Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, prospective luxury home buyers, alleged that Toll Brothers, a real estate development company, unlawfully refused to return deposits when plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage financing. The district court denied Toll Brothers' motion to dismiss or stay the suit pending arbitration, finding that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision lacked mutuality of consideration under Maryland law because it required only the buyer - but not the seller - to submit disputes to arbitration. The court held that the appeal was properly before it under 9 U.S.C. 16(a), and that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision was unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration under Maryland law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan filed an action seeking to enjoin arbitration proceedings on the ground that under the controlling FINRA Rule, defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan entitled to compel arbitration of their dispute. In their FINRA arbitration claim, defendants asserted that Morgan Keegan engaged in misconduct relating to the valuation and marketing of certain bond funds purchased by defendants through their brokerage firm. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in holding that Morgan Keegan was not subject to FINRA arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan, within the meaning of the disputed FINRA Rule 12200, and, therefore, were not entitled to invoke the mandatory arbitration provision contained in that rule. View "Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a putative class action in state court against Santander alleging violations of various Maryland consumer protection laws for undisclosed finance charges and other unfair business practices. Santander subsequently appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings of plaintiff's claims against it. While finding that an enforceable arbitration agreement encompassing plaintiff's claims existed, the district court nevertheless concluded that Santander had waived its rights to enforce arbitration by its delay. The court concluded that the record did not support the district court's finding of waiver. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions to defer the claims to arbitration. View "Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Fourth Circuit concerned commercial arbitration of insurance disputes in foreign tribunals. Appellant-Cross-Appellee ESAB Group, Inc. contended that South Carolina law "reverse preempts" federal law (namely, a treaty and its implementing legislation) pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ESAB Group faced numerous products liability suits arising from alleged personal injuries caused by exposure to welding consumables manufactured by ESAB Group or its predecessors. These suits presently were proceeding in numerous state and federal courts in the United States. ESAB Group requested that its insurers defend and indemnify it in these suits. Several, including Zurich Insurance, PLC (ZIP), refused coverage. As a result, ESAB Group brought suit against its insurers in South Carolina state court. The district court then found that ZIP had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over ZIP was otherwise reasonable. Because it had referred to arbitration all claims providing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ESAB Group timely appealed the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. ZIP filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and its authority to remand the nonarbitrable claims to state court. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, and found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Likewise, the Court rejected ZIP's arguments that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over it and in remanding nonarbitrable claims to state court. View "ESAB Group, Incorporated v. Zurich Insurance PLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Wheeling Hospital and Belmont Hospital along with other medical providers, filed this putative class action in West Virginia state court against the Ohio Valley Health Services and Education Corporation, Ohio Valley Medical Center and East Ohio Regional Hospital, (collectively, the "OV Health System Parties"), and Appellant The Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. The plaintiffs sued in order to collect amounts allegedly owed to them by employee benefit plans established by the OV Health System Parties, for which The Health Plan acted as administrator. After pretrial activity, The Health Plan moved to dismiss the claims brought against it by the hospital plaintiffs pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties. The district court denied this motion, holding that The Health Plan had defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Health Plan appealed. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its determination that The Health Plan defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of The Health Plan’s motion to dismiss. View "Wheeling Hospital, Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Waterford Investment Services, Inc. appealed the district court’s ruling that it must arbitrate certain claims that a group of investors brought before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The investors alleged in their FINRA claims that they received bad advice from their financial advisor, George Gilbert. The investors named Gilbert, his current investment firm, Waterford, and his prior firm, Community Bankers Securities, LLC (CBS), among others as parties to the arbitration. In response, Waterford filed this suit asking a federal district court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings and enter a declaratory judgment that Waterford need not arbitrate the claims. The district court, adopting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, concluded that because Gilbert was an "associated person" of Waterford during the events in question, Waterford must arbitrate the investors' claims. Upon review of the matter, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Gilbert was inextricably an "associated person" with Waterford, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate judge's opinion. View "Waterford Investment Services v. Bosco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of the Philippines, brought suit against defendants for damages arising from severe injuries he sustained aboard the M/V Asian Spirit in the Chesapeake Bay near Baltimore. Plaintiff's complaint alleged multiple clams against defendants, including unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, breach of contract, violation of the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313(i), and negligence under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Arbitration Clause at issue was enforceable and that plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against defendants in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the court vacated the dismissal of the case and remanded for reinstatement thereof, for assessment of the injunction request, for entry of a stay pending arbitration to ensure that plaintiff would have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage for judicial review of his public policy defense based on the prospective waiver doctrine, and for such other and further proceedings. View "Aggarao, Jr. v. Mol Ship Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Wachovia appealed from the district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award entered against it after it sued several former employees on what the arbitrators determined were frivolous claims. Wachovia argued that the arbitrators violated section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(3), and "manifestly disregarded" the law when they awarded attorneys' fees and costs under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act (FCPA), S.C. Code Ann. 15-36-10. The court held that arbitrators have broad discretion to set applicable procedure and the court would not overturn an award for violating section 10(a)(3)'s protection against "any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" where the arbitrators attempted to address the one party's unhappiness with the fairness of the hearing and that party refused to take advantage of the opportunity provided. The court could not hold that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when they awarded the attorneys' fees and costs where, in this case, the court found whether the arbitrators erred by not applying the FCPA's procedural requirements was a question that was itself not clearly defined and was subject to debate. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, II" on Justia Law

This case arose when Union entered into a limited job-preference agreement with Peabody Coal where the agreement included an arbitration clause. The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Union, ruling that the arbitrator properly determined the arbitrability of the dispute. In the alternative, the district court concluded that the dispute was arbitrable, even if the arbitrator lacked authority to decide the arbitrability question. Peabody Coal appealed. The court held, as an initial matter, that the court, not the arbitrator must decide whether the dispute was arbitrable. The parties' agreement lacked the requisite "clear and unmistakable" language evincing an intent to arbitrate arbitrability. Exercising the court's independent judgment on the arbitrability question, the court concluded that Peabody Coal had not rebutted the ordinary presumption in favor of arbitrability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the parties must proceed to arbitration. View "Peabody Holding Co. v. United Mine Workers of America" on Justia Law