Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Massey took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff and vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 2001. He remained in the country until 2008 when he was ordered removed. In 2015, Petitioner was charged with federal bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. In 2016, he was convicted of those charges after pleading guilty and sentenced to 44 months in prison. Based on Petitioner’s convictions, in August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings against Petitioner. And also, because of those convictions, in September 2019, DHS moved to terminate his asylum status. Petitioner conceded he was removable based on the bank fraud and identity theft proceedings but requested the IJ waive those grounds for his removal. Petitioner also applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. And he separately sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for a waiver. Petitioner asked the Fourth Circuit to grant his petition for review and vacate the BIA’s decision determining that the termination of his asylum status renders him ineligible to seek an adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident under Section 1159(b).   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that Section 1159(b) unambiguously precludes an alien whose asylum status has been terminated from adjusting to lawful permanent resident status. On that basis, Petitioner’s argument fails at step one of the Chevron test. Since Petitioner’s asylum status had been terminated at the time he sought to adjust to lawful permanent resident status, he was not eligible for that adjustment. View "Tiger Cela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three sales representatives who alleged that their employer, a food-products distributor, did not pay them the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). Their employer defended on the ground that the plaintiffs fell within the Act’s “outside sales” exemption, which excuses overtime pay for employees who work outside the office and whose primary duty is making sales. The district court found that Plaintiffs were owed overtime pay because their employer had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they came within the outside sales exemption. The court also awarded liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, finding that the employer had not shown objectively reasonable grounds for the challenged pay practices. The court concluded, the Plaintiffs had not shown that their employer willfully violated the Act. Both parties appealed: The employer challenged the district court’s liability finding and its award of liquidated damages, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed the court’s willfulness finding and attendant application of the two-year statute of limitations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that the defendants had only an “aspirational” and not a “concrete” sense of what their sales representatives did and, specifically, their ability to make sales at chain stores. Further, the court explained that the FLSA clearly contemplates as much, establishing as the default rule both the award of liquidated damages – predicated on the absence of objective reasonableness – and a two-year statute of limitations – predicated on a non-willful violation. View "Faustino Carrera v. E.M.D. Sales Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant victimized over a million Americans by furthering a country-wide “scareware” scam that tricked innocent computer users into paying for unnecessary software to remedy entirely fabricated issues purported to plague their devices. An apparent fugitive—having sought for years to evade paying even a cent of the $163,167,539.95 in restitution ordered for her role in the scheme—Defendant sought vacatur of that aging monetary judgment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that an arguable basis clearly supported the judgment imposed, and it cannot be said that there was a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “clear usurpation of power” such that any defect renders the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Further, the court explained that Defendant’s aggregated circumstances are not extraordinary such that she is entitled to vacatur under Rule 60(b) catch-all, and the district court soundly exercised its discretion in denying her such relief. This outcome is wholly consonant with our directive to “delicately balance the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Thus, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant remained liable for $163,167,539.95 in restitution—an amount that would justly recompense the victims. View "FTC v. Kristy Ross" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that because of circumstances beyond his control, he did not receive notice of the district court’s judgment for over 90 days after it was entered, and he filed a notice of appeal shortly after he did receive notice. In response, the Fourth Circuit found his notice of appeal untimely, but the court construed the notice as a timely motion to reopen the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which implements an exception found in 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(c), and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then entered an order under Rule 4(a)(6), reopening the time for noticing an appeal for 14 days from the date of its order. Plaintiff, however, failed to file a notice of appeal within the window so provided.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The court explained that Section 2107(c) of Title 28, which is the statute prescribing the timing requirements for filing appeals in civil actions, provides that a would-be appellant who does not receive timely notice of a judgment and thereafter fails to file a timely notice of appeal may nonetheless request — not more than 180 days after the judgment is entered — that the district court exercise its discretion to reopen the time for appeal by providing a new 14-day window within which to file a notice of appeal. Compliance with this narrow supplemental opportunity for filing a timely notice of appeal is especially significant because the times specified by statute for filing appeals in civil actions are jurisdictional. View "Donte Parrish v. US" on Justia Law

This dispute involves several insurers and one defendant insurer’s alleged duty to defend a lawsuit brought against a general contractor of a residential building project. The district court entered partial summary judgment, holding that the defendant insurer had a duty to defend the general contractor in the underlying action for construction defects. The court also issued a stay of other issues raised by the parties, and administratively closed the case. After the defendant insurer filed the present appeal, the underlying action was resolved in a settlement agreement.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the present interlocutory appeal challenging the defendant insurer’s duty to defend the general contractor. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal. The court explained that while the relief granted in the district court’s order originally may have been prospective in nature, the resolution of the underlying action has eliminated from that order any forward-looking mandate. Thus, the court explained that the order before the court in this appeal currently lacks the character of an injunction and does not require the court to consider any question separate from issues that may be appealed after entry of a final judgment in the district court. View "Westfield Insurance Company v. Selective Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)(the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. The court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that age was the but-for cause of her 2018 nonrenewal. Plaintiff was not meeting Liberty’s legitimate expectations at the time of her nonrenewal in that she repeatedly failed to develop a digital art skillset. And Plaintiff has failed to contend with the fact that the comments she characterizes as evidence of age discrimination — the retirement comments plus the resistant-to-change comment — were made subsequent to the Chair and the Dean having resolved not to renew her teaching contract for the 2018-19 school year. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law