Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
by
In this case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence, wrongful death, and survival claims arising from the death of Eleusipa Van Emburgh who was treated at a Navy medical center. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that regulations enacted under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 do not impose additional jurisdictional requirements beyond those listed in 28 U.S.C § 2675. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision for six of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff, Imelda Crovetto, who failed to satisfy one of the jurisdictional requirements listed in § 2675.The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdictional requirements laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 were the sole source of jurisdictional requirements for the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. The court found that the implementing regulations did not impose additional jurisdictional requirements. The plaintiffs satisfied these jurisdictional requirements when they submitted their claims to the agency, included a specific valuation of their claims, and waited until after their claims were denied before filing suit. View "Estate of Eleusipa Van Emburgh v. US" on Justia Law

by
Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda, a citizen of El Salvador, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his ongoing civil detention during his ongoing withholding-only proceedings was unlawful. He had been ordered removed to El Salvador but had instigated withholding-only proceedings claiming a fear of torture if returned to El Salvador. The length of his detention, pending the resolution of those proceedings, had exceeded the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.Vasquez Castaneda failed to show that his removal from the U.S. was not significantly likely to happen in the foreseeable future. The court reasoned that ongoing withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, do not present the same risk of "indefinite and potentially permanent" detention at issue in Zadvydas. Furthermore, the court rejected Vasquez Castaneda's assertion that due process requires another bond hearing before an immigration judge given his circumstances. The court emphasized that Vasquez Castaneda's ongoing detention was directly tied to the proceedings he voluntarily initiated and that these proceedings would eventually conclude. The court also noted that Vasquez Castaneda had received ample process since his detention began, including a bond hearing, numerous custody reviews by ICE, and the very habeas proceedings in question. View "Castaneda v. Perry" on Justia Law

by
In this case, a South Carolina court-appointed receiver brought an action against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company and other insurers, alleging breaches of insurance policies issued to a defunct company within a state receivership. Travelers removed the action to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. However, the district court granted the receiver’s motion to remand the case back to state court. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case involved property of a state receivership exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state court (based on the doctrine articulated in Barton v. Barbour), and the removal lacked unanimous consent of all defendants due to a forum selection clause in some of the insurance policies issued to the defunct company.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court's conclusions in support of remand were at least colorably supported. The court found that the district court's reliance on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and procedural defect as grounds for remand were colorably supported, and thus, not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Protopapas v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co." on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand two lawsuits back to Maryland state court. The lawsuits were brought by the City of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County against more than 20 energy companies, including BP P.L.C. The local governments accused the companies of misrepresenting and concealing information about the environmental impact of their fossil fuel products in violation of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act and various state tort laws. The companies tried to remove the cases to federal court, arguing that because they had acted under federal authority in their operations, the court had federal question jurisdiction. However, the appeals court found that the company's activities related to fossil fuel production were not relevant to the claims brought by the local governments, which were based on alleged concealment or misrepresentation of information about fossil fuel products. The court also rejected the companies' argument that the First Amendment question related to their right to free speech provided a basis for federal jurisdiction, as this question was a defense rather than a necessary element of the plaintiffs' state-law claims. View "Anne Arundel County v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

by
In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bikachi Amisi, a contract nurse, sued Officer Lakeyta Brooks and Officer Roy Townsend for violating her Fourth Amendment rights when she was mistakenly strip searched on her first day of work at Riverside Regional Jail. Amisi also brought several tort claims under Virginia state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity and good-faith immunity under Virginia law. They also argued that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Amisi's claims. The district court denied their motions and the defendants appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that both officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, a legal protection that shields officers who commit constitutional violations but who could reasonably believe their actions were lawful, because their actions were not reasonable and Amisi’s right to be free from unreasonable strip searches was clearly established. The court also held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act did not bar Amisi's state-law claims because her injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Court further held that Officer Townsend was not entitled to immunity under Virginia law as his belief that his conduct was lawful was not objectively reasonable. View "Amisi v. Brooks" on Justia Law

by
In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, identified as Jane Doe, filed an appeal against two orders from the district court. The first order denied her request to compel the defendant, Cenk Sidar, to provide a DNA sample for a sexual assault case. The second order demanded that Doe disclose her real name in the proceedings following a default judgment against Sidar.The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal regarding the DNA sample for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that orders denying requests for physical or mental examinations are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.However, the court did rule on the anonymity issue. The court found that the district court committed legal error in its order demanding Doe to disclose her real name. The district court had understated Doe's interest in anonymity, announced a general rule that fairness considerations invariably cut against allowing a plaintiff to be anonymous at trial unless the defendant is also anonymous, and failed to recognize the significance of its default judgment on liability. The Court of Appeals thus vacated the non-anonymity order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider its order in light of the appeals court's opinion. The court emphasized the importance of Doe's privacy interests, particularly given that the case involved allegations of sexual assault. View "Doe v. Sidar" on Justia Law

by
In this case, Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, alleging that Cox's customers used its internet service to infringe their copyrights. The plaintiffs argued that Cox should be held accountable for its customers' copyright infringement. A jury found Cox liable for both willful contributory and vicarious infringement of over 10,000 copyrighted works owned by the plaintiffs and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not vicariously liable for its customers' copyright infringement because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability. However, the court affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement because Cox knew of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it.The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages. The court did not vacate the contributory infringement verdict. View "Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Incorporated" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Robert Mestanek, a citizen of the Czech Republic, who filed two Form I-130 petitions to establish his eligibility for lawful permanent residence in the United States based on his marriages to two different U.S. citizens. The first petition was filed by his then-wife Angel Simmons, and the second by his current wife Mary Mestanek. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied both petitions, the first on the grounds that Robert’s marriage to Angel was fraudulent, and the second based on the “marriage fraud bar” which prohibits approval of Form I-130 petitions for any noncitizen who has previously been found to have entered into a fraudulent marriage to circumvent immigration laws. The Mestaneks filed suit in federal district court seeking judicial review of USCIS’s denial of Mary’s Form I-130 petition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS, and the Mestaneks appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that USCIS’s denial was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law. The court rejected all of the Mestaneks’ arguments, including their contention that USCIS applied the wrong legal standard for marriage fraud, and their assertion that the administrative record was incomplete and insufficient for judicial review. The court also found no due process violation by USCIS. View "Mestanek v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

by
In this case, professional concert photographer Larry Philpot brought a copyright-infringement claim against news website Independent Journal Review (IJR) after IJR used his photograph of musician Ted Nugent in an online article. IJR sought summary judgment, arguing that its use of the photo constituted fair use under the Copyright Act and alternatively arguing that Philpot's copyright registration was invalid. Philpot also sought summary judgment, contending that his registration was valid and that IJR's use was not fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to IJR on fair use grounds and denied Philpot's motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision. The court held that IJR's use of the photograph did not constitute fair use because it was non-transformative and commercial, and it adversely affected the potential market for the photograph. It also found that Philpot's copyright registration was valid because the photograph was not published before Philpot registered it as an unpublished work. The court concluded that IJR was not entitled to summary judgment on its fair use defense and that Philpot was entitled to summary judgment on the validity of the copyright registration. View "Philpot v. Independent Journal Review" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a petition by Sintia Dines Nivar Santana, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, who sought to review a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed a decision by an immigration judge (IJ) declaring her ineligible for adjustment of status. Nivar was deemed inadmissible for falsely claiming to be a citizen of the United States. Her appeal presented two contentions of error. First, she argued that the IJ and BIA erroneously ruled that she was required to establish her admissibility “clearly and beyond doubt,” rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, she contended that her evidentiary hearing before the IJ was fundamentally unfair due to the IJ’s erroneous admission of a Form I-9 (the “employment eligibility form”).The court rejected Nivar’s contentions of error and denied her petition for review. On the first point, the court ruled that the BIA and IJ did not err in applying the “clearly and beyond doubt” standard. The court explained that, for a noncitizen to qualify for adjustment of status, she must satisfy a statutory provision, which requires a noncitizen applying for adjustment of status to demonstrate that she is then and there admissible into the United States for permanent residence. The court stated that this requirement means that Nivar was required to prove — “clearly and beyond doubt” — that she did not falsely claim United States citizenship.On the second point, the court found that although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) failed to timely submit the employment eligibility form, Nivar was not deprived of “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” The court also determined that the admission of the form did not render the hearing fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the court concluded that Nivar’s evidentiary hearing did not violate due process considerations. View "Nivar Santana v. Garland" on Justia Law