Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff flunked out of the FBI Academy by failing to perform the required amount of push-ups, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). Plaintiff alleged that the FBI discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in that female New Agent Trainees were required to complete only fourteen push-ups. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the Attorney General appealed. The court held that an employer does not contravene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness standards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on both men and women, requiring the same level of physical fitness of each. Because the FBI purports to assess physical fitness by imposing the same burden on both men and women, this rule applies to plaintiff’s Title VII claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in failing to apply the rule in its disposition of plaintiff's summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bauer v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), against the United States, alleging that prison officials were negligent in failing to protect him from an attack by several other inmates. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the prison officials’ discretionary decision not to separate plaintiff from his attackers is subject to the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, depriving the court of jurisdiction over that claim. In regard to plaintiff's claim that prison officials did not perform the searches of other inmates properly, the court remanded for additional discovery because jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of that claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Rich v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff collapsed with exertional heatstroke while practicing as a member of the Towson University football team. Plaintiff was in a coma for nine days, almost died, and suffered multi-organ failure, requiring a liver a transplant and numerous additional surgeries. Plaintiff subsequently recovered and pursued his plan to return to playing football. However, the Team Physician, a board-certified sports medicine doctor, concluded that allowing plaintiff to participate in the football program at the University presented an unacceptable risk of serious reinjury or death. Plaintiff filed suit against the University, alleging that its decision to exclude him from the football program amounted to a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court entered judgment against the University. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff was not “otherwise qualified” to participate fully in the University’s football program because the University reasonably applied its Return-to-Play Policy. The court was required to give deference to the University's judgment. The court did not reach the University's challenge to the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Class v. Towson Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the police department and three of its former detectives for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the police and prosecution withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland during plaintiff's 1982 murder trial. The district court dismissed the case under Heck v. Humphrey. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that this case involves section 1983 claims that are predicated on alleged Brady violations which would, if proven, necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's convictions. Those convictions have not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, under Heck, they may not be collaterally attacked through section 1983 now. The court concluded that the fact that plaintiff is no longer in custody does not change this result. Finally, plaintiff has identified no impediment to habeas access warranting an expansion of the Heck exception. View "Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, NS, alleging that NS suspended him on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to NS and then plaintiff filed a second suit, claiming that NS in fact suspended him for reporting rail safety offenses, in violation of the whistleblower protection provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109. The district court again granted summary judgment to NS. The court concluded, however, that the Election of Remedies provision in the FRSA does not bar plaintiff's second suit. The court explained that a suspension on the basis of race is not “the same allegedly unlawful act” as a suspension in retaliation for FRSA whistleblowing. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Carilion, alleging wrongful termination for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that no individual activity in which plaintiff engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so called “manager rule,” in any event, prevented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. The court held, however, that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee’s course of conduct as a whole and that the “manager rule” has no place in Title VII jurisprudence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

After charges against plaintiff were dismissed for alleged violations of South Carolina's anti-robocall statute, S.C. Code Ann. 16-17-446(A), plaintiff filed suit challenging the statute on First Amendment grounds. The statute prohibits only those robocalls that are “for the purpose of making an unsolicited consumer telephone call” or are “of a political nature including, but not limited to, calls relating to political campaigns.” The court found that, under the content-neutrality framework set forth in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, that the anti-robocall statute is a content-based regulation that does not survive strict scrutiny; plaintiff lacks standing to bring compelled-speech and vagueness challenges; and plaintiff's other claims fail due to the presence of probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment except for the compelled-speech claim, which the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Cahaly v. LaRosa, III" on Justia Law

John Doe 2 and Mother Doe, on behalf of John Doe 2's younger brother, filed suit against defendant, the president of the Citadel, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant violated an affirmative duty to protect them under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Louis “Skip” ReVille provided childcare for the Doe family and sexually abused the two minor boys. ReVille, a graduate of the Citadel, previously worked as a counselor at the Citadel's youth summer camp. Plaintiffs contend that defendant did not report a complaint that a counselor at the summer camp - later identified as ReVille - had molested a child attending the camp. Plaintiffs argued that defendant's actions allowed ReVille to continue his abuse of Doe 2 and Doe 3. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court affirmed, concluding that the state-created danger doctrine does not impose liability on defendant for ReVille’s ongoing abuse of the Does; while defendant's undisputed failure to act brought dishonor to him and The Citadel, it did not create a constitutional cause of action; and defendant's alleged conduct neither created nor increased the danger ReVille already posed to the Does, and in any event, did not constitute cognizable affirmative acts with respect to ReVille’s abuse of the Does. View "Doe 2 v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Title VII employment discrimination suit, seeking to recover for sexual harassment she allegedly experienced while working at a Drive factory. Drive argued that plaintiff was actually employed by a temporary staffing agency, ResourceMFG, and therefore Drive was not an “employer” subject to Title VII liability. Although the district court acknowledged that in some instances an employee can have multiple “employers” for Title VII purposes, it concluded that in this case ResourceMFG was plaintiff’s sole employer. The court agreed with the district court and its sister circuits and concluded that Title VII provides for joint employer liability. The court also concluded that the so-called “hybrid” test, which considers both the common law of agency and the economic realities of employment, is the correct means to apply the joint employment doctrine to the facts of a case. In this case, the district court did not explicitly use the "hybrid" test in its opinion and thus the court articulated the hybrid test for the joint employment context and applied it to the facts of this case, concluding that Drive was indeed plaintiff's employer. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Drive and remanded for further consideration of plaintiff's Title VII claims. View "Butler v. Drive Automotive Indus." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, appealed from the dismissal of his pro se claims against the VDOC, alleging that defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by prohibiting him from consuming wine during communion, requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed sua sponte plaintiff's Sabbath claims, cell assignment claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and granted defendants summary judgment on the communion wine claim. The court reversed the district court's summary dismissal of the First Amendment wine communion claim where, as the parties agree, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened his religious exercise and the record is insufficient to support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least restrictive means to address the government’s purported security interest. The court further concluded that plaintiff has successfully alleged facts supporting his remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jehovah v. Clarke" on Justia Law