Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Enrollees in the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees (NCSHP) sued, alleging that NCSHP discriminates against its transgender enrollees by categorically denying coverage for gender dysphoria treatments like counseling, hormone therapy, and surgical care, in violation of section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which prohibits “any health program or activity” that receives federal funds from discriminating against individuals on any ground prohibited by various federal statutes, including Title IX, 42 U.S.C. 18116(a).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of NCSHP’s motion to dismiss, asserting that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. NCSHP waived its immunity against this claim by accepting federal financial assistance. Under the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA), “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of . . . any other Federal Statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance,” 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7. View "Kadel v. North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees" on Justia Law

Doe, a student at a public school in Virginia, had recently undergone a gender transition. Vlaming, Doe’s French teacher, refused to use male pronouns to refer to Doe. Vlaming argued that using male pronouns to refer to someone who was born a female violated his religious beliefs. Eventually, the superintendent placed Vlaming on administrative leave and recommended his dismissal. After a hearing, the School Board dismissed Vlaming for failure to comply with his superiors’ directives and violations of policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment. Vlaming sued, alleging statutory and constitutional violations and breach of contract. The Board removed the case to federal court, arguing the district court had removal jurisdiction because it had federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1441(c), over whether Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The Board also argued that because Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, was a “law providing for equal rights,” section 1443(2), the civil rights removal statute, authorized removal.The district court granted Vlaming’s motion for remand. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Because none of Vlaming’s state law claims necessarily raises a federal issue, federal question jurisdiction is lacking, and section 1441(c) does not provide a basis for removal. The Supreme Court has limited the meaning of a “law providing for equal rights” in section 1443 to only those concerning racial equality. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

Stokes’s South childhood included extreme abuse and neglect. When Stokes was 13, his mother died, leaving Stokes parentless. Stokes repeated the eighth grade three times. Stokes, at age 15, became involved with Smith, a friend of his mother’s. They married. In 1988, Stokes was convicted of assaulting Smith with a knife. The couple reunited. In 1991, Stokes assaulted Smith again. After his release from prison, Stokes participated in the rape and murder of his cellmate’s ex-wife. Stokes penned a detailed confession. The jury also heard about the subsequent murder of Ferguson, who had been aware of the murder plot. Stokes pleaded guilty to Ferguson’s murder.Sims’s appointed attorneys for the 1998 trial conducted a mitigation investigation. For the penalty phase, they planned to argue that Stokes’s HIV-positive status made him suitable for a life sentence. On the eve of sentencing, Stokes withdrew his consent, refusing to allow his counsel to mention his HIV status. Counsel did not present any personal evidence, believing that “an Orangeburg County jury” at that time would not be receptive to evidence about his childhood and “white jurors might react especially to Stokes, a Black man, raping Snipes, a white woman. They presented a single mitigation witness, a retired prison warden, who refused to meet Stokes, or interview anyone who knew Stokes. His testimony was counter-productive. The prosecution presented robust aggravating evidence. Evidence of Stokes’s 1991 assault of Smith was especially relevant; Stokes’s lead trial counsel had personally prosecuted that case against Stokes. Stokes was sentenced to death.The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Post-conviction counsel were ineffective, providing good cause for Stokes’s procedural default of his claim. The failure to adequately investigate and present personal evidence was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial. View "Stokes v. Stirling" on Justia Law

In 1993, Plymail was convicted for a 1992 sexual assault. Plymail filed a notice of intent to appeal in March 1994. What followed was an ordeal spanning over 20 years, six lawyers, and multiple state courts. Many delays stemmed from disagreements with the attorneys, difficulty contacting them, various courts taking too long to rule on simple motions, and Plymail’s battle with ulcerative colitis. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed Plymail’s convictions in 2015.Plymail filed a federal habeas petition asserting that his incarceration was unconstitutional based on the delay of his appeal, comments made by the trial judge that coerced the jury into rendering a verdict, and improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. The district court rejected his claims. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Plymail is entitled to habeas relief based on the prosecutor’s improper statements exhorting the jury to protect women and send a message to the community and to “sadomasochistic” persons. Those statements rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny Plymail due process of law. View "Plymail v. Mirandy" on Justia Law

In 2008, Zito purchased a beachfront house and lot on Nags Head (a barrier island). In 2016, the house burned down. The lot is governed by North Carolina’s Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA): buildings with less than 5,000 square feet must be set back at least 60 feet or 30 times the local rate of erosion, whichever is farther, from the vegetation line. Buildings of less than 2,000 square feet built before June 1979 fall under a grandfather provision, requiring a setback of only 60 feet from the vegetation line. The Zito property qualifies for the grandfather provision but is set back only 12 feet from the vegetation line. In 2018, the coastline by the property eroded at an average rate of six feet per year. Experts indicate that coastal erosion and rising sea levels could cause the property to be underwater by 2024. The permit officer denied Zito’s application to rebuild The Coastal Resources Commission denied a variance, informing Zito of the right to appeal in state superior court.Zito filed suit in federal court, arguing that CAMA’s restrictions amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Commission qualifies as an arm of the state subject to the protection of sovereign immunity; the Eleventh Amendment bars Fifth Amendment taking claims against states in federal court where the state’s courts remain open to adjudicate such claims. View "Zito v. North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission" on Justia Law

Under the North Carolina Charter School Act, any child eligible to attend a public school may choose to attend a charter school, but no one is required to attend one. North Carolina charter schools are nominally public schools but are operated by private nonprofit corporations and are exempt from statutes applicable to local boards of education. Although charter schools must adopt policies governing student conduct and discipline, the state does not supervise the content of those policies. CDS, a nonprofit corporation, holds a charter to operate Charter Day School in rural Brunswick County, which currently educates over 900 elementary and middle school students. RBA (a for-profit entity) manages day-to-day operations at Charter Day, which operates as a school promoting traditional values. The school adopted a uniform policy. Three female students sued, challenging a requirement that girls wear either skirts, jumpers or skorts, instead of pants or shorts. The complaint cited the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on the equal protection claim but held that Title IX did not reach school dress codes. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The charter school was not a state actor when promulgating the dress code and is not subject to an equal protection claim but claims of sex discrimination related to a dress code are not categorically excluded from Title IX's scope. View "Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses from Montgomery County. Plaintiff's case stems from her action against the county for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability. The district court held that plaintiff is not eligible for such an award because she is not a "prevailing party" under 29 U.S.C. 794a(b).In this case, plaintiff won a jury verdict that found the county liable for discrimination and entitled plaintiff to equitable relief—at least until the county capitulated by transferring her to a call center called MC 311. The court thought that this case is more like Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), and concluded that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because she catalyzed the county to change its behavior by filing a lawsuit; rather, she is a prevailing party because she proved her claim to a jury before the county capitulated by transferring her to MC 311. The court noted that its holding is narrow, and that it would be unjust to hold that plaintiff did not prevail simply because the county's timely capitulation rendered unnecessary equitable relief that she would have otherwise been entitled to. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Ocean City's ordinance prohibiting public nudity, which prohibits only women from publicly showing their bare breasts. Plaintiffs contend that the gender classification in the ordinance could not withstand the heightened scrutiny required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Ocean City's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with the district court that Ocean City has established that prohibiting females from publicly showing their bare breasts is substantially related to an important government interest—protecting public sensibilities—and satisfies the heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause. The court declined to overrule United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–116 (4th Cir. 1991), which recognized that protecting the portion of society that disfavored public display of female breasts furthers an important governmental interest. In this case, the district court described the testimony from Ocean City's witnesses which indicated that many Ocean City residents and vacationers had voiced strong opposition to allowing public nudity in Ocean City. Furthermore, plaintiffs did not testify, choosing instead to rely upon an expert witness, whose opinion the district court did not find persuasive nor relevant to the issue at hand. View "Eline v. Town of Ocean City" on Justia Law

Marlowe supervised the jail where Kuntz was taken after leaving the scene of a minor accident with a high blood-alcohol level. Kuntz caused a disturbance, Marlowe beat Kuntz. Other officers slammed his head into the wall repeatedly. Officers observed Kuntz lying unconscious in his own vomit and tried to rouse him by pouring ice water over him. Six hours later, an ambulance was called. The EMTs believed they were responding to alcohol poisoning, so Kuntz was not airlifted to a trauma center. Kuntz had irreversible brain damage and died when he was removed from a ventilator. Doctors testified that such injuries are generally treatable if medical attention is sought in the first hours. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 242, Marlowe was sentenced to life imprisonment.In 2009, Marlowe sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief In 2017, Marlowe filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 “Burrage” decision, interpreting a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for drug offenses where death or serious bodily injury results as requiring a showing of but-for causation. The jury in Marlow's case was not asked to decide whether Kuntz would have lived but for Marlowe’s conduct.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Section 2241 is not available unless a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective,” meaning that when Marlowe was convicted, the settled law of the Supreme Court or the circuit in which he was convicted established the legality of his conviction. The law concerning 18 U.S.C. 242’s causation standard could hardly be “settled” if the Sixth Circuit never interpreted it. View "Marlowe v. Warden, FCI Hazelton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that prison officials ignored his repeated medical complaints and denied him meaningful treatment, leading to his collapse and major surgery. Plaintiff alleged a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States for medical negligence, as well as a Bivens claim against certain individuals involved in his care for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously dismissed the FTCA claim because plaintiff did not secure a certification from a medical expert before filing suit, as required by West Virginia law. As two of its sister circuits have concluded, state-law certification requirements like West Virginia's are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus displaced by those rules in federal court. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the FTCA claim.The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to individual defendants on plaintiff's Bivens claims. The district court reasoned that plaintiff could not establish deliberate indifference as a matter of law. However, the court concluded that the district court did not first provide plaintiff, who proceeded pro se, with proper notice of his obligation to support his claims or an opportunity to seek discovery. Accordingly, the court vacated this portion of the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the Bivens claims. View "Pledger v. Lynch" on Justia Law