Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in January, 2013
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Defendant was convicted of two firearm offenses: (1) making a false statement that was material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6); and (2) making a false statement with respect to information required to be kept in the records of a licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A). On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, the court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because, by virtue of the bold-print warning on the ATF Form 4473, defendant was on notice that he was not the actual buyer of the handgun if he was purchasing it for someone else. The court also held that the district court did not err in declining to suppress the receipt concerning defendant's transaction with his uncle where the warrant at issue was supported by probable cause and the court rejected defendant's challenge to the scope of the search warrant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Abramski, Jr." on Justia Law

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The Town appealed the district court's invalidation of its municipal sign ordinance as it applied to a resident. Dissatisfied with the Town's efforts to resolve a dispute with the resident, the resident painted the words, "Screwed by the Town of Cary" across a fifteen foot swath of the facade of his home. The court acknowledged that the Town's Sign Ordinance, and in particular its application to the resident, has aggravated some town residents who believed that it was excessively restrictive. But their recourse lies with the ballot, not the Constitution. Because the Sign Ordinance had distinguished content for a constitutionally permissible purpose, the court held that it did not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Bowden v. Town of Cary" on Justia Law

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CFIF and WVFL are 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in election-related speech. These organizations and an individual brought suit alleging that West Virginia's campaign finance statutes were constitutionally impermissible. At issue was whether West Virginia's campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer requirements could survive constitutional scrutiny, West Virginia Code section 3-8-1 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decisions to (1) strike "newspaper, magazine or other periodical" from West Virginia's "electioneering communication" definition; (2) upheld the "electioneering communication" definition's exemption for grassroots lobbying; (3) declined to consider the merits of the CFIF's challenge to the bona fide news account exemption because the organization lacked standing; and (4) prohibited prosecutions for violations that occurred while the earlier injunctions were in effect. However, the court reversed the district court's decision with respect to (1) its conclusion that subsection (C) of the "expressly advocating" definition was unconstitutional; (2) its choice to uphold the "electioneering communication" definition's section 501(c)(3) exemption; and (3) its application of an "earmarked funds" limiting construction to the reporting requirement for electioneering communications. Because WVFL did not file a notice of appeal in this case, the court could not consider its challenge to the district court's finding that the statutory scheme's twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour reporting requirements were constitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of murder and various drug and firearm offenses in connection with a drug distribution conspiracy. On appeal, defendant argued that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause, upon which the district court relied in admitting the victim's statement, did not apply unless a criminal defendant's sole motivation in making a witness unavailable was to prevent that witness's testimony. The court held however, that so long as a defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applied even if the defendant also had other motivations for harming the witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm that was the basis of the conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the officer possessed a reasonable suspicion that defendant was trespassing at the time of the Terry stop. The court rejected defendant's argument that the officer's decision to stop him for investigatory purposes was unreasonable because other less intrusive investigatory techniques could have been used because the issue had already been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bumper" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, D.L. and his parents, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the BCBSC and Baltimore City Public Schools, contending that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, compelled BCBSC to provide D.L. education services related to certain disorders even though D.L. was enrolled exclusively in a private religious school. Because plaintiffs retained full discretion over school enrollment and because BCBSC has taken reasonable measures to fulfill its mission, the court found that BCBSC's policies placed no undue burden on plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Because the court did not read Section 504 to apply an affirmative obligation on school districts to provide services to private school students and because plaintiffs retained full educational discretion, the court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "D. L. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm." on Justia Law

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The Trustee for debtor TRM appealed the dismissal of his adversary action against real estate development companies, alleging that TRM and the development companies engaged in a scheme to sell properties at inflated prices in recently developed subdivisions in North Carolina and South Carolina. The court held that the development companies were potentially independently liable to TRM's purchasers because it participated in TRM's sales and marketing efforts. But, because TRM was not entitled to statutory contribution, the Trustee's action failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Total Realty Mgmt. LLC v. R. A. North Development, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought this civil enforcement action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that defendants, the Bank, and individual members of the Bank's Corporate Benefits Committee, engaged in prohibited transactions and breached their fiduciary duties by selecting and maintaining Bank-affiliated mutual funds in the investment menu for the Bank's 401(k) Plan and the Bank's separate but related Pension Plan (collectively, the Plans). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Pension Plan claims in the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' remaining claims were time-barred under the limitations period in 29 U.S.C. 1113(1)(A). Finally, the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice did not constitute an abuse of discretion where plaintiffs failed to file a motion to amend and had already amended their original complaint three times. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "David v. Alphin" on Justia Law

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Relator, a sales manager for Takeda, brought a qui tam action against his employer under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Takeda violated the Act by causing false claims to be presented to the government for payment under Medicare and other federal health insurance programs. The district court dismissed relator's claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the third amended complaint because relator failed to plausibly allege that any false claims had been presented to the government for payment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relator leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "US ex rel. Noah Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for her employer, the UPS, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that plaintiff presented no direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the UPS policy at issue, that did not provide light duty work to pregnant workers but did for certain other employees, treated pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike and therefore complied with the PDA. Plaintiff also failed to offer sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. UPS" on Justia Law