Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After her husband was kidnapped and likely murdered in Honduras, and her brother-in-law—who had opposed a local gang—was murdered, a woman and her young daughter fled to the United States. The woman believed the 18th Street Gang was responsible for both crimes and feared retaliation against her family. After arriving in the U.S., she applied for asylum, citing her relationship to her husband’s immediate family as the basis for her claim. She submitted supporting evidence including a death certificate, police report, and affidavits. Later, after receiving direct death threats from individuals identified as gang members, she sought to reopen her asylum proceedings based on this new evidence.The Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but determined the evidence did not sufficiently establish persecution on account of her membership in a protected group—her husband’s family—due to a lack of proof regarding the gang’s involvement in the murders. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed and affirmed this decision. After the death threats, the woman filed a motion to reopen, providing new evidence; however, the BIA denied the motion, concluding the threats did not demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and her family membership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the new evidence and the context surrounding the threats. The court found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, as the threats and violence were sufficiently connected to the woman’s family membership. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The case concerns Robert Boyd, who had a history of sexual offenses involving minors. After serving prison time for downloading child sexual abuse material, post-incarceration civil commitment proceedings were initiated against him under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Boyd was designated a “sexually dangerous person” and committed to the custody of the Attorney General. Eight years later, Boyd was conditionally discharged after the district court concluded he no longer posed a threat if released under a strict treatment regimen. Conditions included supervision, participation in treatment, restrictions on internet usage, and prohibitions on possessing pornography.About a year after his conditional discharge, the Government sought to revoke Boyd’s release, alleging he violated his treatment regimen by possessing an SD card with images deemed pornographic and engaging in risk-related behaviors, such as interactions with underage individuals and unauthorized internet use. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found Boyd in violation, determined he remained sexually dangerous, and revoked his conditional discharge, returning him to federal custody.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that revocation of conditional discharge under the Adam Walsh Act requires the Government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual failed to comply with their prescribed regimen, suffers from a serious mental disorder, and would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct if released. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings, concluding there was sufficient evidence Boyd violated his regimen and posed a risk if allowed to remain in the community. The judgment revoking Boyd’s conditional discharge was affirmed. View "US v. Boyd" on Justia Law

A South Carolina lender originates loans only within South Carolina but has extended credit to individuals with Pennsylvania addresses. Although the lender does not operate in Pennsylvania, it has engaged in activities connected to Pennsylvania, such as perfecting liens, collecting payments, and repossessing vehicles located in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities investigated the lender’s practices involving Pennsylvania residents, issuing subpoenas and ultimately initiating a formal administrative enforcement proceeding for alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s usury laws.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment for the lender, finding Pennsylvania’s subpoena violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Pennsylvania could investigate and apply its usury laws to conduct connected to Pennsylvania. Afterward, Pennsylvania enforced its subpoena and initiated the administrative enforcement proceeding. The lender responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking to enjoin both the enforcement proceeding and a new subpoena, raising constitutional claims including those under the Dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the lender’s complaint, holding that claims related to the enforcement proceeding were barred by issue preclusion or, alternatively, by Younger abstention. Claims challenging the second subpoena were dismissed as unripe due to lack of present injury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims challenging the administrative enforcement proceeding under Younger abstention, finding it was a quasi-criminal civil enforcement proceeding and that state interests and procedures were sufficient. The court also affirmed dismissal of claims challenging the second subpoena on ripeness grounds, but vacated the judgment insofar as those claims were dismissed with prejudice, remanding with instructions to dismiss them without prejudice. View "TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc. v. Spicher" on Justia Law

The case concerns two individuals who owned a car loan business in Virginia. Their business, Total Auto Financing, LLC, borrowed significant sums from American Credit Acceptance, LLC, with the loans personally guaranteed by the owners. After a series of renewals and a final short-term extension with restrictive terms, Total Auto defaulted on its debt. Following the default, American Credit replaced Total Auto as the servicer of its loan portfolio with Peritus Portfolio Services II, LLC. The new servicer’s management coincided with a sharp decline in the value and performance of the loan portfolio. The business was eventually forced into bankruptcy, and its main asset was sold at auction for much less than its previous value, leaving the owners personally liable for a large deficiency due to their guarantees.After the bankruptcy filing, the owners, acting in their personal capacities, filed complaints against American Credit and the new servicer (and related parties), alleging a range of claims including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and others. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed both complaints, finding that the claims belonged to the LLC, not the individual owners. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed the dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the principle determining who owns a claim—whether the business or its equity holders—means that owners cannot personally sue for injuries suffered by the business, even if they are financially harmed as a result. The court concluded that all claims asserted were either direct claims belonging to the LLC or failed to allege a personal injury distinct from the LLC’s injury. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the individual owners could not bring these claims in their own names. View "Bayramov v. American Credit Acceptance" on Justia Law

After a workplace injury, an employee developed a disability that prevented him from performing his previous physically demanding job as a pest control technician. He repeatedly requested reassignment to a less demanding “light-duty” position, providing medical documentation and engaging with his employer about his limitations and desire to return to work. Despite these requests, the employer neither responded substantively nor engaged in discussions about available light-duty positions. Over sixteen months, the employee remained on unpaid leave and ultimately resigned after the employer filled several suitable positions without contacting him.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on both claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the employee could not perform the essential functions of his original position with a reasonable accommodation and concluded that placing him on indefinite unpaid leave constituted a reasonable accommodation. It also determined that the unlawful termination claim failed because the employee had voluntarily resigned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the employer was obligated to reassign the employee to a light-duty position and whether it failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The court clarified that the ADA requires consideration of whether an employee can perform the essential functions of the desired position, not just the original one, and that indefinite unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when reassignment is possible. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the unlawful termination claim because the employee failed to exhaust administrative remedies on that claim. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim, but affirmed summary judgment on the unlawful termination claim. View "Dieng v. Orkin, LLC" on Justia Law

An Indian national entered the United States on a J-1 exchange visa for a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. He and his wife, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, lived in Virginia and publicly opposed the war in Gaza. Following their social media activity and associations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him under a new program targeting foreign nationals thought to support designated terror groups based on online speech. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred between several detention facilities in Virginia, Louisiana, and Texas, often without notice to his family or counsel, and was held under allegedly punitive and harmful conditions.He filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was where he lived, was first detained, and initially held. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked habeas jurisdiction because he was no longer detained in Virginia. The district court denied the motion, finding it had jurisdiction under the “unknown custodian” exception and the exception articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, since the petitioner’s location and custodian were unknown due to government actions. The district court also declined to transfer venue and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner while his habeas case was pending, later ordering his release on bail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had habeas jurisdiction under both the unknown custodian exception and the exception for government conduct thwarting access to the courts. The court further held that no provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), or 1252(a)(5), stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying transfer or by invoking the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction. View "Suri v. Trump" on Justia Law

A Dutch life insurance company, through its trustees, sought to enforce an arbitral award against its former owners after they failed to maintain the company’s required solvency capital ratio, as agreed. When the capital ratio fell below the stipulated threshold, the company initiated urgent arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands, resulting in an award ordering the owners to restore the ratio and imposing a substantial penalty for noncompliance. Despite confirmations of the award by Dutch courts—including the Court of Rotterdam, the Court of Appeal of the Hague, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands—the owners did not comply, leading to the company's liquidation.The trustees filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, seeking to confirm the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention, as well as to recognize the Dutch court’s judgment under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The district court found the arbitration award enforceable, holding the FAA’s three-year statute of limitations was “permissive,” not “mandatory,” and also concluded the Dutch judgment was recognizable as a foreign-country judgment under North Carolina law. The court entered judgment, confirming the award under federal law and did not rule on the alternative state-law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the three-year statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207 is mandatory, not permissive, and reversed the district court’s order confirming the foreign arbitral award under the FAA due to untimeliness. However, the appellate court agreed that the Dutch court judgment qualifies for recognition under the North Carolina Act and remanded the case for further proceedings on the petitioners’ motion to enforce that judgment under state law. View "van Faassen v. Lindberg" on Justia Law

An American software company based in North Carolina and a Dutch company entered into a business relationship that later soured. The American company alleged that the Dutch company stole its brand name, software code, and customer base. The Dutch company operated a website nearly identical to the American company’s, using its name, logo, and marketing materials, and targeted American customers, even convincing at least one U.S. company to switch providers. Disputes between the parties also led to reciprocal lawsuits in both the United States and the Netherlands, with overlapping subject matter.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially issued a preliminary injunction against the Dutch company, finding the American company was likely to succeed on its copyright, trademark, trade secret, and tortious interference claims. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. altered the standard for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, the district court modified its injunction to comply with the new “conduct-focused” approach and dismissed the copyright claim. The district court also ordered the Dutch company to correct statements made to the Dutch court and later held the company in civil contempt for failing to comply fully, imposing a monetary sanction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance from Abitron, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the second amended preliminary injunction, holding that the Dutch company’s conduct constituted infringing use in U.S. commerce under the Lanham Act, and that the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s express extraterritorial provision was satisfied by acts in furtherance of misappropriation occurring in the United States. The court dismissed the appeals from the correction and contempt orders for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV" on Justia Law

A North Carolina software company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against its former business partner, a Dutch entity, after their business relationship dissolved. The plaintiff alleged copyright and trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and various state law violations. Shortly after the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the defendant’s business activities. Meanwhile, the defendant commenced related litigation in the Netherlands. During those Dutch proceedings, the defendant’s American attorney, Pressly Millen, submitted an affidavit that the plaintiff claimed misrepresented the scope and timing of the U.S. litigation.The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen" on Justia Law

During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a limited liability company (LLC), FS Medical Supplies, entered into a contract to supply personal protective equipment and related products to TannerGAP, Inc. and Tanner Pharma UK Limited for distribution. FS Medical later discovered that the Tanner entities had contracted directly with one of its suppliers, prompting FS Medical to sue for breach of contract.Initially, FS Medical brought suit in California state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. FS Medical then filed two actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). FS Medical alleged that its members were citizens of Texas and California, and later acknowledged that one member was a citizen of China. The defendants included both U.S. citizens domiciled in North Carolina and a United Kingdom corporation. After limited discovery and amendment of the complaint, the district court, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the presence of both domestic and foreign members in the plaintiff LLC destroyed diversity jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under § 1332(a)(3), complete diversity requires at least one U.S. citizen on each side of the action. Because FS Medical, as an LLC, had both domestic and foreign members at the time the complaints were filed, and because there were foreign defendants as well, the suit was not between “citizens of different States.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and declined to grant relief under North Carolina’s savings statute, finding it lacked jurisdiction to do so. View "FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited" on Justia Law