Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying Proposed Intervenors' renewed motion to intervene in an action brought by the NAACP challenging the validity of Senate Bill 824. S.B. 824 established, inter alia, photographic voter identification requirements for elections in North Carolina.After determining that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, the court held that the Proposed Intervenors have Article III standing to intervene for the purposes of intervention before the district court based on N.C. Gen Stat. 1-72.2 and Supreme Court precedent. The court rejected the arguments of the NAACP and the State Defendants that section 1-72.2 infringes on the powers of the Executive Branch in violation of the North Carolina Constitution's separation of powers provisions.In regard to intervention as a matter of right, the court held that the district court erred in determining that the Proposed Intervenors lacked a sufficient interest in the S.B. 824 litigation without careful consideration of section 1-72.2(a). Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to more fully consider the North Carolina statute in the analysis of the Proposed Intervenors' interest in the litigation. Because the Proposed Intervenors may have interests which may be practically impaired if not permitted to intervene in the action before the district court, the court remanded as to this issue as well. The court further stated that, although it was appropriate for the district court to apply the Westinghouse presumption since the Proposed Intervenors and the State Defendants appear to seek the same ultimate objective, the district court erred in demanding that the Proposed Intervenors overcome that presumption by the heightened standard of a "strong showing." In regard to permissive intervention, the court held that the district court failed to address sections 1-72.2(a) and (b) and 120-32.6. Given the import of those statutes, the court remanded for consideration of the permissive intervention request. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Deputy Commonwealth Attorney for Carroll County, Virginia, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her former employer violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by terminating her in retaliation for reporting alleged sex discrimination.In line with Fourth Circuit precedent and the majority of courts to consider the question, the court held that a pure retaliation claim is not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. The court explained that, to the extent a public employee contends she suffered adverse consequences for expressing complaints or reporting discrimination to her employer, her claim arises under the First Amendment. Furthermore, to the extent a public employee links an alleged retaliatory action to her gender, that allegation would constitute part of an equal protection discrimination claim, not a freestanding retaliation claim. In this case, plaintiff has not made such an allegation, nor has she pleaded a First Amendment action. Rather, the right to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination upon which plaintiff solely relies is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause. The court noted that these existing legal avenues challenging public employer retaliation remain open to employees, but declined to create a new one under the auspices of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Equal Protection Clause. View "Wilcox v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a malicious prosecution claim. In this case, defendant arrested plaintiff and charged him with congregating on the sidewalk in violation of the City Code of Columbia, South Carolina. Defendant voluntarily dropped the charge over three years later. Plaintiff alleged that defendant arrested him without probable cause and ultimately dismissed the case because plaintiff was innocent.The court held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the termination of criminal proceedings against plaintiff. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court held that plaintiff has presented testimony that conflicts with defendant's explanation, as well as corroborating circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the nolle prosse was consistent with plaintiff's innocence. Therefore, in light of the evidence and the fact that the district court cannot weigh credibility at this stage, summary judgment was not appropriate. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Salley v. Myers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the State Defendants, challenging the constitutionality of Maryland's handgun licensing law, which is part of the Maryland Firearm Safety Act of 2013 (FSA), for violating their Second Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also challenged other FSA regulations as vague and ambiguous in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and separately attacked certain FSA regulations as ultra vires under Maryland law. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Defendants based on plaintiffs' lack of Article III standing.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that Atlantic Guns lacks both independent and third-party standing to bring a Second Amendment claim. In this case, the district court erroneously weighed the evidence by focusing on the extent of the economic injury as opposed to the existence of one; Atlantic Guns' owner and presidents' uncontroverted testimony and declaration, as well as the pertinent Maryland State Police records and Atlantic Guns' year-over-year sales records, are sufficient to establish an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing; Atlantic Guns' injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged statute; and the injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Furthermore, Atlantic Guns has standing to challenge the statute on behalf of potential customers like the Individual Plaintiffs and other similarly situated persons.The court also held that, because standing for one party on a given claim is sufficient to allow a case to proceed in its entirety on that issue, the court need not reach the question of whether the Individual Plaintiffs and MSI have standing to bring their Second Amendment claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals challenging the dismissal of petitioner's three habeas petitions, the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner adequately alleged that his due process rights were violated by (1) inadequate notice of the basis for revoking his suspended sentence, (2) undue delay in seeking revocation based on the violation, and (3) incarceration when he was previously adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity and civilly committed to receive treatment in a mental health hospital. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissals and remanded with instructions to the district court to consider the merits of petitioner's due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. View "Farabee v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of state officials on petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the state postconviction court reasonably denied petitioner's exhausted Strickland claims on the grounds that capital sentencing counsel thoroughly investigated and presented his available evidence in mitigation, and did not neglect a viable Confrontation Clause objection to his disciplinary record. The court also held that the district court properly denied petitioner's Strickland claim as insubstantial under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action challenging the "winner-take-all" aspect of South Carolina's process for appointing its nine Electors to the Electoral College.After determining that it has subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal, the court held that the winner-take-all process does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because it does not treat any particular group of voters in the State differently; the winner-take-all process does not violate plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it does not burden plaintiffs' right to freedom of association; and the winner-take-all process does not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In this case, while plaintiffs allege that Black voters in South Carolina are a minority group sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, the court stated that they fail to address what this means in the context of a statewide election. View "Baten v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate in custody of the VDOC, filed suit pro se alleging that the Director of the VDOC and three other VDOC officials violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fourteenth Amendment when they did not allow him to resume his job after a short hospitalization.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's ADA claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities, and in dismissing plaintiff's ADA and equal protection claims for injunctive relief against the Director in his official capacity. The court held that plaintiff's ADA and 42 U.S.C. 1983 equal protection claims were timely filed; plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of Title II and an equal protection claim; and defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity at this juncture. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of these claims. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Fauconier v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for damages against federal officers, invoking the implied cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.The Fourth Circuit held, contrary to the officers' suggestion, that the court's well-established forfeiture rules govern here, and those rules do not allow the officers to raise before the court a Bivens-related claim they never pressed in the district court. The court dismissed the portion of the officers' appeal contending that the district court misconstrued the record evidence, because, during this interlocutory posture, the court's jurisdiction is limited to issues of law and does not permit review of the district court's assessment of the factual record. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part the district court's order. View "Hicks v. Ferreyra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the four years that he spent in solitary confinement in prison. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a protected liberty interest.The Fourth Circuit vacated and held that plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating that his confinement conditions were severe in comparison to those that exist in general population and that his segregation status may have had collateral consequences relating to the length of his sentence. Furthermore, although the duration of plaintiff's segregated confinement is not as long as the substantial periods of segregated confinement that this court has found sufficient to support a protected liberty interest in the past, prisoners need not languish in solitary confinement for decades on end in order to possess a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the four-plus years that plaintiff spent in administrative segregation is significant enough to tip the scales in his favor, particularly in light of the other evidence of indefiniteness that he relies upon in this case. Therefore, the court held that there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff's conditions of confinement imposed a significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Collins" on Justia Law