealment of the offense." The court also held that, because it was undisputed that defendant gained initial access to the octogenarian's personal information by posing as a bail bondsman and later used this information to commit her wire-fraud offenses, that standard was clearly met here. Therefore, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in imposing the enhancement for abuse of trust. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned the court for review of the BIA's decision to deny his petition for cancellation of removal and his motion to reopen removal proceedings so that he could pursue cancellation of removal after an adjustment of status for which he had an application pending. The court held that, because petitioner raised no constitutional claims or questions of law, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal. The court also held that, because the BIA based its denial of petitioner's motion to reopen on a determination that he did not merit the discretionary relief of cancellation of removal, the court also lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.