Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications.Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

A United States citizen, formerly known as Paul Anderson and now Saadiq Long, was placed on the federal government’s Terrorist Screening Dataset (commonly called the Terrorist Watchlist) and, at one point, on its No Fly List subset. After experiencing travel restrictions, employment issues, and other alleged harms, Long challenged his placement on these lists, asserting constitutional and statutory violations. He claimed that his inclusion was based on impermissible factors such as race, religion, and protected activities, and that the government’s information-sharing practices and redress procedures were unlawful. While the litigation was ongoing, Long was removed from the No Fly List, but remained on the broader Watchlist. He also alleged that his Watchlist status led to the denial of credentials necessary for his work as a truck driver.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially transferred some of Long’s claims to the Fourth Circuit and stayed others. After Long’s removal from the No Fly List, a prior Fourth Circuit panel found his No Fly List claims moot and remanded for the district court to determine which claims remained justiciable. On remand, the district court dismissed all of Long’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that his removal from the No Fly List mooted those claims and that he lacked standing for his Watchlist-related claims, as his alleged injuries were either resolved or not sufficiently imminent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in FBI v. Fikre, Long’s removal from the No Fly List did not necessarily moot his claims, as the government had not shown it could not repeat the challenged conduct. The court also found that Long had standing to challenge his Watchlist status based on the denial of transportation credentials, and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of his claims. View "Long v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A prisoner at Eastern Correctional Institution was suspected of possessing a knife, prompting two correctional officers to search him. The officers escorted the prisoner and his cellmate to a recreation area, where a strip search occurred. The parties dispute the events that followed: the officers claimed the prisoner was noncompliant and bit one of them during a struggle, while the prisoner alleged he complied with orders and was then violently assaulted without justification, suffering injuries to his head, neck, and back. Medical records documented a bruise and other injuries, and the prisoner sought treatment over several months. An internal investigation cleared the officers of wrongdoing.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the prisoner’s state law claims and claims against a supervisory official, then granted summary judgment to the correctional officers on the remaining Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. The district court found that the undisputed evidence did not support a finding that the officers acted maliciously or sadistically, and characterized the prisoner’s injuries as minor. The court also denied the prisoner’s requests for discovery and for appointment of counsel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding the amount and justification for the force used, as well as the officers’ intent. The court found that the prisoner’s verified complaint and medical evidence could support a finding of more than de minimis force and potentially malicious conduct. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the prisoner to renew his motion for counsel and proceed to trial. View "Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2020, Maurice Wells participated in a protest outside the Alamance County courthouse in North Carolina, which focused on issues including solidarity with George Floyd and opposition to the local sheriff. During the protest, a confrontation occurred between Wells and counterprotestors over the ringing of a courthouse bell. Sheriff Terry Johnson, concerned about escalating tensions, ordered the crowd to disperse. When Wells refused to comply and continued shouting, Johnson arrested him. Wells was subsequently charged with failure to disperse and disorderly conduct. He was convicted in North Carolina District Court after the judge rejected his First Amendment defense, and his appeal of that conviction remains pending.While his state criminal appeal was ongoing, Wells filed a civil suit against Sheriff Johnson, alleging that his arrest was unconstitutional and constituted retaliation for protected speech. He sought only a declaratory judgment stating that the arrest violated his First Amendment rights, arguing that such a declaration would address both past and potential future harms. Johnson removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment for Johnson, holding that Wells’s state conviction established probable cause and precluded his claims, and that Wells lacked evidence for his alternative theory of viewpoint discrimination. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether Wells had standing to seek the declaratory relief requested. The Fourth Circuit held that Wells lacked standing because the declaratory judgment he sought would not provide constitutionally adequate redress for his alleged injuries, either past or future. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court, as required when federal jurisdiction is lacking in a removed case. View "Wells v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old student, S.B., who had a history of trauma and mental health challenges, began high school in Appomattox County, Virginia, in August 2021. S.B. identified as male at school and was advised by a counselor that he could use the boys’ restroom. Following this, S.B. was subjected to harassment, threats, and sexual assault by male students. School staff, including counselors, were aware of the harassment and S.B.’s mental health vulnerabilities but did not inform S.B.’s adoptive mother, Blair, about the gender identity issues, the bullying, or the school’s responses. Instead, staff continued to affirm S.B.’s male identity without parental notification and failed to take effective action to stop the harassment. After a series of escalating incidents, S.B. suffered a breakdown, ran away, and was subsequently victimized by sex traffickers.Blair filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the school board and staff, alleging deliberate indifference to sexual harassment under Title IX, Monell liability for unconstitutional policy or failure to train, and violations of substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed all claims, finding insufficient allegations of deliberate indifference or Monell liability, and granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the due process claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that Blair’s Title IX claim for deliberate indifference against the school board was sufficiently pleaded and should not have been dismissed, as the complaint alleged the school’s response to known harassment was clearly unreasonable. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the Monell and substantive due process claims, finding the allegations were conclusory or the rights not clearly established. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Title IX claim. View "Blair v. Appomattox County School Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Jane Roe, a student at Marshall University, who was sexually assaulted by her ex-boyfriend, John Doe, at an off-campus party following a football game in September 2022. Roe reported the incident to the police, who then informed the university. The university's Title IX office reviewed the case but determined it fell outside their jurisdiction as the incident occurred off-campus and was not part of a university-sponsored event. The matter was referred to the Office of Student Conduct, which investigated and disciplined both Doe and Roe for their respective violations of the Student Code.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Roe filed a lawsuit against the Marshall University Board of Governors, alleging deliberate indifference and retaliation under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the university, finding that the university's response did not amount to deliberate indifference and that the university did not retaliate against Roe for reporting the assault.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the university did not have substantial control over the context of the harassment, as the incident occurred at a private off-campus residence. Additionally, the court found that Roe failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the university's reasons for disciplining her were pretextual. The court concluded that the university's actions were not retaliatory and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the university. View "Roe v. Marshall University Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Evy Orellana suffered serious injuries when a tactical canine bit her leg as a U.S. Marshals fugitive task force executed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Eric Trinidad. Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived in the basement of Trinidad’s mother’s home. The officers breached a sealed door to access the basement, and the dog bit Orellana during the search. Orellana sued the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, claiming a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable search and seizure.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the case was similar enough to Bivens to apply its cause of action. The court also denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that this case presented a new context for Bivens because the officers were part of a specialized federal-state task force operating under a warrant. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Bivens to new contexts, particularly when Congress is better suited to create a cause of action. The court concluded that special factors, including federalism concerns and the existence of alternative remedial procedures, counseled against extending Bivens in this situation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, denying Orellana a Bivens remedy. View "Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Godec" on Justia Law

Zachary Hebb challenged a municipal ordinance in Asheville, North Carolina, that prohibited the use of amplified sound within 150 feet of a medical clinic during its operating hours. Hebb, who regularly protested outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, argued that the ordinance infringed on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He preferred using a sound amplifier to communicate his message without yelling. After being cited for violating the ordinance, Hebb filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially granted Hebb a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance likely violated his First Amendment rights and was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied Asheville's motions to dismiss and later granted Hebb's motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining the ordinance and awarding nominal damages for the due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Asheville's motions to dismiss Hebb's First Amendment claim but reversed the summary judgment in Hebb's favor, finding that there were disputed factual and legal questions that warranted further consideration. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and served a significant government interest in protecting patients from harmful noise. However, it concluded that the entry of summary judgment was premature.Regarding Hebb's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the 2021 version of the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to prevent Hebb from using a plastic cone. The court found that the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited and included sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Hebb v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

Terrence Hammock, a detainee at the Baltimore County Detention Center (BCDC), filed a lawsuit alleging severe violations of his constitutional rights. He claimed that BCDC served him rotten and unsafe food, causing him to get sick multiple times and lose weight. Additionally, Hammock, a practicing Muslim, alleged that he was denied the ability to attend Jum’ah services, a central practice of Islam, throughout his detention from September 2019 to at least March 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Hammock’s claims. The court found that his allegations regarding the food did not meet the standard of a “serious deprivation of a basic human need” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It also held that the denial of Jum’ah services was justified by legitimate penological interests, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied Hammock’s motion for appointed counsel, stating that the case had not yet proceeded to discovery or trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Hammock’s claims. The appellate court held that Hammock sufficiently pleaded a claim of deliberate indifference based on the conditions of confinement, specifically the provision of rotten and mice-bitten food. The court also found that Hammock adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim, as the defendants did not present a penological interest to justify the denial of Jum’ah services for the entire period in question. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Hammock’s claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the appointment of counsel for Hammock. View "Hammock v. Watts" on Justia Law

Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson Island, Maryland, sought to build an assisted living facility for elderly people with disabilities. The Gibson Island Corporation, a homeowners association, opposed the project, citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting business use of homes without approval. Lussi requested an exemption as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Maryland law, but the Corporation imposed four conditions, which Lussi found unreasonable. Negotiations failed, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the Corporation, finding that Lussi could not show the requested accommodation was necessary for providing equal housing opportunities. The court also dismissed Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims, concluding there was no evidence of adverse actions or discriminatory intent by the Corporation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the necessity element by focusing on the removal of the Corporation's conditions rather than the requested exemption itself. The appellate court held that the exemption was necessary to provide equal housing opportunities for disabled individuals on Gibson Island. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Corporation's conditions, which should be resolved by a jury.Additionally, the appellate court determined that Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims presented jury questions. The court noted evidence suggesting the Corporation's stated reasons for opposing the project might be pretextual and that community hostility towards disabled residents could imply discriminatory intent.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp." on Justia Law