Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The government asserted that petitioner had participated in a tax avoidance scheme to take advantage of the lower taxes in the Virgin Islands. At issue was whether the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying the motion of the Virgin Islands to intervene in this case, which was filed in response to a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS to petitioner for not paying U.S. income taxes. Because Tax Court Rule 1(b) gave the Tax Court broad discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to follow Rule 24 governing intervention and because Rule 24 itself conferred broad discretion on a trial court, the court gave deference to the Tax Court's decision to deny intervention, reviewing for only a clear abuse of discretion. Because the Tax Court's concerns over the consequences of granting the Virgin Islands' motion to intervene were not unreasonable, the court found no clear abuse of the Tax Court's broad discretion. View "McHenry v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Rosetta Stone appealed from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Google for Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement, contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, and trademark dilution claims. Rosetta Stone also appealed from an order dismissing its unjust enrichment claim under Virginia Law. Rosetta Stone contended that Google's policies concerning the use of trademarks as keywords and in ad text created not only a likelihood of confusion but also actual confusion, as well as misleading Internet users in purchasing counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. The court affirmed the district court's order with respect to the vicarious infringement claim and the unjust enrichment claims. The court vacated, however, the district court's order with respect to Rosetta Stone's direct infringement claim after addressing the likelihood of confusion and the functionality doctrine; contributory infringement claim where the evidence recited by the district court was sufficient to establish a question of fact as to whether Google continued to supply its services to known infringers; and dilution claim where the district court erred by omitting the question of good faith and collapsing the fair-use defense into one question. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of providing, and conspiring to provide, material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization. For the third time, defendant challenged the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for a "federal crime of terrorism" under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4 (terrorism enhancement) and his resultant sentence of 180 months imprisonment. Having carefully reviewed and assessed the sentencing proceedings prompting this third appeal, the court was satisfied that the district court complied with its mandate that the district court make specific findings of facts that supported its application of the enhancement. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement, plus his other assertions of procedural error, and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Chandia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of stalking through the use of a facility of interstate commerce and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including the vagueness of the stalking statute and the length of his sentence. Accepting defendant's contentions, however, would undermine Congress' efforts to protect people like D.S. and R.S., the people defendant was stalking, from precisely the sort of terrifying conduct that took place in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Shrader" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of all claims alleged in a putative class action complaint filed pursuant to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725. Appellees (Lawyers) were South Carolina attorneys who in 2006 and 2007 instituted several "group action" lawsuits in South Carolina state court against numerous car dealerships under the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (Dealers Act), S.C. Code Ann. 56-15-10 et seq. Appellants (Buyers) were car buyers who received mailings from Lawyers regarding the Dealers Act litigation. Buyers sued Lawyers in this action alleging that Lawyers violated the DPPA when they obtained and used Buyers' personal information without their consent in connection with the Dealers Act litigation. The court held that the district court erred in its determination that the conduct of Lawyers did not constitute solicitation within the contemplation of the applicable DPPA prohibition. Nevertheless, the district court correctly ruled that Lawyers' conduct in respect to Buyers' personal information was undertaken in anticipation and in connection with litigation, a use permitted by the DPPA. View "Maracich v. Spear" on Justia Law