Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a civil rights action against two Orangeburg County, South Carolina sheriff’s deputies (collectively, the “Defendants”). As a pro se plaintiff, Plaintiff received repeated notice of the requirement to inform the court of any change in her address immediately. After Plaintiff failed to provide an updated address, she did not receive the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation filed in her case. Accordingly, she missed deadlines to file objections to the Report and Recommendation and to note an appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the time to note an appeal, giving her fourteen days to do so. Yet, by the time Plaintiff re-filed her notice of appeal as permitted by the district court below, her appeal was already pending in the Fourth Circuit. At issue in this appeal is what it means to “receive notice” for purposes of a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time to note an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion to reopen the time for Plaintiff’s appeal. The court found that because Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the entry of judgment in her case, the first of Rule 4(a)(6)’s three statutory requirements for reopening the time for appeal has been met. Further, the court found that the remaining requirements 4 of Rule 4(a)(6) have been satisfied as well. View "Melodie Shuler v. Orangeburg County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Before his trial on child-pornography charges, Defendant moved to suppress evidence related to the search of his van. Defendant argued that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required them to immediately enter the van without a warrant to see if anyone was in medical distress inside. He also argued that the officers did not have legal authority to tow the van. Last, he argued that the inventory search was a pretext for a warrantless criminal investigation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police discovered while searching his van without a warrant.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that warrantless searches of vehicles carried out as part of law enforcement’s community caretaking functions do not violate the Fourth Amendment if reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the officers searched Defendant’s van in exercising those community caretaking functions and not as a pretext for a criminal investigatory search. The court likewise concluded that the district court did not err in holding the search was reasonable. View "US v. Alexander Treisman" on Justia Law

Suspecting that Defendant was engaged in drug-trafficking activity, law enforcement officers in Chesapeake, Virginia, stopped the vehicle he was driving to investigate. After a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs, the officers searched the vehicle and recovered methamphetamine and related evidence. After Defendant was charged with drug trafficking offenses, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle (and later from his apartment), contending (1) that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to make the stop and (2) that, in any event, they unduly prolonged the stop — all in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity, justifying a brief stop to allay the officer’s suspicion. In this case, the investigatory stop did not allay that suspicion but confirmed it. Shortly after the stop, a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Defendant’s vehicle, leading to the recovery of drugs and other evidence used in this case. Further, the mission of the stop was to investigate potential drug-trafficking activity, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the officers failed to “diligently pursue” their investigation to confirm or allay that suspicion. View "US v. Xavier Howell" on Justia Law

While living in Japan, Defendant sexually abused a young girl. The government brought charges under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. The government’s theory was that Defendant was employed by the Armed Forces because he worked for a Department of Veterans Affairs subcontractor. Or, the government argued, he was accompanying a member of the Armed Forces because he lived with his wife, who worked at the Kadena Air Base in Japan. Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges in exchange for the government’s dropping the rest. As part of the deal, he also agreed to waive any right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to 420 months imprisonment. But, despite his waiver, Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Defendant attempted to get around his appeal waiver by arguing that jurisdiction cannot be waived, and thus he has every right to proceed. The court reasoned that Defendant confuses a crime’s jurisdictional element with federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, Defendant is not challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. He’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his crimes’ jurisdictional element. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge falls under his appeal waiver, and thus the court dismissed his appeal. View "US v. Emilio Moran" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical doctor, pleaded guilty to multiple charges under Section 841 for prescribing oxycodone and other controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical need. After Defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), which held that the statutory knowing-or-intentional mens rea applies not only to the distribution-related elements of the crime but also to the question of authorization. Accordingly, if a defendant charged under Section 841 “produces evidence that he or she was authorized to dispense controlled substances, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner, or intended to do so.” Defendant contends his plea was not valid because the district court did not inform him that, if he went to trial, the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew or intended that his conduct was unauthorized, as required by Ruan.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if the district court’s explanation of the charges alone did not properly reflect the mens rea required by Ruan, the language of the indictment does reflect Ruan’s holding. The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that when explaining the nature of the charges, a district court may rely on the defendant’s sworn statement that he has read the indictment and discussed it with his attorney. View "US v. Jong Kim" on Justia Law

Not long after getting a new boss at the Priority Automotive Honda dealership, Plaintiffs effectively resigned from their jobs. They then sued, alleging racial discrimination—claiming that the new boss and the company fostered a hostile work environment and demoted them because they are Black—along with various state torts. Plaintiffs lost at summary judgment and appealed.   The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed but remand their state-law conversion claims for further proceedings. First, the court explained that a reasonable person might conclude that the employee’s alleged “white side” was race-based harassment. But the statement, on its own, does not create a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. Next, the court held that, since Plaintiff failed to support a reasonable inference of unlawful intentional discrimination, the magistrate judge rightfully rejected his disparate-treatment claim. Further, the court held that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ alleged conduct “rises to the level of ‘outrageous and extreme’ as the term has been interpreted and applied” in North Carolina. The court reasoned that courts do not weigh the evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. So when both parties raise facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for them at trial, the claim must survive. But discrimination claims need more than neutral facts, an adverse action, and speculation about discriminatory motives to make it past this stage. As such, on the current record, a reasonable juror could find for Plaintiffs on their conversion claim. View "Kenneth Robinson v. Priority Automotive Huntersville, Inc." on Justia Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. That range was determined, in part, by the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment that is required by Section 2252A(b)(2) when a defendant has a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense. The district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction under Maryland law for a sexual offense in the third degree qualified as a predicate for the Section 2252A(b)(2) enhancement. Defendant then sought a review of the district court’s ruling that his prior Maryland conviction qualified as a predicate conviction under Section 2252A(b)(2), which triggered the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court agreed with the government that Defendant waived his right to appeal that issue in his plea agreement. The court explained the indictment’s allegation that a 120-month minimum sentence applied because of Defendant’s prior Maryland conviction and the limitations that Defendant’s plea agreement placed on his right to challenge that allegation, as well as Defendant’s broad waiver of his right to appeal any determination that the district court made on that issue, preclude the present appeal. And this is confirmed by Defendant’s express waiver of the district court’s determination of the applicable sentencing guidelines range. View "US v. Bruce Sturtz" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Maryland Capitol Police officer, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on several First and Fourth Amendment claims brought by picketers whom he arrested on the sidewalk outside the Maryland State House. Appellant arrested the picketers after they disobeyed his orders to back up off the sidewalk and protest instead from an adjoining square.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held a reasonable officer in Appellant’s position could have believed that the orders constituted lawful time, place, or manner restrictions on the picketers’ First Amendment rights. Therefore, Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained no law, clearly established or otherwise, required Appellant to wait for an imminent traffic accident. Preventive measures to promote public safety are a basic contribution of government. Appellant’s assessment of safety risks and attempts to mitigate them were informed by common sense and the facts on the ground, not animus or conjecture. It was at least reasonable for him to believe that his orders promoted a substantial governmental interest. View "Clayton Hulbert v. Brian Pope" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. He claimed that his guilty plea wasn’t voluntary because he didn’t know that Maryland’s sentencing guidelines were merely advisory. But a Maryland court denied his request for postconviction relief, finding that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including his maximum sentencing exposure. The district court held that the Maryland court’s decision denying Defendant postconviction relief was reasonable.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that AEDPA forecloses habeas relief unless the PCR court’s decision was “based on” an erroneous finding, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2), and Defendant doesn’t make that showing. Further subsection (d)(1) corrects only the most “extreme malfunctions.” Here, the PCR court’s decision wasn’t “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent because it didn’t “arrive at a result different from” a Supreme Court case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Nor was the PCR court’s decision an “unreasonable application” of principles announced by the Supreme Court. Here, the PCR court concluded that Defendant couldn’t reasonably believe that the guidelines were mandatory or that he was entitled to a sentence between 30 and 51 years. That’s because the plea court correctly advised him that each of his charges carried a possible sentence of 30 years. So this isn’t a case in which Defendant was clueless about the endpoints of his sentencing exposure. View "Calvin Currica v. Richard Miller" on Justia Law