Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

John Telly King was murdered by a fellow inmate. King’s estate sued the South Carolina Department of Corrections prison guards on duty and their supervisors, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to King’s safety and medical needs and, therefore, responsible for his death. A magistrate judge disagreed, granting summary judgment to the defendants, and King appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the prison guards on duty failed to violate a clearly established right so are entitled to qualified immunity. And Plaintiff failed to allege, or raise a disputed material fact of, any individual involvement by the supervisor Defendants. The court explained that nowhere does Plaintiff identify how each defendant violated the constitution. This is a prerequisite to a supervisory-liability claim. Nor does Plaintiff present a material dispute about any individual Defendant’s knowledge. Instead, Plaintiff only claims that Defendants “either maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the risk” (whatever that risk may be). The court wrote that this boilerplate conclusion—lacking defendant specificity and factual support— does not state a claim for relief or allow a plaintiff to get past summary judgment. View "David King v. Timothy Riley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Massey took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff and vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three sales representatives who alleged that their employer, a food-products distributor, did not pay them the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). Their employer defended on the ground that the plaintiffs fell within the Act’s “outside sales” exemption, which excuses overtime pay for employees who work outside the office and whose primary duty is making sales. The district court found that Plaintiffs were owed overtime pay because their employer had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they came within the outside sales exemption. The court also awarded liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, finding that the employer had not shown objectively reasonable grounds for the challenged pay practices. The court concluded, the Plaintiffs had not shown that their employer willfully violated the Act. Both parties appealed: The employer challenged the district court’s liability finding and its award of liquidated damages, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed the court’s willfulness finding and attendant application of the two-year statute of limitations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that the defendants had only an “aspirational” and not a “concrete” sense of what their sales representatives did and, specifically, their ability to make sales at chain stores. Further, the court explained that the FLSA clearly contemplates as much, establishing as the default rule both the award of liquidated damages – predicated on the absence of objective reasonableness – and a two-year statute of limitations – predicated on a non-willful violation. View "Faustino Carrera v. E.M.D. Sales Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a Telecommunications Network Coordinator for the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC). After VDOC fired Plaintiff for declining a random drug test, Garrett sued, alleging that VDOC employees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by applying VDOC’s drug testing policy to him. Defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, concluding that general constitutional principles clearly establish Plaintiff’s right to be free from suspicionless drug testing.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court wrote that based on the facts as alleged in the complaint here, VDOC has some degree of government interest in drug testing Plaintiff. Whether that interest amounts to a “special need” within the meaning of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a debatable legal question. By baking into its analysis the absence of a sufficient special need, the district court glossed over the central question for immunity purposes: whether every reasonable official in Defendants’ position would understand that VDOC’s proffered interests were not substantial enough to override Plaintiff’s privacy interest. In view of existing law, the constitutionality of Defendants’ drug testing is simply not “beyond debate.” View "Jacoby Garrett v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that because of circumstances beyond his control, he did not receive notice of the district court’s judgment for over 90 days after it was entered, and he filed a notice of appeal shortly after he did receive notice. In response, the Fourth Circuit found his notice of appeal untimely, but the court construed the notice as a timely motion to reopen the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which implements an exception found in 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(c), and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then entered an order under Rule 4(a)(6), reopening the time for noticing an appeal for 14 days from the date of its order. Plaintiff, however, failed to file a notice of appeal within the window so provided.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The court explained that Section 2107(c) of Title 28, which is the statute prescribing the timing requirements for filing appeals in civil actions, provides that a would-be appellant who does not receive timely notice of a judgment and thereafter fails to file a timely notice of appeal may nonetheless request — not more than 180 days after the judgment is entered — that the district court exercise its discretion to reopen the time for appeal by providing a new 14-day window within which to file a notice of appeal. Compliance with this narrow supplemental opportunity for filing a timely notice of appeal is especially significant because the times specified by statute for filing appeals in civil actions are jurisdictional. View "Donte Parrish v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a package delivery driver for United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), injured his hip and buttocks. He requested he be allowed to drive his route with a smaller truck that would have a softer suspension or, alternatively, that he be assigned to an “inside job.” However, UPS determined that Plaintiff's route required a larger truck and there were no openings for inside work; thus, UPS offered Plaintiff an unpaid leave of absence until he could return to work.Plaintiff filed a claim, asserting that UPS’s refusal to provide him with the accommodations he requested violated his rights under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS, concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff had not shown that the accommodations he requested were reasonable and that his unpaid leave of absence constituted a reasonable accommodation in the circumstances.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff failed to establish that UPS needed to allow him to drive a smaller vehicle on his existing route and that the leave of absence was not a reasonable alternative. View "Jay Hannah v. UPS" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law