Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a deaf and blind inmate, claims he was denied the same access and enjoyment available to inmates without disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). And he contends the prison’s head covering policies substantially burdened his Islamic faith as prohibited by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the prison on Plaintiff’s ADA claim. But vacated the district court’s order rejecting the RLUIPA claim and remanded. The court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude on the record that the accommodations provided to Plaintiff did not afford him “meaningful access” to all programs at the prison.   However, the court found that the policy required Plaintiff to either violate his religious beliefs— by refraining from wearing a head covering at all times—or risk discipline at the prison for violating the policy. In other words, the prison’s head-covering policy placed Plaintiff between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Doing so substantially burdens his religious beliefs under the RLUIPA. Thus, the court found that Plaintiff met his burden of showing that the prior policy imposed a substantial burden. Thus, the court vacated that portion of the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "David Richardson v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

After East Carolina University (“ECU”) dismissed Plaintiff from its School of Social Work’s Master’s Degree program, Neal sued the university alleging that its decision discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to ECU based on its conclusion that Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact to support two elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. It determined that the record did not show that (1) she was “otherwise qualified to participate in ECU’s” program or (2) ECU dismissed her “on the basis of” her disability. Plaintiff challenged both grounds on appeal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that for purposes of assessing ADA compliance, universities have a responsibility to the entire academic community and to the public to ensure that a student is qualified to meet the lawful requirements of their program, especially where, as here, conferral of a degree is a prerequisite to state licensure requirements. ECU properly exercised its discretion in that regard and assisted Plaintiff during her enrollment in the MSW Program. It gave her a second chance with the out-of-order readmission in the Spring 2014 semester. She received a third chance in the Fall 2014 semester following the A&R Committee proceeding. And MSW Program faculty gave her a fourth chance as they tried to work with her thereafter. Now, Plaintiff wants to force ECU to provide a fifth chance. The ADA contains no such requirement given an absence of evidence supporting her claim of discriminatory dismissal. View "Olivia Neal v. East Carolina University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims against the U.S. Attorney General because she failed an allegedly discriminatory physical-fitness test that was a condition of her federal employment and was told to either retake the test, resign, or be fired. She resigned. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing, finding that her resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action” that could serve as the basis of either claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. The court held that the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. View "Jane DiCocco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff s a disabled prisoner who walks with a cane, yet he was denied a handicap pass to access the first-floor library for seven months. Because of that denial, Plaintiff was forced to climb two flights of stairs to get to the general-population library. Plaintiff asserted that this exertion caused him serious pain, made his old injuries worse, and caused him new injuries. Plaintiff filed a pro se civil suit seeking compensatory damages for the aggravated injuries to his legs. The district court granted summary judgment to North Carolina on Plaintiff’s ADA claims because the ADA does not provide a remedy for negligence.   The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court explained that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, plaintiffs can only get compensatory damages for intentional discrimination. What showing that requires is an open question in the Fourth Circuit, but it at least requires deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s federally protected rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference, the district court was right to grant summary judgment to the State of North Carolina. View "Rodney Koon v. State of North Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint -- which alleges whistleblower protection and discrimination claims relative to his employment at the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (the “DEA” or the “Agency”) -- for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the whistleblower protection claims, and the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. However, the court remanded the case to the district court so that it may consider in the first instance whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Appellant’s discrimination claims.   The court explained that Appellant points out that if an IRA appeal cannot serve as the basis for a mixed case, then an employee alleging both WPA claims and discrimination claims would be required to pursue those claims separately. But because the MSPB cannot consider an employee’s discrimination allegations as part of his IRA appeal, his WPA claims and his discrimination claims are, by necessity, already bifurcated.   Lastly, Appellant argues that even if he failed to allege a mixed case, the district court should still have considered his discrimination claims. However, the district court considered only whether Appellant’s discrimination claims were properly before it as part of a mixed case, not whether it could adjudicate the Title VII claims independently of the other claims. Accordingly, remand is necessary for the district court to decide in the first instance whether it may address the merits of Appellant’s Title VII claims. View "Robert Zachariasiewicz, Jr. v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to multiple instances of racial harassment and other discrimination during two periods of employment with the defendant Oakland Living Center, Inc. (“OLC”). According to Plaintiff, she was compelled to resign for good in the summer of 2018 after repeatedly being called racial slurs by the six-year-old son of an OLC supervisor and others (collectively “Defendants”).   Plaintiff contests the district court’s award of summary judgment to OLC on her hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the claims against OLC.   The court explained that in considering all of the circumstances, the fact that the three n-word incidents were perpetrated by a six-year-old boy does not preclude a finding that those incidents are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Plaintiff’s conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. Accordingly, the court rejected OLC’s contention that it is entitled to summary judgment for lack of an adequate showing on the third element of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.   Further, here, the record indicates that OLC failed to provide reasonable procedures for complaints of workplace harassment. OLC has produced no evidence that it had any harassment reporting policy in July and August 2018, when the three n-word incidents occurred. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could charge OLC with constructive knowledge of all three n-word incidents. View "Tonya Chapman v. Oakland Living Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a transgender woman with gender dysphoria, spent six months incarcerated in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. Though prison deputies initially assigned her to women’s housing, they quickly moved her to men’s housing when they learned that she was transgender. There, she experienced delays in medical treatment for her gender dysphoria, harassment by other inmates, and persistent and intentional misgendering and harassment by prison deputies. Following her release from the detention center, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action against the Sheriff of Fairfax County, a prison deputy, and a prison nurse alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Constitution, and state common law. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the complaint failed to state grounds for relief with respect to some claims and that the statute of limitations barred others.The Fourth Circuit reversed the remanded the district court’s ruling. The court held that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does not fall within the ADA’s exclusion for “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.” In addition, the court held that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to her Original Complaint and that she has stated claims of gross negligence against the Sheriff and Deputy. View "Kesha Williams v. Stacey Kincaid" on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff s an inmate at United States Penitentiary (“USP”) Hazelton who filed a pro se civil action in United States district court alleging violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for denied and delayed medical care of his chronic illnesses. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Following the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the district court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion on the grounds that he did not meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court explained that a plain reading of the statute requires that litigants allege sufficient specific facts to demonstrate a nexus between the claims presented and the imminent danger alleged. Here, both parties agree that it is a “commonsense requirement that a prisoner’s allegation of imminent danger must relate to their underlying claims.” Moreover, the Government concedes that “a fairly traceable relationship exists between Plaintiff’s alleged imminent danger and the claims set forth in his FTCA complaint, as they both arise from his allegations of delay and denial of medical treatment.” Plaintiff has passed this threshold because he alleged that the prison’s continued denial and delay in providing medical treatment are directly causing his worsening physical and medical conditions which present an imminent danger of serious physical injury.Finally, since the district court did not have access to Defendant’s medical records and, thus, did not have a complete record to determine whether Defendant satisfied the “imminent danger” exception based on the court's clarified standard, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Marc Hall v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency alleging religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that because the alleged discrimination and retaliation arose from Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy additional security requirements and would require the court to review the merits of the security-authorization decision, the court is bound by the decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), to affirm the district court’s dismissal of this matter for lack of jurisdiction.   The court explained that it agrees that courts must exercise caution in expanding the reach of Egan. Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt the hardline position, urged by Plaintiff, that Egan’s rationale may only ever apply to determinations explicitly labeled “security clearances.” Rather, as in Foote and Sanchez, this case requires a more detailed analysis of whether the judgment at issue is of the type that Egan intended to shield from judicial review. Furhter, the court held that the CIA’s decision to stop Plaintiff’s assignee-security authorization processing is the kind of discretionary predictive judgment shielded from judicial review by Egan. View "Nathan Mowery v. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law