Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rosetta Stone appealed from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Google for Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement, contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, and trademark dilution claims. Rosetta Stone also appealed from an order dismissing its unjust enrichment claim under Virginia Law. Rosetta Stone contended that Google's policies concerning the use of trademarks as keywords and in ad text created not only a likelihood of confusion but also actual confusion, as well as misleading Internet users in purchasing counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. The court affirmed the district court's order with respect to the vicarious infringement claim and the unjust enrichment claims. The court vacated, however, the district court's order with respect to Rosetta Stone's direct infringement claim after addressing the likelihood of confusion and the functionality doctrine; contributory infringement claim where the evidence recited by the district court was sufficient to establish a question of fact as to whether Google continued to supply its services to known infringers; and dilution claim where the district court erred by omitting the question of good faith and collapsing the fair-use defense into one question. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of providing, and conspiring to provide, material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization. For the third time, defendant challenged the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for a "federal crime of terrorism" under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4 (terrorism enhancement) and his resultant sentence of 180 months imprisonment. Having carefully reviewed and assessed the sentencing proceedings prompting this third appeal, the court was satisfied that the district court complied with its mandate that the district court make specific findings of facts that supported its application of the enhancement. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement, plus his other assertions of procedural error, and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Chandia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of stalking through the use of a facility of interstate commerce and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including the vagueness of the stalking statute and the length of his sentence. Accepting defendant's contentions, however, would undermine Congress' efforts to protect people like D.S. and R.S., the people defendant was stalking, from precisely the sort of terrifying conduct that took place in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Shrader" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of all claims alleged in a putative class action complaint filed pursuant to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725. Appellees (Lawyers) were South Carolina attorneys who in 2006 and 2007 instituted several "group action" lawsuits in South Carolina state court against numerous car dealerships under the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (Dealers Act), S.C. Code Ann. 56-15-10 et seq. Appellants (Buyers) were car buyers who received mailings from Lawyers regarding the Dealers Act litigation. Buyers sued Lawyers in this action alleging that Lawyers violated the DPPA when they obtained and used Buyers' personal information without their consent in connection with the Dealers Act litigation. The court held that the district court erred in its determination that the conduct of Lawyers did not constitute solicitation within the contemplation of the applicable DPPA prohibition. Nevertheless, the district court correctly ruled that Lawyers' conduct in respect to Buyers' personal information was undertaken in anticipation and in connection with litigation, a use permitted by the DPPA. View "Maracich v. Spear" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's order granting final judgment to the United States upon equitable claims of payment by mistake of fact and unjust enrichment against Tuomey arising out of alleged violations of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn, (the Stark Law), and awarding damages plus pre- and post-judgment interest. Because the court concluded that the district court's judgment violated Tuomey's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Because the court was remanding the case, the court also addressed other issues raised on appeal that were likely to recur upon retrial. View "Drakeford v. Tuomey Healthcare System" on Justia Law

Based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony, the United States sought to remove him. The IJ denied petitioner's statutorily eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and the BIA affirmed, concluding that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident constituted an "admission" to the United States. Because the court found that the plain language of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), did not bar an alien who adjusted post-entry to lawful permanent resident status from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility, the court granted the petition, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Bracamontes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Former Louisiana congressman, William J. Jefferson (defendant), was convicted of eleven offenses - including conspiracy, wire fraud, bribery, money laundering, and racketeering - arising from his involvement in multiple bribery and fraud schemes. Defendant appealed his convictions on several grounds: (1) that an erroneous instruction was given to the jury with respect to the bribery statute's definition of an "official act"; (2) that another erroneous instruction was given with respect to the "quid pro quo" element of the bribery-related offenses; (3) that defendant's schemes to deprive citizens of honest services did not constitute federal crimes; and (4) that venue was improper on one of his wire fraud offenses. The court affirmed each of defendant's conviction except his Count 10 wire fraud conviction and sentence, which the court vacated and remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Jeremy Mayfield, a professional race car driver, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against NASCAR for conduct arising out of a positive drug test. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for defamation, violation of North Carolina's disability statute, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, and negligence, when one of the defendants, Brian France, held a press conference where he indicated that plaintiff had been suspended because he took a "performance enhancing" or "recreational" drug. The court found that the district court properly dismissed the case and there was no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motions to reconsider and to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mayfield v. NASCAR, et al." on Justia Law

Following the denial of its application for a conditional use permit to construct a wireless communication tower at an elementary school, T-Mobile filed suit in federal court, alleging that the denial violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) and (iv). The district court agreed and issued an injunction directing that T-Mobile's application be granted. Because the court also concluded that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence as required by the Act, the court affirmed the judgment. View "T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. City Council of Newport News" on Justia Law