Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Business Law
Justin Adkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”) issued furlough notices to employees at its facility in Huntington, West Virginia. Shortly thereafter, over 65 employees submitted forms requesting to take medical leave based on claimed minor soft-tissue injuries sustained while off duty. The forms were similar in content; all were signed by one of two chiropractors; and all called for medical leave of eight weeks or more.Under CSXT’s benefit plans, if an employee were furloughed while on medical leave, the employee would receive health and welfare benefits for up to two years. Otherwise, a furloughed employee would receive such benefits for only four months. Suspecting benefits fraud, CSXT charged the employees with violating its workplace rule against dishonesty and, following hearings, terminated their employment.Plaintiffs, a group of 58 terminated employees, claimed violations of their rights under federal and state law, including violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”). The district court granted summary judgment to CSXT on all claims and Plaintiffs appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Employer's belief that Plaintiff employees committed benefits fraud was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs couldn't prove pretext or retaliation. View "Justin Adkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law
Synopsys, Inc. v. Risk Based Security, Inc.
Both Risk Based Security, Inc. (“RBS”) and Synopsys, Inc., identify vulnerabilities in the source code of software and share information about those vulnerabilities so they can be corrected before nefarious individuals exploit them. After RBS accused Synopsys of engaging in unlawful conduct related to the content of RBS’ vulnerability database, Synopsys filed this declaratory judgment action. In relevant part, Synopsys sought a judicial declaration that it had not misappropriated RBS’ trade secrets. On the merits, the district court granted Synopsys’ motion for summary judgment on that claim after concluding that RBS had not come forward with evidence showing that any of its alleged trade secrets satisfied the statutory definition of that term. RBS appealed by challenging the district court’s merits determination of trade secrets as well as its decisions denying RBS’ motion to dismiss the case as moot, excluding testimony from two of RBS’ expert witnesses, and denying its motion for partial summary judgment as to some of its trade secret claims.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court properly concluded that RBS failed to put forward admissible evidence showing that the seventy-five alleged trade secrets had independent economic value. Absent proof sufficient to satisfy that part of the statutory definition of a “trade secret,” RBS could not prevail in a misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Synopsys. Given this holding, the court wrote, it need not consider RBS’ additional argument that the district court erred in denying its motion for partial summary judgment. View "Synopsys, Inc. v. Risk Based Security, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law
Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company
In 2015, Towers Watson & Co. (“Towers Watson”), a Delaware company headquartered in Virginia, purchased directors and officers (“D&O”) liability insurance coverage from several insurance companies, including National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. (“National Union”) as the primary insurer. Following Towers Watson’s merger with another company, Towers Watson shareholders filed several lawsuits against Towers Watson’s chairman and CEO and others, alleging that the shareholders received below-market consideration for their shares in the merger. The litigation was settled, and Towers Watson sought indemnity coverage from its insurers under the relevant D&O policies. The insurers refused the indemnity request, citing a so-called “bump-up” exclusion in the policies. This declaratory judgment action followed. The district court sided with Towers Watson and held that the bump-up exclusion “does not unambiguously” preclude indemnity coverage for the underlying settlements.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Under Virginia law, it will not do to merely identify any conceivable basis to hold that an insurance-coverage exclusion does not apply before stripping the exclusion of all force. Rather, the language of the exclusion must reasonably lend itself to an “equally possible” interpretation precluding the exclusion’s applicability. Here, however, the district court’s chosen interpretation, which disregarded the Policy’s plain language and inserted terms not included by the parties, cannot be characterized as one of two “equally possible” constructions. View "Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Adnet, Inc. v. Rohit Soni
While working for Adnet, Inc. (“Adnet”), Defendants learned of a subcontract that Adnet was attempting to win. Thereafter, Defendants, through their own company, submitted a bid for that same subcontract. After Defendants won the subcontract, Adnet brought claims against them for breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious interference with a business relationship, and business conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendants did not compete against Adnet, that Adnet did not have a business expectancy in the subcontract, and that, without proof of an underlying tort, there was no business conspiracy. Adnet appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s claims for breach of the duty of loyalty and tortious interference with a business relationship. Further, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s business conspiracy claim and remanded. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence of a direct competition for the subcontract between Adnet and Defendants while they were working for Adnet to bar a grant of summary judgment to Defendants. A reasonable juror could conclude that employees, like Defendants, breach their duty of loyalty to their employer when they learn of a potential business opportunity through their employment and then participate in direct competition with their employer for that opportunity while still employed. View "Adnet, Inc. v. Rohit Soni" on Justia Law
Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation
Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning. But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law
SEC v. Mark Johnson
Defendant challenged the district court’s disgorgement order against him and Owings Group, LLC, the entity he founded and controlled. Together, Defendant, Owings, and three codefendants perpetrated a fraudulent scheme in violation of federal securities laws. After Defendant consented to an entry of judgment, the court ordered him to disgorge $681,554 and imposed a monetary penalty in the same amount.Defendant argued that the disgorgement order violates Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) and that the district court erroneously premised the associated monetary penalty on joint-and-several liability. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s disgorgement order and its monetary penalty.The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Defendant and Owings were “partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing". The court wrote that Owings’s conduct in the scheme generated its ill-gotten gains—and Defendant controlled that conduct. Further, the district court didn’t order a joint-and-several penalty. It ordered a penalty equal to Defendant's disgorgement, which happened to be joint and several.Finally, the court concluded that it found no abuse of discretion. Though the district court didn’t explicitly discuss Defendant's financial situation, it’s clear to the court that the district court considered it, along with the remaining factors. The district court understood that all the defendants were insolvent but decided that Defendant's substantially more serious role in the scheme warranted a penalty all the same. View "SEC v. Mark Johnson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Securities Law
Robert F. Anderson v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc.
Infinity Business Group used an accounting practice that artificially inflated its accounts receivable and therefore its revenues. The company’s CEO, board of directors, and outside auditors affirmed the wrongdoing. Appellant, the company’s trustee, alleges that the true mastermind was a financial services company and an adviser of the company (“Defendants”) that Infinity contracted with to unsuccessfully solicit investments.The Fourth Circuit held that even assuming that the financial services company played some role in creating or perpetuating the flawed accounting technique, Appellant still cannot succeed in holding Defendants liable. Infinity engaged Defendant for the limited purpose of assisting with “a private placement of” Infinity stock. Defendants’ task was to help prepare a confidential information memorandum for potential investors, which was to include Infinity’s financial information from 2003 to 2005. Infinity’s CEO prepared and provided the relevant information for all three years. The accounting practice the company used was inconsistent with the generally accepted accounting principles endorsed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.Appellant first contends that he represents Infinity as well as Infinity’s creditors. Thus, when he was acting on behalf of the presumptively blameless creditors, Appellant insists he is immune from in pari delicto. The court held that when a trustee pursues a right of action that ultimately derives from the debtor—even if the trustee is nominally exercising a creditor’s powers when doing so—the trustee remains subject to the same defenses as the debtor. The court ultimately found that Infinity’s officers and auditors were the authors of the company’s demise—not Defendants. View "Robert F. Anderson v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Securities Law
Teresa Speaks v. U. S. Tobacco Cooperative
Certain members of the The U.S. Tobacco Cooperative(“Cooperative”) seek dissolution of the Cooperative and distribution of its reserves. They claim that “the Cooperative is no longer fulfilling the mandates under which it was created” and “is no longer able to carry out its purpose.” According to the members, the Cooperative simply cannot keep up with market realities and they request the judicial dissolution of the Cooperative.The Cooperative argued that the ground for which the members seek dissolution—that the Cooperative can no longer carry out its purpose—only applies to dissolution under North Carolina’s Nonprofit Corporation Act (“Nonprofit Corporation Act”). The key issue underlying the Cooperative’s motion to dismiss was whether the Business Corporation Act or the Nonprofit Corporation Act applied to the Cooperative’s dissolution. The members argue that the Nonprofit Corporation Act, not the Business Corporation Act, applies to judicially dissolve the Cooperative.The court found the members fail to explain why applying the Business Corporation Act’s dissolution provisions here would contradict the statute’s “so far as appropriate” language. Therefore, the court determined that since the Cooperative is organized “with capital stock,” the Business Corporation Act governs the Cooperative’s dissolution. The Business Corporation Act does not list the failure of a corporation to carry out its purposes as a ground for dissolution. But that is the only ground the members addressed on appeal. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the members’ claim for judicial dissolution. View "Teresa Speaks v. U. S. Tobacco Cooperative" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law
Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc.
Puma, a pharmaceutical company, created an investor presentation during a proxy contest with Eshelman, a Puma shareholder and the founder of PPD, another pharmaceutical company. Puma invited its shareholders to visit a link on its website where it had published the presentation, which indicated that, a decade earlier, while Eshelman was CEO of PPD, a clinical investigator falsified documents. The presentation was published at least 198 times. Puma also filed the presentation with the SEC, which made it permanently accessible on its website.Eshelman, a resident of North Carolina, initiated a diversity action with state-law claims of defamation. Puma is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in California; Auerbach, Puma’s CEO, resides in California. The court found defamatory per se Puma’s statements that Eshelman was “involved in clinical trial fraud” and that Eshelman was replaced as CEO after being forced to testify regarding fraud in 2008. A jury awarded Eshelman $15.85 million in compensatory damages and $6.5 million in punitive damages.The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to liability but vacated the award after finding that Puma waived its personal jurisdiction claim. Each of the statements at issue is capable of a singular, defamatory interpretation but “there is no evidence justifying such an enormous award.” View "Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc." on Justia Law
Episcopal Church in South Carolina v. Church Insurance Company of Vermont
In 2012, Bishop Lawrence sought to disaffiliate his South Carolina-based diocese from the Episcopal “Mother Church”. Some parishes followed suit. The Mother Church purported to remove Lawrence and selected a new bishop. The Disassociated Diocese and Parishes sued the Mother Church to clarify their property rights in diocesan. The Mother Church filed counterclaims and separately filed trademark and false-advertising claims. Both cases are ongoing.The Church Insurance Company, wholly owned by the Church Pension Fund, is a freestanding nonprofit affiliated with the Mother Church. Captive insurance companies may only cover the risks of their parent companies and related entities. Before the schism, the Company issued a Diocesan Program Master Policy, listing as “named insured” the Episcopal diocese and listing 56 participant parishes, including the now-Disassociated Parishes, in its declarations. Each parish has a separate, individualized insurance policy and paid premiums directly to the Company. The policies provide liability coverage for injuries arising out of “infringement of copyright, title, slogan, trademark, or trade name” and include a broad duty to defend. The Company has reimbursed the Disassociated Parishes’ defense costs in connection with both lawsuits.The Associated Diocese sued the Company, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of that suit for lack of standing. The Company has not strayed beyond its limitations as a captive insurer or breached its obligations under the policies, so there is no injury traceable to such conduct. View "Episcopal Church in South Carolina v. Church Insurance Company of Vermont" on Justia Law