Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a consent decree that was negotiated by the parties and previously approved by the district court. The decree prohibits the Receivership Estate of ERP Environmental Fund, Inc. from conducting surface coal mining at certain sites unless it is necessary for and incidental to reclamation of the site. The question presented is whether that prohibition also applies to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site—the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine in Lincoln County, West Virginia. The district court held that it did, stating that all third-party permit transferees are bound by the terms of the consent decree.The consent decree originated from a 2011 citizen suit under the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that now-defunct Patriot Coal Corporation and three of its subsidiaries violated federal environmental laws by discharging excessive amounts of selenium in connection with its surface mining operations. To resolve the litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia approved.In 2020, ERP ran out of money and ceased all operations. As a result, a West Virginia state court appointed Doss Special Receiver, LLC to administer ERP’s Receivership Estate. In 2022, the Receiver sought to finance its administration of the Receivership Estate by authorizing third parties to surface mine at a former Patriot Coal facility—the Buck Fork Surface Mine. The Conservation Groups intervened, arguing that such surface mining would violate Paragraph 63 of the Decree. The district court agreed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions. The court held that the district court's interpretation of the consent decree could not be squared with the plain text of the decree. The court found that the consent decree's prohibition on surface mining did not apply to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site. The court concluded that neither Paragraph 24 nor Paragraph 25 of the decree would bind a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine to Paragraph 63's prohibition on surface mining, a prohibition that expressly applies only to ERP and its Affiliated Companies. View "West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. ERP Environmental Fund, Inc" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a private school, Concordia Preparatory School, was sued by a student and her mother for alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally-funded educational programs. The plaintiffs claimed that the school's tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) constituted federal financial assistance, thus making it subject to Title IX.The school moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not receive federal financial assistance and was therefore not subject to Title IX. The district court denied the school's motion, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the school's tax-exempt status constituted federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes. However, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on this issue.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court reasoned that while tax exemption is a benefit, it is not equivalent to "receiving Federal financial assistance" as required by Title IX. The court explained that the term "assistance" implies aid, help, or support, which suggests a grant of funds. Tax exemption, however, is merely the withholding of a tax burden rather than an affirmative grant of funds. Furthermore, the court distinguished tax exemption from the indirect receipt of federal funds as was the case in Grove City College v. Bell.As such, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that tax-exempt status does not equate to "receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined a dispute between the plaintiffs, John and Dawn Harrell, and the defendant, Douglas DeLuca. The Harrells sued DeLuca, a general contractor from whom they purchased a home, for fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DeLuca regarding the Harrells’ fraud claims based on one category of misrepresentations. The case otherwise proceeded to a bench trial where the court found DeLuca liable for breaching the contract, but not for the remaining claims. The Harrells appealed, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the district court should have made explicit findings related to their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims.The Court of Appeals upheld parts of the lower court's decision but also vacated parts of it. It agreed with the Harrells that the summary judgment was inappropriate, vacated it, and remanded the case for additional proceedings. It also agreed that the district court should have made explicit findings related to one of each of their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims. However, it affirmed the resolutions of the remaining claims which were not challenged by the Harrells on appeal. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Harrell v. Deluca" on Justia Law

This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and involved the Estate of Arturo Giron Alvarez and 773 other plaintiffs, who brought claims against The Rockefeller Foundation (TRF), alleging the foundation's involvement in nonconsensual human medical experiments in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948. The experiments involved exposing people to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) to study the diseases and potential treatments. The defendants had previously filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, specifically challenging the decision relating to TRF.The appeal hinged on the question of whether Dr. Soper, an Associate Director of TRF who was assigned to the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) in Guatemala during the time of the experiments, was acting as an agent of TRF, thus making TRF liable for his actions. The court found that despite TRF paying Dr. Soper's salary during his time at the PASB, there was no indication that TRF was directing or controlling Dr. Soper’s work. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Dr. Soper considered himself no longer with TRF, and the PASB's constitution prohibited him from taking outside direction.The court concluded that TRF's connection to the experiments was too tenuous to be held liable for them. It affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TRF, stating that Dr. Soper was not an agent of TRF during the time of the experiments. View "In re Estate of Alvarez v. Rockefeller Foundation" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The case originated from a lending relationship between Jeffrey Frye and his companies, The Wall Guy, Inc., and JR Contractors, and First State Bank. After the relationship soured, both parties sued each other, leading to nearly a decade of litigation involving two state-court lawsuits, a jury trial, post-trial motions, removal to federal district court, and motions practice in that court. However, the appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.The court determined that the plaintiffs had not properly invoked the court's appellate jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had filed a notice of appeal before the district court had announced a decision on a future or pending motion, which under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), was insufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction over a later order related to that motion.The court also determined that the plaintiffs had not established a timely notice of appeal regarding other orders. The court emphasized that while the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be liberally construed, they cannot be ignored, especially when they implicate the court's appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals. View "The Wall Guy, Inc. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence, wrongful death, and survival claims arising from the death of Eleusipa Van Emburgh who was treated at a Navy medical center. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that regulations enacted under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 do not impose additional jurisdictional requirements beyond those listed in 28 U.S.C § 2675. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision for six of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff, Imelda Crovetto, who failed to satisfy one of the jurisdictional requirements listed in § 2675.The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdictional requirements laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 were the sole source of jurisdictional requirements for the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. The court found that the implementing regulations did not impose additional jurisdictional requirements. The plaintiffs satisfied these jurisdictional requirements when they submitted their claims to the agency, included a specific valuation of their claims, and waited until after their claims were denied before filing suit. View "Estate of Eleusipa Van Emburgh v. US" on Justia Law

Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda, a citizen of El Salvador, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his ongoing civil detention during his ongoing withholding-only proceedings was unlawful. He had been ordered removed to El Salvador but had instigated withholding-only proceedings claiming a fear of torture if returned to El Salvador. The length of his detention, pending the resolution of those proceedings, had exceeded the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.Vasquez Castaneda failed to show that his removal from the U.S. was not significantly likely to happen in the foreseeable future. The court reasoned that ongoing withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, do not present the same risk of "indefinite and potentially permanent" detention at issue in Zadvydas. Furthermore, the court rejected Vasquez Castaneda's assertion that due process requires another bond hearing before an immigration judge given his circumstances. The court emphasized that Vasquez Castaneda's ongoing detention was directly tied to the proceedings he voluntarily initiated and that these proceedings would eventually conclude. The court also noted that Vasquez Castaneda had received ample process since his detention began, including a bond hearing, numerous custody reviews by ICE, and the very habeas proceedings in question. View "Castaneda v. Perry" on Justia Law

In this case, a South Carolina court-appointed receiver brought an action against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company and other insurers, alleging breaches of insurance policies issued to a defunct company within a state receivership. Travelers removed the action to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. However, the district court granted the receiver’s motion to remand the case back to state court. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case involved property of a state receivership exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state court (based on the doctrine articulated in Barton v. Barbour), and the removal lacked unanimous consent of all defendants due to a forum selection clause in some of the insurance policies issued to the defunct company.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court's conclusions in support of remand were at least colorably supported. The court found that the district court's reliance on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and procedural defect as grounds for remand were colorably supported, and thus, not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Protopapas v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand two lawsuits back to Maryland state court. The lawsuits were brought by the City of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County against more than 20 energy companies, including BP P.L.C. The local governments accused the companies of misrepresenting and concealing information about the environmental impact of their fossil fuel products in violation of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act and various state tort laws. The companies tried to remove the cases to federal court, arguing that because they had acted under federal authority in their operations, the court had federal question jurisdiction. However, the appeals court found that the company's activities related to fossil fuel production were not relevant to the claims brought by the local governments, which were based on alleged concealment or misrepresentation of information about fossil fuel products. The court also rejected the companies' argument that the First Amendment question related to their right to free speech provided a basis for federal jurisdiction, as this question was a defense rather than a necessary element of the plaintiffs' state-law claims. View "Anne Arundel County v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law