Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

CSX Transportation, Inc. sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company in 2018, alleging that they conspired to exclude CSX from competing in the international shipping market at the Norfolk International Terminal by imposing an exclusionary switch rate starting in 2010. CSX claimed this rate caused ongoing injury to its business. The key issue was whether the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations barred CSX’s claims or if an exception applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding CSX’s claims time-barred. The court held that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because the decision to maintain the switch rate did not constitute a new act causing new injury within the limitations period. The court also found that CSX failed to show specific damages resulting from any acts within the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because maintaining the switch rate was not a new act but a continuation of the initial decision. The court also found that CSX did not provide sufficient evidence of new antitrust injury within the limitations period. The court emphasized that for the continuing-violation doctrine to apply, there must be an overt act within the limitations period that causes new injury, which CSX failed to demonstrate. Therefore, the court held that CSX’s claims were time-barred and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CSX Transportation, Incorporated v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law

A power company based in Florida sued a North Carolina-based power company, alleging that the latter had monopoly power in the wholesale power market in the Carolinas and maintained that power through anticompetitive conduct, violating § 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant devised a plan to exclude the plaintiff from competing for the business of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the only major customer whose contract was expiring soon enough for the plaintiff to compete.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court found that while there was a question of fact regarding the defendant's monopoly power, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted legitimate competition to retain Fayetteville’s business.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by compartmentalizing the defendant's conduct rather than considering it as a whole. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's conduct, including a blend-and-extend strategy and interference with the plaintiff's interconnection efforts, could be seen as part of a coordinated anticompetitive campaign. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant's actions were anticompetitive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also ordered that the case be assigned to a different judge, citing the principle that once a judge recuses himself, he should remain recused from the case. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Brent Brewbaker, appealed from his conviction of a per se antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as five counts of mail and wire fraud. Brewbaker had asked the district court to dismiss the Sherman Act count for failure to state an offense, but the court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction, finding that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do. The court, however, affirmed his fraud convictions and remanded the case for resentencing.The legal basis for the case was Brewbaker's argument that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not state a per se Sherman Act offense, a claim that the appellate court agreed with. The court explained that the indictment alleged a restraint that was both horizontal and vertical in nature, which does not fit neatly into either category as per existing case law. The court further noted that the Supreme Court had not yet clarified how to analyze an agreement between two parties with both vertical and horizontal aspects. The court concluded that the indictment did not allege a restraint that has been previously held to be per se illegal, nor one that economics showed would invariably lead to anticompetitive effects, and thus failed to state a per se violation of the Sherman Act.The court also rejected Brewbaker's claim that the jury instructions on the Sherman Act count "infected" the jury’s consideration of the fraud counts, noting that the fraud counts were not dependent on finding Brewbaker guilty under the Sherman Act. It further cited the presumption that juries follow instructions, and found no extraordinary situation to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the fraud convictions were affirmed. View "US v. Brent Brewbaker" on Justia Law

Both Risk Based Security, Inc. (“RBS”) and Synopsys, Inc., identify vulnerabilities in the source code of software and share information about those vulnerabilities so they can be corrected before nefarious individuals exploit them. After RBS accused Synopsys of engaging in unlawful conduct related to the content of RBS’ vulnerability database, Synopsys filed this declaratory judgment action. In relevant part, Synopsys sought a judicial declaration that it had not misappropriated RBS’ trade secrets. On the merits, the district court granted Synopsys’ motion for summary judgment on that claim after concluding that RBS had not come forward with evidence showing that any of its alleged trade secrets satisfied the statutory definition of that term. RBS appealed by challenging the district court’s merits determination of trade secrets as well as its decisions denying RBS’ motion to dismiss the case as moot, excluding testimony from two of RBS’ expert witnesses, and denying its motion for partial summary judgment as to some of its trade secret claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court properly concluded that RBS failed to put forward admissible evidence showing that the seventy-five alleged trade secrets had independent economic value. Absent proof sufficient to satisfy that part of the statutory definition of a “trade secret,” RBS could not prevail in a misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Synopsys. Given this holding, the court wrote, it need not consider RBS’ additional argument that the district court erred in denying its motion for partial summary judgment. View "Synopsys, Inc. v. Risk Based Security, Inc." on Justia Law

The appeal is another installment in a series of disputes involving an enforcement action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against a group of fraudulent real estate developers (the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action). Appellants, a group of 14 individual investors and a family-owned corporation moved to intervene in an action brought by others and sought relief from the district court’s judgment. Appellants did not do so until after the district court had entered final judgment and that judgment had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Because the Sanctuary Belize enforcement action was already on appeal when Appellants filed their motions, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain those motions. It held alternatively that the motions should be denied as meritless.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a motion to intervene while an appeal is pending, regardless of who noted the appeal. Further, the court explained that because the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction on a matter that had been appealed to the Fourth Circuit, the court held that it only has jurisdiction to review that decision, not to entertain the underlying merits. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Yu Lin" on Justia Law

Blenheim Capital Holdings Ltd. and Blenheim Capital Partners Ltd., Guernsey-based companies (collectively, “Blenheim”), commenced this action against Lockheed Martin Corporation, Airbus Defence and Space SAS, and the Republic of Korea and its Defense Acquisition Program Administration (the last two, collectively, “South Korea”), alleging that Defendants conspired to “cut it out” as the broker for a large, complex international military procurement transaction.   Blenheim alleged that the defendants (1) tortiously interfered with its brokerage arrangement and its prospective business expectations; (2) conspired to do so; (3) were unjustly enriched; and (4) conspired to violate federal and state antitrust laws. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). With respect to the tort claims, it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because South Korea was presumptively immune from jurisdiction under the Act and had not been engaged in “commercial activity,”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the offset transaction was not commercial activity as excepted from the immunity from jurisdiction conferred in the FSIA, accordingly the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Blenheim’s tort claims. Further, because Blenheim felt adverse impacts immediately upon Lockheed’s October 2016 termination of the brokerage agreement, the date of the satellite launch is not relevant to the date when the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Blenheim’s antitrust claims are barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. View "Blenheim Capital Holdings Ltd. v. Lockheed Martin Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an antitrust class action against Actelion, alleging that Actelion extended its patent monopoly for its branded drug Tracleer — a drug to treat pulmonary artery hypertension — beyond the patent's expiration date. Plaintiffs claimed that Actelion did so "through illegitimate means" with the intent of precluding competition from generic drug manufacturers and charging supracompetitive prices for Tracleer, in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. Plaintiffs further claimed that, as a result of Actelion's illegal monopolization, they were injured by having to pay supracompetitive prices for Tracleer for some three years after Actelion's patent for Tracleer expired.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's limitations ruling and concluded that plaintiffs' antitrust claims did not accrue until they were injured by paying supracompetitive prices for Tracleer after the patent expired in November 2015. Therefore, plaintiffs action commenced in November 2018 was timely. The court also concluded that, even if the February 2014 date, when Actelion entered into agreements settling the generic manufacturers' antitrust claims, marked the last anticompetitive act, damages could not then have been recovered by plaintiffs because their claims would not have been ripe for judicial resolution in view of the speculative nature of future conduct that might have thereafter occurred. Therefore, limitations would not begin to run until the claims became ripe. In any event, the court explained that because plaintiffs alleged that Actelion continued with anticompetitive acts after November 2015 in selling Tracleer at supracompetitive prices, new limitations periods began to run from each sale that caused plaintiffs damages. The court largely agreed with the district court's standing, but concluded that the allegations asserting violations of the laws in states where plaintiffs did not purchase Tracleer may yet be considered when determining whether plaintiffs can, based on a Rule 23 analysis, represent class members who purchased Tracleer in those States, and if they can, then whether plaintiffs can include those claims. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd." on Justia Law

GPI and Foodbuy were engaged in a non-exclusive commercial relationship, which was memorialized in a supplier agreement. Foodbuy subsequently filed suit against GPI alleging, among other claims, breach of contract for overcharging its Committed Customers. GPI counterclaimed, asserting, in relevant part, breach of contract for over-invoicing and violations of North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA). The district court held that the Agreement's terms were unambiguous, and, under its plain language, required GPI to pay a volume allowance only for purchases made through Foodbuy's program (and thus at Foodbuy's price). In the alternative, the district court determined that should the Agreement's terms be found to be ambiguous, the same result would follow because the various methods of contract interpretation pointed to the same conclusion.The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Foodbuy failed to show that it suffered any individualized harm as a result of GPI's alleged failure to sell its products to Committed Customers at the correct pre-determined prices under the Agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Foodbuy's overcharging claim for lack of standing. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Foodbuy's motion in limine to exclude GPI's damages calculation, and in denying Foodbuy's request for leave to amend its answer to conform to the evidence. The court noted that the proper framework for resolving the breach of contract claim involves the tools for interpreting ambiguous contracts. In this case, the district court undertook that analysis in its alternative holding wherein it concluded that the parties' intent was to require GPI to pay a volume allowance on only those purchases made through the Foodbuy program at the negotiated price. Because Foodbuy failed to present any argument in its opening brief taking issue with this facet of the district court's alternative holding, even though the court found the Agreement to be ambiguous, Foodbuy has waived any challenge to the district court's judgment on that ground. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the Agreement. However, the district court wrongly denied GPI's cross-claim alleging violations of the UDTPA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded on this issue. View "Foodbuy, LLC v. Gregory Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law