Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Board of Supervisors of Pittsylvania County, Virginia met twice per month. At the beginning of each meeting, a member of the Board opened the proceedings with an invocation, usually explicitly Christian in nature, and asked the audience to stand for the prayers. Hudson is a non-Christian resident of Pittsylvania County who has attended nearly every Board meeting and alleges that the Christian prayers made her and other non-Christian citizens of Pittsylvania County feel unwelcome. Hudson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violation of the Establishment Clause. The district court entered summary judgment for Hudson and permanently enjoined Pittsylvania “from repeatedly opening its meetings with prayers associated with any one religion,” and struck the case from the active docket while retaining jurisdiction. Hudson sought attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $59,679.92.1. A magistrate judge recommended an award of $53,229.92 and the district court adopted the recommendation. Pittsylvania filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), 175 days after the court entered its order. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the merits appeal as untimely and affirmed the award of fees. View "Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cnty, Va." on Justia Law

Universal, a leather wholesaler located in North Carolina, filed suit against Koro, a leather company in Argentina, in North Carolina state court, alleging breach of contract. Koro removed to federal court and the district court granted its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Universal met its initial burden of demonstrating that Koro purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state by submitting affidavits stating that Koro contacted Universal in the forum state, conducted repeated in-person solicitations and meetings concerning the parties' business relationship there, and engaged in numerous business transactions over a two-year period. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Universal Leather v. KORO AR" on Justia Law

The district court entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney, Peter A.T. Sartin. Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him and to appeal the clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal two days late. The appeal was voluntarily abandoned. Sartin then filed a malpractice suit against the McNair Firm and the district court granted the Firm's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court's original intent was to impose sanctions on Sartin individually and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order. Because the court concluded that the district court's earlier case properly employed Rule 60(a), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm's failure to appeal the earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order caused Sartin no injury. The court disposed of Sartin's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern appealed the district court's order remanding to state court a claim brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Norfolk also petitioned for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's order and either dismissing the case, or alternatively, remanding to the district court to address the merits of its federal defense to the FELA claim. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred review of the district court's order by appeal or via mandamus; Norfolk Southern has not established entitlement to mandamus relief because it has not shown a clear and indisputable right to such relief; and, accordingly, the court dismissed Norfolk Southern's appeal and deny its mandamus petition.View "In re: Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

GEICO appealed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment against them on the issue of liability in an action asserting denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiffs cross-appealed an order granting partial summary judgment against them on several issues relating to the remedy to be awarded. With no final decision to review, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeals before it. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeals.View "Calderon v. GEICO General Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Colgate and others, asserting that each of the defendants' products had at some point exposed them to asbestos. Colgate removed to federal court on the basis of diversity citizenship. The district court remanded to federal court. The federal removal statute immunizes from review any order remanding to state court a case removed to federal court, with an exception for certain civil rights cases or suits against federal officers. Colgate argued that a federal court may strike a remand order and retrieve a remanded case from its state cousin as a sanction against plaintiffs' counsel for making misrepresentation to the federal court related to the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the face of Congress' explicit direction to federal courts that an order remanding a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after it has been removed "is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, " 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), the court rejected Colgate's collateral attack on the remand orders and affirmed the order of the district court insofar as it ruled that it lacked jurisdiction.View "Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co." on Justia Law

Respondent filed suit in state court against multiple defendants alleging various construction defects in her home. Petitioners, a subset of defendants, filed a petition in federal court to compel respondent to arbitrate her claims against them based on an arbitration clause in the warranty. The court remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the petition for want of subject matter jurisdiction because petitioners failed to join necessary and indispensable parties, some of which were non-diverse from resopndent, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.View "Home Buyers Warranty Corp. v. Hanna" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Chevron sought documents from two Maryland-based attorneys who assisted the lead attorney representing Ecuadorian plaintiffs in a multi-billion dollar judgment rendered in Ecuador against Chevron. The district court ordered production of the requested documents and the attorneys appealed. The court dismissed appeal number 13-1382 based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the district court's order on Chevron's Rule 45 subpoenas because the finality rule prohibits such an interlocutory appeal, and affirmed the lower court's judgment in appeal number 13-2028 under 28 U.S.C. 1872 based on the lead attorney's waiver and two other independent bases to permit discovery of the documents at issue. View "Chevron Corp. v. Page" on Justia Law

Crane, one of the many defendants in this asbestos litigation, removed this case to federal court, asserting a federal defense to plaintiff's state tort claims. Plaintiff amended his complaint, eliminating the claims underlying that federal defense, and the district court remanded to state court. Crane appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because this case was originally removed under the federal officer removal statute. The court affirmed the district court's decision to remand where Crane complained that it should have been given the opportunity to assert a new basis for federal jurisdiction but it had declined to do so in a timely fashion. View "Wood v. Crane Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the EPA seeking declaratory relief in connection with its administrative enforcement proceedings against her. CBF moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion as untimely. The court concluded that when CBF moved to intervene, the proceedings had already reached a relatively advanced stage. Further, CBF conceded that its belated intervention would cause some delay and would require plaintiffs to expend "extra effort." CBF's deliberate forbearance understandably engendered little sympathy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene. View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Alt" on Justia Law