Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an action alleging that his dismissal from medical school for unprofessional behavior violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical school and plaintiff appealed. Because the court agreed with the district court that, with or without a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff's ADHD and anxiety disorder, plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" to participate in the medical school's program, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that he was a seaman in the employ of defendants and that he had been injured in the course of his employment by their negligence. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated that (1) he was a seaman and (2) his injury occurred during the course of his employment as a seaman. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim where it generally had federal question jurisdiction over Jones Act claims and plaintiff's complaint in particular alleged a colorable Jones Act claim in that it was not "so substantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions . . . , or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

After defendant was indicted for two drug trafficking crimes, he filed a motion to suppress the cocaine discovered in and taken from a secret compartment in his vehicle, alleging that the search of the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion on the ground that the search exceeded the scope of defendant's consent. Because the court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards for determining whether law enforcement officers had consent to search defendant's vehicle and, in any event, whether they had probable cause to search it, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Franklin Insurance commenced this action against its insured, School Board, for a declaratory judgment that Franklin Insurance owed no duty to defend the School Board in an action commenced by the School Board employees for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), nor any duty to indemnify the School Board for any judgment that might be entered in the action. The court concluded that the failure to comply with FLSA was a wrongful act and that, while a judgment awarding unpaid wages would not be a covered loss under the policy because payment of those wages was a preexisting duty, any obligation to pay liquidated damages and attorneys' fees would cause the School Board a loss from a wrongful act, covered by the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin Insurance. View "Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the Agencies' execution of a tiered review process related to planning improvements to Virginia's Interstate 81 corridor. The district court rejected appellants' challenge which alleged various constitutional and statutory violations. On appeal, appellants claimed that the Agencies were attempting to foreclose consideration of environmentally friendly alternatives for specific sections of I-81 by choosing a corridor-wide improvement concept in the first stage of the review process. The court held, however, that appellants misapprehended the Agencies' position where the Agencies planned to comply with the Stipulation in this case and the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by considering site-specific alternatives to the corridor-wide concept in subsequent stages. Because there was no actual dispute here, and because appellants could not show any injury or imminent threat of injury, this suit was not justiciable. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Shenandoah Valley Network v. Capka, et al." on Justia Law

Wachovia appealed from the district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award entered against it after it sued several former employees on what the arbitrators determined were frivolous claims. Wachovia argued that the arbitrators violated section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(3), and "manifestly disregarded" the law when they awarded attorneys' fees and costs under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act (FCPA), S.C. Code Ann. 15-36-10. The court held that arbitrators have broad discretion to set applicable procedure and the court would not overturn an award for violating section 10(a)(3)'s protection against "any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" where the arbitrators attempted to address the one party's unhappiness with the fairness of the hearing and that party refused to take advantage of the opportunity provided. The court could not hold that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when they awarded the attorneys' fees and costs where, in this case, the court found whether the arbitrators erred by not applying the FCPA's procedural requirements was a question that was itself not clearly defined and was subject to debate. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, II" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the United States' effort to forfeit the assets of C.L.P., a cigarette manufacturer, following its guilty plea to several tobacco-related charges. The United States obtained a preliminary order of forfeiture allowing it to seize funds that C.L.P. had deposited into an escrow account, which held 35 sub-accounts for the benefit of each state in which C.L.P. sold its products. Two of those states, Oregon and Wisconsin, sought to amend the forfeiture order to exclude their respective sub-accounts from the forfeiture. Because the court concluded that the states have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that they have a legal interest that entitled them to amendment of the forfeiture order, the court vacated the forfeiture order and remanded. View "United States v. State of Oregon, et al." on Justia Law

BP appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Charles V. Stanley, Jr., and his business (defendants), in BP's action seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed. BP also appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. The court held that the district court erred in finding the Petroleum Restriction (PR), in the Special Warranty Deed that was attached to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) at issue, was overbroad and unenforceable where the PR did not prohibit Stanley from operating a non-BP-branded vehicle repair business on his property so long as the business did not also sell non-BP-branded gasoline. The court also concluded that the PR's prohibition of the sale of certain enumerated items was too inconsequential to invalidate the entire PR. Therefore, the PR on the whole "afford[s] a fair protection" to BP's interest without being "so large as to interfere with the interests of the public." Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, vacated the fee and cost award, remanding for further proceedings. View "BP Products North America, Inc. v. Stanley, Jr." on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy case, SunTrust filed a proof of claim for repayment of a loan that it claimed was secured by a deed of trust on two contiguous parcels of debtor's real property in Orange County, North Carolina (Tract I and Tract II). The Trustee commenced this action under 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(3) to avoid the lien on Tract I because the deed of trust, while recorded on the official recordation index of Orange County as to Tract II, was not so recorded as to Tract I. SunTrust contended that even though the recordation was deficient, the Trustee was imputed with constructive knowledge of the lien on Tract I. The bankruptcy court rejected SunTrust's arguments and ordered its lien on Tract I avoided under section 544(a)(3), and the district court affirmed. Because the Trustee's status vis-a-vis the title of Tract I was, under section 544(a)(3), that of a bona fide purchaser under North Carolina law, the Trustee was only imputed with the notice that would be imputed to a bona fide purchaser of Tract I under North Carolina law. And North Carolina law allowed a purchaser to rely exclusively on the official recordation index of the county to discover liens, regardless of what other independent knowledge that purchaser might have. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCormick v. Northen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., asserting that his inability to work more than eight hours per day and rotate day/night shifts as a result of physical impairments rendered him disabled under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that an inability to work overtime did not constitute a "substantial" limitation on a major life activity under the ADA and the record contained no evidence indicating that plaintiff's inability to work overtime "significantly restricted" his ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boitnott v. Corning Inc." on Justia Law