Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action alleging that defendants participated in a global Internet conspiracy to sell illegal prescription drugs, in violation of the laws of the United States and Virginia. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against four foreign banks for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Rule 4(k)(2) did not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the banks because exercising jurisdiction over them would not, in the circumstances here, be consistent with the United States Constitution and laws. Subjecting the banks to the coercive power of the court in the United States, in the absence of minimum contacts, would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders dismissing the complaint against the banks. View "Unspam Technologies v. Chernuk" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Wells Fargo after plaintiffs' application for a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was denied. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and therefore granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not plausibly stated a breach of contract claim; plaintiffs' negligence claim failed because there was no express or implied contract and therefore, no tort duty could arise as a matter of law; plaintiffs' Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 13-301(1), claim failed because Wells Fargo did not make misrepresentations when it stated that it needed more information to process plaintiffs' HAMP application; and the district court court properly dismissed the negligent misrepresentation and common law fraud claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this civil enforcement action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that defendants, the Bank, and individual members of the Bank's Corporate Benefits Committee, engaged in prohibited transactions and breached their fiduciary duties by selecting and maintaining Bank-affiliated mutual funds in the investment menu for the Bank's 401(k) Plan and the Bank's separate but related Pension Plan (collectively, the Plans). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Pension Plan claims in the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' remaining claims were time-barred under the limitations period in 29 U.S.C. 1113(1)(A). Finally, the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice did not constitute an abuse of discretion where plaintiffs failed to file a motion to amend and had already amended their original complaint three times. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "David v. Alphin" on Justia Law

The Trustee filed this action against former directors and officers of Bancshares. The directors also all formerly served as the officers and directors of the Bank, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bancshares. The court held that the Trustee could pursue her claims only as to the directors' alleged improper subordination of Bancshares' LLC interest. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the district court's judgment as to that claim, but affirmed its judgment in all other respects. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in granting the directors' motion to dismiss except as to the claim for subordination of the LLC interest of Bancshares. View "Beach First National Bancshare v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court was persuaded that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 24, 484(A), and federal regulations preempted the CLEC, and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract. The court held that the district court erred in deeming plaintiff's CLEC claim against Capital One preempted by federal law and regulations where Capital One was subject to the terms of the CLEC in loans it acquired through assignment. The court also held that a breach of contract claim had been adequately pleaded and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Decohen v. Capital One N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David McCorkle and William Pender appealed a district court order dismissing two of their class action claims against Bank of America Corporation for alleged violations of certain provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Their claims centered on the Bank's use of a normal retirement age (NRA) that allegedly violated ERISA in calculating lump sum distributions and further ran afoul of ERISA's prohibition of "backloading" the calculation of benefit accrual. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it affirmed the district court's judgment to dismiss those claims. View "Pender v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law

In this purported class action on behalf of borrowers holding home mortgage loans serviced by Bayview, plaintiffs claimed that Bayview improperly added fees to borrowers' accounts in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 through 46A-8-102. At issue was whether, under the statute of limitations, "the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement" was June 5, 2007, the loan acceleration date set by Bayview. The court concluded that the acceleration date was the operative date for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, because no further payments were scheduled after that date. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the statute of limitations began to run from the acceleration date, and that, therefore, plaintiffs' claims were time barred. View "Delebreau v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claim that Deutsche and others violated various consumer protection laws in connection with a mortgage plaintiffs secured on their home. Plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to relief on account of violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667(f), and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 1026; North Carolina usury law, N.C. Gen. State 24; the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCUDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1; and North Carolina's Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-50. Plaintiffs also claimed a breach of contract and that Deutsche lacked the authority to enforce the loan. The court held that plaintiffs' TILA claim was not time-barred; plaintiffs adequately pled the elements of their usury claim and the claim was ripe for adjudication; similarly, plaintiffs' NCUDTPA claims should also be allowed to proceed; res judicata no longer barred plaintiffs from litigating whether Deutsche had authority to enforce the note; and plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in denying their motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e) was moot. View "Gilbert, Jr., et al. v. Residential Funding LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law