Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged a First Amendment challenge to section 1-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, insofar as that statute prohibits and punishes the broadcasting of the official court recordings of state criminal proceedings. In January 2020, the district court dismissed the entire action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the Broadcast Ban constitutes a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech that survives intermediate scrutiny.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the First Amendment claim, concluding that the Broadcast Ban is properly assessed as a penal sanction for publishing information released to the public in official court records and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court's decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). The court explained that, at bottom, the district court was wrong to apply intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to the Broadcast Ban. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Soderberg v. Carrion" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland's Governor and Attorney General have no control over the potential enforcement actions that could be brought against plaintiff. In this case, plaintiff, a professional counselor seeking to provide talk therapy to reduce his minor clients' same-sex attractions, filed suit against the Governor and the Attorney General of Maryland, alleging that Maryland has infringed his First Amendment rights by preventing him from engaging in the type of counseling he wants to do.Plaintiff argues that he can sue the Governor and the Attorney General under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which provides an exception to their immunity from being sued in federal court. However, the court explained that neither the Governor nor the Attorney General have the necessary connection to enforcing Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. 1-212.1 that permits plaintiff's suit against them. Therefore, because of plaintiff's choice of defendants, the court may not consider the First Amendment issues he raises. While plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint, the court left that question to the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision as to the Governor and Attorney General's immunity from suit in federal court and vacated the remainder of its rulings. View "Christopher Doyle, LPC v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against Dorchester County, seeking compensation pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the death of their bees. Appellants contend that the bees died after the County sprayed pesticide in an effort to kill mosquitos, and the bees' death amounted to a taking of appellants' private property.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the County's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no taking because the loss of appellants' bees was only an incidental consequence of the County's action. The court noted that the death of appellants' bees is undoubtedly a tragedy, but the court cannot conclude that it was the foreseeable or probable result of the County's action when it is a clear outlier in terms of collateral damage arising out of the County's mosquito abatement effort. Therefore, because the death of the bees was neither intended nor foreseeable, the Takings Clause does not require compensation. View "Yawn v. Dorchester County" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that "job sharing" a single full-time position with a willing partner does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation that an employer must provide under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court explained that, if the job share in question did not exist at the time it was proposed as an accommodation, the ADA does not require the employer to create the new position to accommodate a disabled employee.In this case, the court concluded that providing plaintiff with the job share position with another employee was not a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA—not because the position was not "vacant" but because the position she sought did not exist. Therefore, summary judgment should have been granted to Sanofi on plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim on this ground. Furthermore, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable accommodation, Sanofi cannot separately be liable for failing to engage in the interactive process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanofi. View "Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal is whether the leaders of the North Carolina House and Senate are entitled to intervene, on behalf of the State of North Carolina, in litigation over the constitutionality of the State's voter-ID law. North Carolina's Attorney General, appearing for the State Board of Elections, already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, actively defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court. Legislative Leaders moved twice to intervene so that they also can speak for the State.The en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of the Leaders' renewed request for intervention. The en banc court explained that, at this point in the proceedings, the legislative leaders may assert only one interest in support of intervention: that of the State of North Carolina in defending its voter-ID law. The en banc court further explained that it follows that they have a right to intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) only if a federal court first finds that the Attorney General is inadequately representing that same interest, in dereliction of his statutory duties – a finding that would be "extraordinary." In this case, after reviewing the district court's careful evaluation of the Attorney General's litigation conduct, the en banc court is convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to make that extraordinary finding here. The en banc court concluded that this is enough to preclude intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). The en banc court similarly deferred to the district court's judgment denying permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Berger" on Justia Law

While plaintiff was incarcerated in a prison medical unit, his doctor reminded him within earshot of others that he had not taken his HIV medication. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the doctor's conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, rejecting plaintiff's clam that the doctor's statement violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the court concluded that when the doctor disclosed plaintiff's HIV status, plaintiff was in prison, a place where individuals have a curtailed expectation of privacy. Furthermore, whatever expectations remain fail to include the diagnosis of or medication for HIV, a communicable disease. The court also rejected plaintiff's HIPAA claim because HIPAA does not create a private right of action that plaintiff may avail himself of. View "Payne v. Taslimi" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, a York County Sheriff's Office (YCSO) employee, disclosed confidential information about an ongoing investigation into an inmate's death to his wife, who worked at a local news station, and then lied to internal investigators about the disclosure, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff's speech was not protected speech after applying the proper standard. The district court found the speech in question caused a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO and that defendant's interest in avoiding such a disruption outweighed plaintiff's circumstantially diminished First Amendment interest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's balancing of the parties' interests.The Fourth Circuit afforded diminished weight to plaintiff's First Amendment interest and concluded that it was outweighed by defendant's reasonable apprehension of disruption. In this case, plaintiff acted on limited and unconfirmed information when disclosing confidential details, and did so knowing that an investigation into the incident was underway, making no effort whatsoever to proceed through the chain of command or any law enforcement channel. Furthermore, the record reveals a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO, particularly considering plaintiff's speech propelled a frenzy of media attention about unconfirmed facts related to the inmate's death. The court explained that the disruption ballooned into separate internal investigation into the unauthorized disclosure, undercutting manpower and resources to continue the ongoing investigation into the incident. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed and the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Billioni v. Bryant" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's murder conviction was vacated when another person confessed to the murder, plaintiff filed suit against the City of Baltimore, the Baltimore Police Department, and others, alleging violations of his federal and state civil rights which led to his wrongful imprisonment for the murder. After a ten-day trial, the jury returned a $15 million verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant Goldstein, one of the officers at the scene of the murder, appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial under Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found police misconduct. The court found no error in the district court's jury instructions, taken as a whole, because they complied with the law and the district court's earlier rulings. Finally, although the district court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, the error, in the context of the record as a whole, was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's denial of Rule 50 and 59 motions. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the Baltimore Police Department under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) where the district court did not explain why the allegations of the complaint that were sufficient earlier no longer were. Rather, the district court's dismissal seems to be based on the verdict issued against Defendant Goldstein. If the City does in fact indemnify Goldstein and the judgment is satisfied, the Monell claim would be moot. View "Burgess v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the Foundation's complaint against the executive director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (the Board), alleging a violation of the disclosure provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The Foundation sought disclosure of broad categories of documents related to the identification of North Carolina voter registrants whom the Board had identified as potentially failing to satisfy the statutory citizenship requirement.The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that the district court erred in holding that the Foundation failed to state a claim under the NVRA's disclosure provision simply because the request implicated potential criminal conduct of registrants. The court explained that the disclosure provision does not contain such a blanket exemption and requires a more exacting and tailored analysis than what occurred in this case. Because discovery was not conducted, the court cannot discern on this record whether the Foundation may be entitled to disclosure of some of the documents requested. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for further consideration of the documents subject to four restrictions excluding from disclosure: (1) information precluded from disclosure by the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994; (2) information obtained from confidential federal databases under the United States Department of Homeland Security's Systemic Alien Verification for Entitlements system (the SAVE system) that is otherwise protected from disclosure by statute or by the Board's agreement with the Department regarding confidentiality; (3) any requested voter registration applications, or the names affiliated with those applications, that are subject to protection as part of any prior or current criminal investigation; and (4) the identities and personal information of individuals who potentially committed criminal offenses, including those who later were determined to be United States citizens, which must be redacted from any documents ultimately released as sensitive information vulnerable to abuse. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2010, Lancaster was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic in crack cocaine and cocaine powder. In 2020 he sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, to the sentence that would have been imposed, had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect at the time of his offense. The district court denied Lancaster’s motion, concluding on the merits that it would have imposed the same sentence on him had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. The court did not recalculate Lancaster’s Guidelines range and apparently did not consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in light of current circumstances. Lancaster argued that he no longer qualifies as a career offender for purposes of sentencing.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Additional analysis was required. Lancaster was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 846, a statute for which sentences were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, and is eligible for discretionary relief under the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. The court was, therefore, required to consider that Lancaster no longer could be sentenced as a career offender and consider section 3553's factors. View "United States v. Lancaster" on Justia Law