Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Russell Lucius Laffitte, who was convicted of bank and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The government alleged that between 2006 and 2021, Laffitte, as CEO of Palmetto State Bank, conspired with Alex Murdaugh, a disbarred attorney, to defraud Murdaugh’s clients. Laffitte was accused of using his position to access settlement accounts, collecting fees, and extending unsecured loans to Murdaugh, resulting in nearly two million dollars being stolen from the accounts. Laffitte was charged with conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and misapplication of bank funds.During the trial, the government presented fifteen witnesses, and Laffitte called eight witnesses and testified in his own defense. After the jury began deliberations, the court received notes from jurors indicating issues, including one juror needing medication and another feeling pressured. The district court decided to remove two jurors, Juror No. 88 and Juror No. 93, and replaced them with alternates. The jury then returned a guilty verdict on all counts.Laffitte appealed, arguing that the removal of the jurors violated his Fifth Amendment right to be present and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the removal of Juror No. 88 violated Laffitte’s Sixth Amendment right because there was a reasonable and substantial possibility that her removal was related to her views on the case. The court also found that the removal violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present, as he was not present during the in camera interview when the decision to remove Juror No. 88 was made. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and vacated Laffitte’s convictions and sentence, remanding the case for a new trial. View "US v. Russell Laffitte" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Siddhanth Sharma, a convicted felon, challenged North Carolina's felony-disclosure requirement for candidates running for federal office. This state law mandates that candidates disclose any felony convictions and provide additional information about the convictions and the restoration of citizenship rights. Sharma, who announced his candidacy for North Carolina’s Thirteenth Congressional District seat, argued that this requirement violated the Qualifications Clause and the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Sharma's claims. The court found that Sharma had standing to challenge the felony-disclosure requirement but concluded that it did not constitute an additional qualification for office. The court also held that the requirement did not violate the First Amendment, as it served a substantial interest in promoting an informed electorate and posed only a modest burden. Sharma's challenge to the address-disclosure requirement was dismissed for lack of standing, as the court found his injury insufficiently particularized.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the felony-disclosure requirement is constitutional. The court reasoned that the requirement does not exclude candidates from the ballot or disadvantage political viewpoints, and it falls within the state's authority to regulate elections. The court also found that the requirement imposes only a light burden on First Amendment rights and serves the state's interest in fostering an informed electorate. However, the court vacated the judgment on the address-disclosure challenge and remanded it to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot, as Sharma's address was already publicly available in the voter-search database. View "Siddhanth Sharma v. Alan Hirsch" on Justia Law

The case involves the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the North Carolina Republican Party (NCGOP) filing two state law claims against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (State Board) and its members. The claims, one statutory and one constitutional, allege that the State Board failed to comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which mandates certain voter registration and maintenance procedures. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) intervened as a defendant. The plaintiffs argue that the State Board's noncompliance with HAVA led to improper voter registrations, potentially affecting 225,000 voters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court found it had original jurisdiction over the state statutory claim but not the state constitutional claim. It dismissed the statutory claim, ruling that the relevant statutory provision did not provide a private right of action. Consequently, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim and remanded it to state court, also holding that Section 1443 did not provide a valid basis for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court's remand order was improper. It found that the district court possessed original jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim under Section 1331 because the claim contained an embedded federal question. The court also determined that removal was permissible under Section 1441. Additionally, the court held that the defendants validly removed the constitutional claim pursuant to Section 1443(2), which allows for removal in cases involving the refusal to perform an act on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with laws providing for equal rights. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RNC v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves Warren Balogh, who participated in the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The rally, organized to protest the removal of a Robert E. Lee statue, quickly turned violent between protesters and counterprotesters. Balogh alleged that the Charlottesville Police, under Chief Al Thomas, and the Virginia State Police, under Lieutenant Becky Crannis-Curl, failed to protect his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not intervening in the violence and declaring an unlawful assembly, which he claimed amounted to a heckler's veto.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed Balogh's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right to police intervention to protect First Amendment rights from third-party violence. The court also held that Balogh failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, noting that the police did not selectively enforce the unlawful assembly order and that Balogh's allegations of intentional discrimination were conclusory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment does not obligate police to protect protesters' constitutional rights amid violence, explicitly stating that the First Amendment is a shield against invasive speech regulations, not a sword to wield against violent disruptions. The court also found that Balogh's equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment failed because he did not provide sufficient facts to show intentional or purposeful discrimination. Additionally, the court rejected Balogh's Monell claim against the City of Charlottesville, as he did not demonstrate that the City Manager, the final policymaker, had ratified or delegated authority to Chief Thomas. View "Balogh v. Virginia" on Justia Law

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition. View "Lumumba v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by retroactively imposing new punishments for crimes committed in the past. The statute requires offenders to report personal information to law enforcement and restricts where they can live, work, and visit. The plaintiffs, including two nonprofit organizations and two individuals, sought to bar the retroactive application of certain amendments to the statute.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held a bench trial and found that the statute was nonpunitive and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court concluded that the legislature intended to create a civil, nonpunitive scheme and that the plaintiffs failed to show by the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were punitive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the legislature intended to enact a civil, nonpunitive scheme aimed at protecting public safety. The court also found that the statute was rationally connected to this nonpunitive purpose and was not excessive in relation to its goal. Although the statute imposed significant burdens on registrants, the court concluded that these burdens did not amount to punishment. The court held that the plaintiffs did not provide the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were so punitive as to override the legislature’s intent.Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "National Assoc. For Rational Sexual Offense Laws v. Stein" on Justia Law

Randy Price was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and possession of a firearm by a felon. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Price moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes were facially unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion regarding the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge, finding that the analysis required under Bruen rendered the statute an impermissible restriction on the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Price's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge. The court concluded that the conduct prohibited by the statute was protected by the Second Amendment and that there was no historical tradition of firearm regulation consistent with the statute. The Government appealed the dismissal of the obliterated serial number charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the conduct regulated by the statute does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because a firearm with a removed, obliterated, or altered serial number is not a weapon in common use for lawful purposes. The court concluded that there is no compelling reason for a law-abiding citizen to possess such a firearm, and such weapons are primarily used for illicit purposes. Therefore, the statute's regulation of these firearms does not violate the Second Amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Maryland's Firearms Safety Act of 2013, which prohibits the sale and possession of certain military-style assault weapons, including the AR-15, AK-47, and Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle. The plaintiffs, consisting of individual Maryland residents, gun rights organizations, and a firearms dealer, argued that the Act violates the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, citing the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in Kolbe v. Hogan, which upheld the same Maryland statute. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' acknowledgment that their argument was foreclosed by Kolbe. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that a panel could not reconsider an en banc holding. The plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, upon reconsideration, upheld the district court's judgment. The court held that the assault weapons regulated by Maryland's statute fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment because they are military-style weapons designed for combat, not self-defense. The court also found that the Maryland law aligns with the nation's tradition of regulating excessively dangerous weapons. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge to the statute. View "Bianchi v. Brown" on Justia Law

Ahmad Hashimi was indicted on four counts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including drug-related charges and charges involving violence against his ex-girlfriend. Hashimi and his court-appointed lawyer, Bruce Johnson, had a contentious relationship, with Hashimi repeatedly complaining about poor communication and the lack of a plea deal. Despite these issues, the district court did not replace Johnson. During the trial, Johnson attempted to negotiate a plea deal for the violence charges, but the court rejected it, and the case proceeded to the jury. In his closing argument, Johnson conceded Hashimi's guilt on the violence charges without Hashimi's explicit consent, focusing his defense on the drug charges. The jury found Hashimi guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 300 months in prison.Hashimi appealed his conviction, arguing that Johnson's concession of guilt without his consent violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the conviction but reconsidered after the Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, which established a defendant's right to maintain innocence. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed but allowed Hashimi to raise his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Hashimi filed the motion, presenting evidence that he did not consent to the concession and highlighting his poor communication with Johnson.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Hashimi's § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that Hashimi did not explicitly object to the concession. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying the motion without a hearing. The appellate court held that the record did not conclusively show that Hashimi was informed of and consented to the concession, as required by McCoy. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further factual development. View "US v. Hashimi" on Justia Law