Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The court held that the BIA's conclusion that petitioner's proposed social group of young Honduran males who refuse to join MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha gang), have notified the police of MS-13's harassment tactics, and have an identifiable tormentor within the gang did not qualify as a particular social group was not manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review with respect to the asylum and withholding of removal claims. However, the court granted the petition for review with respect to petitioner's CAT claim, vacating the BIA's final order, and remanding for further proceedings for additional investigation and explanation as the court had outlined. View "Zelaya v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this proceeding in the district court alleging that the Board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., by failing to reasonably accommodate her hearing disability. Plaintiff's complaint sought back pay, future pay, compensatory damages of $1,000,000, punitive damages of $1,000,000, plus attorney's fees and costs. The Board subsequently appealed the district court's partial rejection of the Board's assertion of immunity. The court held that the district court properly adhered to the Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert decision in ruling that the immunity provision effected a waiver of the Board's Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims of $100,000 or less. View "Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's County Public Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claiming that the administrator of the Principal Life policies had misconstrued the policies in calculating his predisability earnings and that, with a proper calculation, his predisability earnings were far greater. The district court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, entered judgment in favor of Principal Life. The court affirmed. Even though the court recognized that the policy language, defining those expenses that could be subtracted from gross income to arrive at predisability earnings, was somewhat confusing and, to be sure, needlessly verbose, the court concluded that the administrator's interpretation was a reasonable one. View "Fortier v. Principal Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants, a law firm and its attorney, alleging that they violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.c. 1692 et seq. At issue was whether defendants' Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted plaintiff's case. Also at issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that defendants' first offer, a payment of $250 in actual damages, and defendants' second offer, conditioning the amount of actual damages on the district court's determination, did not moot plaintiff's case. The court also held that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to allege violations of 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2), and 1692e(11). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A." on Justia Law

This case arose when Union entered into a limited job-preference agreement with Peabody Coal where the agreement included an arbitration clause. The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Union, ruling that the arbitrator properly determined the arbitrability of the dispute. In the alternative, the district court concluded that the dispute was arbitrable, even if the arbitrator lacked authority to decide the arbitrability question. Peabody Coal appealed. The court held, as an initial matter, that the court, not the arbitrator must decide whether the dispute was arbitrable. The parties' agreement lacked the requisite "clear and unmistakable" language evincing an intent to arbitrate arbitrability. Exercising the court's independent judgment on the arbitrability question, the court concluded that Peabody Coal had not rebutted the ordinary presumption in favor of arbitrability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the parties must proceed to arbitration. View "Peabody Holding Co. v. United Mine Workers of America" on Justia Law

After the negligence of government doctors in California caused significant and irreversible brain damage to J.C., his parents brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674, suit against the United States. This case returned to the court after remand to the district court. On remand, the district court held that it could not provide the government with a reversionary interest in the future care award that "would comply with" both the FTCA and California law. The United States appealed. Because granting the government a reversionary interest in J.C.'s future care award eliminated the potential for a windfall without in any way rendering the award less sufficient compensation for J.C., the court found such a remedy approximated Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 667.7 in a manner that was consistent with the FTCA. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to fashion such a remedy. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Cibula, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The government appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing its action to civilly commit respondent as a "sexually dangerous person" under 18 U.S.C. 4248. The district court held that the statute as applied to respondent violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and respondent cross-appealed. The court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the government's commitment action; the district court did not err in concluding that section 4248 was a civil statute and thus was not subject to the various constitutional safeguards placed on criminal proceedings; nor did it err in relying on this court's precedent that section 4248's requirement that proof of past conduct by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt" was appropriate; and circuit precedent also foreclosed respondent's argument that section 4248 could not be invoked because his criminal sentence included post-incarceration supervised release. However, the district court erred in finding that, as applied to respondent, section 4248 deprived him of equal protection and due process of law. The case was remanded for the district court to determine on the merits whether respondent met the section 4248 criteria. View "United States v. Timm" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the federal government's initiation of civil commitment proceedings against respondent via a certification that he was a "sexually dangerous person" under 18 U.S.C. 4248, enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Act). Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the government had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was sexually dangerous under the Act. The court held that the district court's application of the statutory standards to the evidence was not erroneous and its factual findings represented a permissible and reasonable interpretation of the evidence presented at the hearing. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that respondent was not sexually dangerous within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the government's commitment action. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of her application for supplemental security income (SSI). The court found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commissioner. View "Hancock v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibited a person who was subject to a domestic violence protection order issued under certain specified circumstances from, inter alia, possessing a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of scrutiny for defendant and similarly situated persons. The court held that section 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), as applied to defendant, satisfied the intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing his Second Amendment challenge to such a statute where the government had carried its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the substantial government objective of reducing domestic gun violence and keeping firearms out of the hands of persons who were currently subject to court order. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law