Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former coal miner s filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. An administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Benefits Review Board both determined that Petitioner, Edd Potter Coal Company, would be responsible in the event that the coal miner was entitled to benefits. Once the Board remanded the case to determine if benefits were in fact appropriate, Edd Potter decided to raise an Appointments Clause challenge. Both the ALJ and the Board concluded that Edd Potter had forfeited this issue by failing to timely raise it.    Given Edd Potter’s double forfeiture, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the Department of Labor’s regulations requires issue exhaustion both before the ALJ and before the Board. The court wrote that it is firmly established that, before an agency, parties must raise all issues they seek to maintain on appeal “at the time appropriate under its practice.” United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952). The court explained the Department’s regulations, the Board’s consistent practice, and the mandate rule’s application all point in the same direction as logic. On remand, parties may not raise whatever new issues they would like if they have previously failed to bring those issues to the attention of the ALJ and the Board. The mere fact of a remand does not wipe the whole slate clean. Further, the court found that Edd Potter forfeited its Appointments Clause claim not once but twice. View "Edd Potter Coal Company, Inc. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted several constitutional and procedural claims related to his inclusion in the Terrorism Screening Database and its subclassification, the No Fly List. These are two governmental, interagency tools used to share information about suspected terrorists. The district court determined that Petitioner’s as-applied claims fell within 49 U.S.C. Section 46110’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal appellate courts over challenges to final Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) orders. So it transferred those claims to us under 28 U.S.C. Section 1631.   Petitioner moved to remand his claims to the district court, arguing it erred in finding that the Fourth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 46110. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the government that a portion of Petitioner’s claims—those challenging his status on the No Fly List—is moot. But the court wrote it thinks it’s unclear which of Petitioner’s claims the district court intended to transfer under Section 1631. Thus the court vacated the transfer order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss as moot Petitioner’s challenges to his status on the No Fly List; decide whether it has jurisdiction over the rest of Petitioner’s claims; and, if not, transfer them to the proper Circuit. View "Saadiq Long v. David Pekoske" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was transferred from a class where she instructed emotionally disturbed (“ED”) children to a class where Plaintiff worked with children with moderate intellectual disabilities. Plaintiff alleged that one of her students sexually harassed her between fall 2018 through mid-March 2019. This student, S.M., was an eight-year-old boy diagnosed with Down’s Syndrome and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). Although the teacher in the classroom recorded the incidents in her notes, or “point sheets,” where she detailed each student’s daily behavior, Plaintiff claims the teacher was generally dismissive of her concerns. After exhausting her remedies with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff filed suit against the Chesterfield County School Board (“the School Board”) alleging that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.   The district court granted the School Board’s motion for summary judgment. At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim on summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the record does not support a prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court explained that Plaintiff cannot primarily rely upon her own statements to argue that S.M.’s conduct surpassed what could be expected of an eight-year-old child with his disabilities after two special education experts testified that it did not—instead, she is required by law to demonstrate it. Further, even if Plaintiff established that S.M. targeted her because of sex, she would still be unable to meet the third required element—that is, show that S.M.’s conduct rose to the level of severe or pervasive. View "Regina Webster v. Chesterfield County School Board" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses and was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment and ten years' supervised release. Subsequently, Defendant moved to challenge eight of his supervised-release conditions, claiming that six of the conditions restrict his liberty more than necessary and that intervening Supreme Court precedent rendered two other conditions limiting his internet use unconstitutional. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's first claim pertaining to six of the challenged conditions because his arguments should have been raised at sentencing. By not doing so, he deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify them. However, regarding Defendant's second claim, the court acknowledged that Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), created “new, unforeseen, or changed legal . . . circumstances” relevant to Defendant's internet-use conditions. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's challenge. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide whether to modify those conditions. View "US v. Sebastian Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and its foreign subsidiaries (collectively, “Eli Lilly”) applied to the district court under 28 U.S.C Section 1782 for an order requiring Novartis Pharma AG to provide discovery for use in ongoing patent litigation between the two companies. After Novartis intervened and objected to Eli Lilly’s application, the district court entered an order denying the application.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and addressed two grounds. The district court held that Novartis was not “found” in the Eastern District of Virginia because it was not physically present there. Eli Lilly contends that the court erred in interpreting the word “found” so restrictively, arguing instead that a person is “found” within a district for purposes of Section 1782 when it is “within the personal jurisdiction” of the district court, extending to “the full reach of personal jurisdiction” under the Due Process Clause.   Here, in view of the definitions in legal dictionaries and Supreme Court opinions, the court presumed that when Congress similarly used “found” in Section 1782, it intended that the same meaning apply — that a corporation is found where it is physically present by its officers and agents carrying on the corporation’s business. Thus, the district court acted in conformance with the requirements of Section 1782 when it denied Eli Lilly’s application to issue a discovery order directed against Novartis on the ground that Novartis was not found in the Eastern District of Virginia. Further, the court wrote it is apparent that the factors addressed by the district court fall squarely within those factors identified by the Supreme Court in Intel as relevant. View "Eli Lilly and Company v. Novartis Pharma AG" on Justia Law

In a putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that as prisoners at two of Virginia’s supermax facilities, they have suffered severe isolation in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) has not used its supermax facilities for any legitimate penological purposes. Instead, Plaintiffs claim, that Virginia and its officers have warehoused prisoners in solitary, without any meaningful path back to the general population, to justify the profligate costs of building and running those institutions.     The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The court explained that Defendants invoked qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss before any of the evidence is in. And on the facts Plaintiffs have pleaded, Defendants cannot succeed. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants knew the harms long-term solitary confinement causes and disregarded them. But qualified immunity does not protect knowing violations of the law.   The court explained that its analysis of due process entails a two-part inquiry: (1) whether Plaintiffs had a protectable liberty interest in avoiding security detention; and (2) whether Defendants failed to afford minimally adequate process to protect that liberty interest. Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to meet even the most basic due process requirements like notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the criteria Defendants employ to assess solitary placements are entirely divorced from legitimate penological interests. On those allegations—and at this litigation stage—Defendants cannot claim immunity. View "William Thorpe v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Charter Day School (“CDS”) a public charter school in North Carolina, requires female students to wear skirts to school based on the view that girls are “fragile vessels” deserving of “gentle” treatment by boys. Plaintiffs argued that this sex-based classification grounded on gender stereotypes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subjects them to discrimination and denial of the full benefits of their education in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”).  In response, despite CDS’ status as a public school under North Carolina law, CDS denied accountability under the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining that they are not state actors.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Equal Protection claim against CDS. The court also vacated the district court’s summary judgment award in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.   The court held that CDS is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. By implementing the skirts requirement based on blatant gender stereotypes about the “proper place” for girls and women in society, CDS has acted in clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court further held that sex-based dress codes like the skirts requirement, when imposed by covered entities, are subject to review under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX. View "Bonnie Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Air Evac EMS, Inc., is an emergency air ambulance provider. Because the company's services are expensive, it markets and sells what it characterizes as a "debt cancellation program." Under this program, West Virginia residents pay a sum of money annually and any amount due on their bill in excess of what is covered by insurance will be canceled by the company.Through a series of communications and actions taken by West Virginia, Air Evac determined that the state was favoring a competitor. Air Evac brought several suits in district court. This one alleges that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner from taking any enforcement efforts. Following this case, Air Evac brought another case against the Commissioner that remains pending at the time of this appeal.The district court determined that the abstention doctrine applied, however, because the case presented "extraordinary circumstances," the court determined that abstention was not appropriate.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to consider matters related to ongoing state criminal proceedings as well as quasi-criminal proceedings if the state proceeding is ongoing, implicates important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court properly analyzed the abstention factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Allan McVey" on Justia Law

In March of 2020, West Virginia’s Governor began to adopt public-safety measures in response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Six months later, a group of Plaintiffs sued, challenging those measures as unconstitutional. The district court dismissed their case, holding that the amended complaint failed to state a valid constitutional claim.   On appeal, the Plaintiffs argued for the voluntary cessation exception. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. The court held that the case is moot because the Governor has long since terminated each of the challenged executive orders, and there is no reasonable chance they will be reimposed.  The court reasoned a defendant claiming mootness based on the voluntary cessation of a challenged practice must show that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Here, the Governor has not imposed any new COVID-19 restrictions, let alone restrictions similar in scope or subject matter to those Plaintiffs' challenge. Nor have Plaintiffs pointed to any conduct by the Governor suggesting that measures like gathering limits, capacity restrictions, or school closures will be reimposed in the future. View "Eden, LLC v. Jim Justice" on Justia Law

North Carolina law allows “[a]ny qualified voter registered in the same district as the office for which [a] candidate has filed or petitioned” to file a challenge with the state board of elections asserting “that the candidate does not meet the constitutional or statutory qualifications for the office.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 163-127.1, -127.2. A group of voters in Representative Cawthorn’s district filed such a challenge. According to the voters, Representative Cawthorn encouraged the violent mob that disrupted the peaceful transition of power by invading the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, and that encouragement constituted “insurrection” and disqualifies Representative Cawthorn for further service in Congress. Seeking to stop the challenge process from going forward, Representative Cawthorn sued the members of the state board of elections in federal district court.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that consistent with the statutory text and context, the 1872 Amnesty Act removed the Fourteenth Amendment’s eligibility bar only for those whose constitutionally wrongful acts occurred before its enactment. The court concluded that the district court erred in construing the Act as a sweeping removal of all future Fourteenth Amendment disabilities. Thus, because the district court’s ruling was based solely on its view of the 1872 Amnesty Act, the court reversed its decision and vacated the permanent injunction. View "Madison Cawthorn v. Barbara Lynn Amalfi" on Justia Law