Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These habeas corpus proceedings on behalf of petitioner were before the court for the third time. Most recently, in 2012, the court affirmed the judgment entered in the Eastern District of Virginia vacating petitioner's 2002 state court convictions for capital murder and other crimes, and the court remanded for further proceedings, leaving in place the district court's remedial edict that petitioner be retried or released. In this appeal, respondent sought relief from the district court's Order Enforcing Judgment. The court concluded that the district court accurately determined that the Commonwealth neglected to timely observe the retry-or-release directive. Though the district court was correct to order petitioner's immediate release, it fashioned an overbroad remedy and thereby abused its discretion by precluding the Commonwealth from retrying petitioner in a new proceeding. Therefore, the court vacated the Order Enforcing Judgment and remanded for the district court to enter a substitute order directing that petitioner simply be released from the custody imposed as the result of his 2002 convictions. View "Wolfe v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC against his employer, Dollar General, alleging that Dollar General failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. While awaiting the EEOC's notice of his right to sue, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Then plaintiff filed the present suit in district court. Dollar General moved for summary judgment, arguing that the filing of plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition deprived plaintiff of standing to maintain his ADA claim. The court agreed with its sister circuits and concluded that because of the powers vested in the Chapter 13 debtor and trustee, a Chapter 13 debtor could retain standing to bring his pre-bankruptcy petition claims. The court also concluded that because plaintiff was unable to show that he could perform the essential functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Dollar General's favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Wilson v. Dollar General Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their son appealed the district court's summary judgment holding that they were not entitled under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, to an accommodation and a modification that they requested from the HOA. Plaintiffs had requested a modification to add a ramp leading to the front door of their home for use by their son, who required the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiffs also requested an accommodation to an HOA policy prohibiting the use of certain types of vehicles to allow the son to use an ATV within the community. The court vacated the district court's holding on the merits of the modification request for the wheelchair access ramp because that claim was not ripe; affirmed the district court's holding with respect to the accommodation request for permission to use an ATV because that request was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Act; and affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs. View "Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the insured, appealed the district court's holding that his Hartford insurance policy prohibited plaintiff from "stacking," or combining the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (UM/UIM) for each insured vehicle, when the policy failed to specify any particular amount of UM/UIM coverage afforded. The court concluded that because Virginia Code 38.2-2206(A) mandated that UM/UIM coverage "shall equal" the general liability coverage, this provision by operation of law provided plaintiff an equal amount of UM/UIM coverage under the Hartford policy. Accordingly, the court held that the anti-stacking provision in plaintiff's policy unambiguously prevented the stacking of UM/UIM coverage, and affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Hartford. View "Dooley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this action to challenge the fill permit issued under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), contending, inter alia, that the Corps, in conducting its analysis for the section 404 permit, "materially misapprehended" the baseline conditions in the relevant watershed, thus corrupting its analysis of the cumulative impact that the Reylas mine would have on the streams in the watershed. The court found no merit to plaintiffs' claim that the Corps "misapprehended" the baseline conditions where the Corps considered the relevant factors, evaluating both the impact site and the entire watershed. Because the Corps' analysis satisfied the National Environmental Policy Act's, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., procedural requirements, the Corps' finding of cumulative insignificance was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ohio Valley Environmental v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate serving a life sentence, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging several constitutional violations relating to the conditions of his confinement. At issue on appeal was whether certain actions taken by prison officials after plaintiff's suspected receipt of contraband, including suspension of the inmate's visitation privileges for two years, violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the prison warden who imposed the challenged actions was shielded by qualified immunity from plaintiff's claim for monetary damages because, under the facts presented here, the inmate did not have a clearly established constitutional right to visitation. The court also held that because plaintiff's visitation privileges already have been restored, his request for injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in all other respects the judgment of the district court. View "Williams v. Ozmint" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Afghanistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order of removal, contending that the BIA erred when it ruled that his Maryland second-degree assault conviction was for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16, and thus an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) that triggered his removability. The court concluded that the Attorney General failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's assault conviction necessarily rested on facts identifying his second-degree assault offense as a type of assault that qualified as a crime of violence. Consequently, the Attorney General had not met his burden of proving petitioner's removability as an aggravated felon. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order of removal, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to reinstate petitioner's asylee status. View "Karimi v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Debtors filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to discharge their unsecured debt, strip down liens on their primary residence and a rental property, and obtain a loan modification to address mortgage arrears on the properties. The Trustee subsequently challenged confirmation orders entered by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court, stripping off junior liens against debtors' residences. The Trustee argued that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 created a per se rule barring lien-stripping in so-called "Chapter 20" cases. The Act, however, dd not bar the orders entered by the bankruptcy court, and the stripping off of valueless liens - liens secured by collateral without a single penny of value to support it - was otherwise consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Branigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of Medicaid beneficiaries who suffered from severe developmental disabilities, sued the NCDHHS, PBH, and the director of PBH, alleging that defendants violated their rights under the Medicaid statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reducing their health care services without notice and an opportunity for a hearing. On appeal, PBH and the director challenged the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction. However, the NCDHHS did not join the appeal. Given that the NCDHHS had decided not to litigate the appeal, the court concluded that the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(5), and accompanying regulations precluded PBH from appealing in the absence of the NCDHHS. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "K.C. v. Shipman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a district court order adding to her previously imposed sentence a new requirement that she apply all tax refunds and other money she received from any "anticipated or unexpected financial gains" toward an outstanding restitution obligation imposed on her as a part of her sentence. Defendant was convicted of theft of government property because she received Supplementary Security Income (SSI) from the Social Security Administration after her eligibility for such payments had ended. Defendant had been receiving the money on behalf of her special-needs daughter but failed to notify the government when she subsequently married and her husband's income made her ineligible for SSI. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by later amending the original sentence in the absence of evidence of the impact the amendment would have on defendant's ability to support herself and her family and, therefore, the court vacated the order. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law