Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Supreme Court lifted certain Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, restrictions that prevented jurisdictions like North Carolina from passing laws that would deny minorities equal access, North Carolina began pursuing sweeping voting reform with House Bill 589. Plaintiffs and the federal government filed suit against North Carolina, alleging that House Bill 589 violates equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and seeking a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction and not preventing certain provisions of House Bill 589 from taking effect. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction as to House Bill 589's elimination of same-day registration and prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction with respect to the following House Bill 589 provisions: the reduction of early-voting days; the expansion of allowable voter challenges; the elimination of the discretion of county boards of elections to keep the pools open an additional hour on Election Day in "extraordinary circumstances"; the elimination of pre-registration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who will not be eighteen years old by the next general election; and the soft roll-out of voter identification requirements to go into effect in 2016. View "Duke v. State of North Carolina" on Justia Law

The district court entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney, Peter A.T. Sartin. Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him and to appeal the clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal two days late. The appeal was voluntarily abandoned. Sartin then filed a malpractice suit against the McNair Firm and the district court granted the Firm's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court's original intent was to impose sanctions on Sartin individually and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order. Because the court concluded that the district court's earlier case properly employed Rule 60(a), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm's failure to appeal the earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order caused Sartin no injury. The court disposed of Sartin's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant and affirmed his conviction; the court found no due process violation; but, because the facts do not affirmatively demonstrate sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) in his attempt to commit bank fraud, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing.View "United States v. Adepoju" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that his former employer, NCED, along with other defendants, defrauded the government through various schemes in connection with contracts pursuant to the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. After NCED and its former CEO settled, the district court dismissed relator's claims against the remaining defendants. The court held that the public-disclosure bar deprived the district court of jurisdiction over relator's claims against Defendants NISH, Green Bay, IPC, and Smurfit. With respect to these defendants, the district court properly determined that relator's proposed amendments to his first amended complaint were futile. The court held that relator's second amended complaint failed to adequately plead an FCA claim against Defendant Weyerhaeuser. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "US ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern appealed the district court's order remanding to state court a claim brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Norfolk also petitioned for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's order and either dismissing the case, or alternatively, remanding to the district court to address the merits of its federal defense to the FELA claim. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred review of the district court's order by appeal or via mandamus; Norfolk Southern has not established entitlement to mandamus relief because it has not shown a clear and indisputable right to such relief; and, accordingly, the court dismissed Norfolk Southern's appeal and deny its mandamus petition.View "In re: Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Government subpoenaed a 19-year-old man, (Doe Jr.) to testify with regard to potential federal charges against his father (Mr. Doe). Doe Jr. moved to quash the subpoena under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(2), claiming that his testimony was shielded by a purported parent-child privilege and the district court granted the motion. The court, concluded, however, that no federal appellate court has recognized a parent-child privilege and the court declined to do so in this case. Doe Jr. has not made a strong showing of need for the parent-child privilege and "reason and experience" did not warrant creation of the privilege in the face of substantial authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(a) and 2255(h), holding that defendant did not meet the requirements of a permissible second or successive motion to vacate. The court held that a numerically second section 2255 motion should not be considered second or successive under section 2255(h) where, as here, the facts relied on by the movant seeking resentencing did not exist when the numerically first motion was filed and adjudicated. Here, defendant's claim was unripe at the time his numerically first motion was adjudicated. Thus, in light of the subsequent vacatur of his state No Operator's License conviction, which contributed to the original guidelines calculation of his federal sentence, his motion was not successive. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Hairston" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the law enforcement officer's search of defendant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the probable cause on which the search was based was tainted. Defendant's discriminatory statements that gave rise to probable cause to search the car were elicited in response to the officer's manifestly false assertion that he had probable cause to search the car and his suggestion that, with our without defendant's consent, he would proceed with the search. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the suppression motion, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Saafir" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court concluded that defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), due to his three prior state convictions for "breaking and entering" in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a). The court concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a), as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court, sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary. The state court's clarification that the offense requires either breaking or entering without a building owner's consent brings it within Taylor v. United States's requirement of an "unlawful or unprivileged entry." This clarification also "excludes any case in which a person enters premises open to the public, no matter his intent" as required by Descamps v. United States. Accordingly, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a) qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. Mungro, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The court affirmed the district court's determination that, although plaintiff prevailed in his lawsuit against the Commissioner, attorney's fees were unwarranted because the Commissioner had pursued a substantially justified position. Despite the oddity of the Commissioner's original position, his misstep did not merit a fee award.View "Meyer, III v. Astrue" on Justia Law