Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, D.L. and his parents, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the BCBSC and Baltimore City Public Schools, contending that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, compelled BCBSC to provide D.L. education services related to certain disorders even though D.L. was enrolled exclusively in a private religious school. Because plaintiffs retained full discretion over school enrollment and because BCBSC has taken reasonable measures to fulfill its mission, the court found that BCBSC's policies placed no undue burden on plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Because the court did not read Section 504 to apply an affirmative obligation on school districts to provide services to private school students and because plaintiffs retained full educational discretion, the court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "D. L. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for her employer, the UPS, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that plaintiff presented no direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the UPS policy at issue, that did not provide light duty work to pregnant workers but did for certain other employees, treated pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike and therefore complied with the PDA. Plaintiff also failed to offer sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. UPS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute restricting interstate transfers of handguns, 18 U.S.C. 922(b)(3); a federal regulation implementing that statute, 27 C.F.R. 478.99; and a Virginia law prohibiting Virginia firearms dealers from selling handguns to non-residents of Virginia, Va. Code section 18.2-308.2:2. Because the challenged laws did not burden plaintiffs directly, and because plaintiffs were not prevented from acquiring the handguns they desired, they did not allege an injury in fact. Even if plaintiffs established an injury in fact, they were unable to demonstrate traceability. The court also held that there was no organizational standing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on standing grounds. View "Lane v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

These appeals arose from allegations that the City of Durham and its officials mishandled false rape charges made against members of the 2005-2006 Duke University lacrosse team. The City and its officials asserted various immunities from suit and on that basis moved to dismiss, or for summary judgment, as to all claims alleged against them. The district court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. The City and its officials appealed. The court reversed the district court's denial of all defendants' motions to dismiss the federal claims alleged against them; reversed the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment as to the state common-law claims alleged against it; affirmed the denial of Officer Gottlieb and Himan's motions to dismiss the state common-law malicious prosecution claims alleged against them; reversed the denial of the officers' motions to dismiss all other state common-law claims; dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction the City's appeal of the state constitutional claims alleged against it; and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Evans v. Chalmers" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for possessing firearms while being illegally or unlawfully in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, contending that section 922(g)(5) violated his rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments. The district court denied the motion, holding that section 922(g)(5) was constitutional. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the scope of the Second Amendment did not extend to provide protection to illegal aliens, because illegal aliens were not law-abiding members of the political community and aliens who have entered the United States unlawfully have no more rights under the Second Amendment than do aliens outside of the United States seeking admittance. On defendant's Fifth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that prohibiting aliens, as a class, from possessing firearms was rationally related to Congress' legitimate interest in public safety. View "United States v. Carpio-Leon" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of appellees. The district court held that appellant failed to submit sufficient evidence to meet his burden with regard to various Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, claims. Appellees cross-appealed on the ancillary issue of whether the number of employees of the National Red Cross and the Greenbrier Valley Chapter could be aggregated for purposes of determining "employer" status. The court held that appellant did not meet the ADA's definitions of disability and affirmed the district court with regard to appellant's primary ADA claim; appellant's retaliation claim based on appellant's lifting restriction and on his workers' compensation request both failed; and appellant did not have sufficient evidence to support his confidentiality claim. The court also held that Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. dictated that the ADA's employee threshold was not a limit on jurisdiction but, rather, an element of the claim itself; the cross-appeal was not properly taken; and the court vacated the district court's ruling on the employee aggregation issue. View "Reynolds v. American National Red Cross" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding against defendants, challenging the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners and invasive pat-downs at airport screening checkpoints in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs maintained that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the TSA's standard operating procedures for checkpoint screenings did not constitute an "order" under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued, that section 46110's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction in a court of appeals deprived them of due process and contravened the separation of powers rooted in the Constitution. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291; on the merits, the district court did not err in ruling that the Checkpoint Screen SOP constituted an order of the TSA Administrator under section 46110; and plaintiffs' remaining contentions lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blitz v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Martin and Lucky Strike appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an action to enjoin enforcement of two South Carolina anti-gaming statutes, S.C. Code Ann. 12-21-2710 and 12-21-2712, which prohibited certain devices pertaining to games of chance. Because the statutes have a legitimate application, the court affirmed the district court's vagueness holding. The court further concluded that the statutes did not fall within the scope of Ex Parte Young's holding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Martin v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized that this was a case of mistaken identity and rectified the error. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, Officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended that Horner was not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on and utilized unverified information to set "forth a chain of events that would lead to the indictment and arrest of the wrong individual." Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff was unable to establish that his seizure was "pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause," and he could not show the essential constitutional violation underlying a 1983 claim. Because there was, as a matter of law, probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention, his state law malicious prosecution claim failed too. View "Durham v. Horner" on Justia Law

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Randstad" on Justia Law