Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs in this case are parents of children with special needs attending public schools in Fairfax County, Virginia. They allege that the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional "taking" of their children's Fifth Amendment property interest in public education. The plaintiffs argue that Virginia law establishes a fundamental right to public education, which they claim is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and, by extension, should be considered private property under the Takings Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that while the right to public education in Virginia may be a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause, it does not necessarily qualify as private property under the Takings Clause. The court noted that federal courts have long interpreted property interests protected by the Takings Clause as narrower than those protected by the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that the right to public education is subject to regulation and revision by the Virginia government and cannot be bought or sold, distinguishing it from private property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' children may have a property interest in public education under the Due Process Clause but held that this does not extend to the Takings Clause. The court emphasized that the Takings Clause applies only to private property and that public education, being subject to government regulation and not possessing the characteristics of private property, does not qualify. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for compensation under the Takings Clause. View "Chollet v. Brabrand" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Myrtle Beach's response to a surge in violent crime in an area known as "the Superblock." Between 2015 and 2016, eleven people were shot, and dozens more were sexually assaulted, battered, or robbed in the Superblock, primarily around a small cluster of bars. The City increased police presence and investigated these establishments for compliance with safety regulations. Despite these measures, crime persisted, leading the City to shut down two bars for repeated legal violations, while a third bar closed due to lack of business. Years later, the bars and the landlord sued the City and the City Manager, alleging violations of the Takings Clause, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, claiming the City unlawfully targeted them because their owners and clientele were predominantly racial minorities.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted directed verdicts for the City on all claims during a jury trial. The court held that the appellants did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the right to conduct their business. It found that the City's enforcement actions were within the legitimate bounds of state police power and rejected the § 1985 civil conspiracy claims based on the intra corporate conspiracy doctrine, which states that corporate and government agents cannot conspire with themselves.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the City acted within its lawful authority to address serious public safety threats and enforce compliance with state and local regulations. The appellants' claims were deemed speculative and unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. The court found no discriminatory intent or violation of due process, and it upheld the application of the intra corporate conspiracy doctrine, concluding that the City officials did not possess a personal stake independent of their relationship to the City. View "Brady v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

David Nutter was indicted in August 2021 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Nutter had three prior convictions in Ohio for domestic violence and child endangerment. He acknowledged possessing firearms and did not dispute his prior convictions but moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Nutter's motion, applying the means-end analysis from District of Columbia v. Heller. Nutter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which rejected the means-end analysis, Nutter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional under the new framework. The district court again denied the motion, concluding that § 922(g)(9) was consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals deemed a threat to public safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional, finding that it fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court noted that the statute's purpose and method align with historical analogues, such as surety and going armed laws, which were designed to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Nutter's motion to dismiss the indictment and upheld his conviction. View "United States v. Nutter" on Justia Law

In 2019, Navient Solutions, LLC, a student loan servicer, filed a civil action alleging that a group of lawyers, marketers, and debt-relief businesses conspired to defraud Navient out of millions of dollars in unpaid student debt. Navient claimed that the defendants lured student borrowers into filing sham lawsuits against Navient under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which regulates abusive telemarketing practices. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of Navient. However, the district court later granted the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the TCPA suits were not sham litigation and setting aside the jury's verdicts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially rejected the defendants' argument that their litigation activities were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, which safeguards the First Amendment right to petition the government. After the jury returned verdicts against each defendant, the district court vacated the verdicts, concluding that the TCPA litigation was not sham litigation and that Navient's damages were directly related to the TCPA litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the TCPA actions were not sham litigation and were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. The court found that the defendants' actions were based on a legitimate question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the TCPA. The court also noted that Navient had conceded the merits of the TCPA cases and had only sought damages related to the litigation costs. As a result, the court concluded that the defendants' petitioning activity was protected by the First Amendment, and the district court's judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. View "Navient Solutions, LLC v. Lohman" on Justia Law

Julio Alvarado Dubon moved to suppress firearms and ammunition discovered during a warrantless search of his home. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Alvarado Dubon voluntarily consented to the search and, even if he had not, the items were found during a valid protective sweep. The case involves officers searching for a man named Rolman Balcarcel, who was reported to have weapons and potentially planning violent acts. Alvarado Dubon allowed officers into his home, where they saw a handgun magazine. After a brief interaction, Alvarado Dubon gestured and verbally indicated consent for the officers to check the rest of the house, where they found firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Alvarado Dubon's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that Alvarado Dubon had voluntarily consented to the search and that the search was justified as a protective sweep. Alvarado Dubon entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that Alvarado Dubon's actions and body language indicated consent and that the conditions under which he consented did not suggest coercion or duress. The court also concluded that Alvarado Dubon did not effectively revoke his consent before the rifle was found. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Dubon" on Justia Law

Adolfo Acevedo Ibarra, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally and used the identity of a U.S. citizen, Raul Cabrera, to obtain various documents and benefits fraudulently. He was detained in 2014 for using a fraudulent Social Security number and later pleaded guilty to illegal entry. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, and Ibarra admitted to the allegations and agreed he was removable. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his four U.S.-citizen children. However, the immigration judge denied his application, citing his lack of good moral character due to his fraudulent activities.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision, agreeing that Ibarra's significant negative criminal history, including fraud, outweighed any evidence of good character. Ibarra then petitioned for review, claiming that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the removal hearing when his attorney's attempts to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were overruled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's finding that Ibarra lacked good moral character. The court noted that Ibarra's fraudulent activities, even without a conviction, justified the finding under the catchall provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The court also rejected Ibarra's Fifth Amendment claim, stating that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted by the individual, not their attorney, and that Ibarra continued to testify without asserting the privilege himself.The Fourth Circuit denied Ibarra's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal based on the substantial evidence of his lack of good moral character and rejecting his Fifth Amendment claims. View "Ibarra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2011, Winston Sylvester Oliver II and his co-defendant, Warren Brown, were convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and use of a firearm during these crimes. Oliver's firearm convictions were later vacated, necessitating resentencing for the remaining convictions. At his resentencing, Oliver argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to his pending appeal. Oliver also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially sentenced Oliver to 630 months in prison. After his firearm convictions were vacated, the court resentenced him to 610 months. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated his remaining firearm conviction and remanded for resentencing. At the second resentencing, Oliver's motion to recuse the entire bench of the Eastern District of Virginia was denied. The district court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, excluded unauthenticated letters allegedly written by Brown, and calculated Oliver's Guidelines range, ultimately sentencing him to 480 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, as his testimony could have had adverse consequences due to his pending appeal. The court also found that the district court did not err in applying sentencing enhancements for Oliver's leadership role, obstruction of justice, and firearm discharge. The court concluded that the 480-month sentence was substantively reasonable, considering Oliver's extensive criminal history and the impact on the victims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Jacob Doe, a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), was found responsible for two allegations of sexual misconduct and subsequently expelled from the university system. Doe sued the university and several employees, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Title IX, and various state laws. The district court largely denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing Doe’s federal and most state law claims to proceed.The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court erred in rejecting the defendants' claims of sovereign and qualified immunity. The court held that the UNC institutions were entitled to sovereign immunity, reversing the district court’s decision to allow Doe’s claims against them. Additionally, the court determined that the individual university employees were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Doe’s due process claims for damages, as the right to cross-examination in university disciplinary proceedings was not clearly established at the time.However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow Doe to seek prospective injunctive relief for the alleged due process violations. The court recognized that Doe had adequately alleged a liberty interest due to the permanent expulsion and the ongoing harm from the erroneous disciplinary record. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Doe’s Title IX claim against UNC-CH, dismissing that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s rulings, allowing Doe’s claims for prospective injunctive relief to proceed while dismissing his claims for damages against the UNC institutions and individual employees. View "Doe v. The University of North Carolina System" on Justia Law

A retired teacher, Patsy Talley, received overpayments in her retirement benefits from the North Carolina Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (TSERS) for over eight years, totaling $86,173.93. When the overpayment was discovered, TSERS began reducing her monthly benefits to recoup the overpaid amount. Talley did not dispute the overpayment but argued that the recoupment process violated her due process rights because she was not provided a hearing before the reductions began.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed all of Talley’s claims. The court held that her official capacity claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, her substantive due process claim failed because she received adequate post-deprivation process, and her equal protection claim did not allege a fundamental right or suspect class. The court also dismissed her individual capacity procedural due process claim, finding the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court denied Talley’s motion to amend her complaint to add new plaintiffs, citing procedural deficiencies and lack of good cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment barred the official capacity claims and that the individual capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity. The court found that Talley failed to state a substantive due process claim because she received adequate post-deprivation process and that her equal protection claim did not meet the rational basis review. The court also upheld the denial of her motion to amend the complaint, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. View "Talley v. Folwell" on Justia Law

A city ordinance criminalizes broadcasting obscene, profane, or vulgar language from commercial properties above certain volumes at specific times. A bar owner challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment. This appeal focuses on the restriction of "vulgar" language.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina declined to enjoin the vulgar-language provision, interpreting it as only restricting speech that is obscene under constitutional standards, which can be entirely prohibited. The court upheld the obscene-language and vulgar-language provisions but enjoined the profane-language provision. The bar owner appealed, arguing that the vulgar-language provision, properly construed, is unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the district court's interpretation, concluding that the vulgar-language provision reaches some constitutionally protected speech and is not limited to obscene speech. The court held that the vulgar-language provision is content-based and fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. The court found that the provision is both overinclusive and underinclusive, affecting protected speech and not effectively serving the city's stated interests.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the vulgar-language provision is unconstitutional. View "Moshoures v. City of North Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law