Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned the court to review the decision of the BIA denying his petition for cancellation of removal and his motion to reopen removal proceedings so that he could pursue cancellation of removal after adjustment of status for which he had an application pending. As a preliminary matter, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss or transfer the matter on the basis of improper venue. The court held, however that petitioner raised no constitutional claims or questions of law and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal. The court further held that because the BIA based its denial of petitioner's motion to reopen on a determination that petitioner did not merit the discretionary relief of cancellation, the court also lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

An officer shot an unarmed man wanted for failure to pay child support, when he started running away. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the parties stipulated that the officer intended to use his Taser rather than his gun. The district court granted him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, analyzing the shooting as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and applying an objective standard of reasonableness. The use of force could be viewed by a jury as objectively unreasonable. The officer knew he carried his Taser in the holster on his thigh, about a foot lower than the holster on his hip; he knew that the gun weighed twice what the Taser weighed; and he knew that the Taser had a thumb safety that the gun did not have. The shooting was not a split-second decision; well-established precedent prohibits shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious physical threat. A reasonable jury could also find that the officer was grossly negligent and not protected by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code State Govt, 12-101.

Plaintiff, formerly a colonel in the North Carolina Army National Guard, commenced this action against his former colleagues alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by wrongfully intercepting, reading, and forwarding his e-mails while he was deployed in Kuwait. Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The court held that the district court reasonably found that plaintiff had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to justify granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court also rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that the district court should have treated plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a new complaint. Accordingly, under the circumstances of the case, the court could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's March 31, 2008 motion to reopen the September 14, 2007 judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).

In 2010, plaintiff's application for ballot placement as an independent candidate for Congress was denied due to his failure to comply with the state’s requirement that each petition signature be witnessed by a district resident. The district court dismissed a challenge to the requirement, relying in part on a 1985 Fourth Circuit case. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that its rationale in the earlier case has been superseded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The district court should determine whether the in-district witness requirement is justified by a state's desire to gauge the depth of a candidate's support. Plaintiff's supporters lack standing, but the plaintiff's challenge is not moot. There is a reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will be applied against the plaintiff again during future election cycles.

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine where he signed an acceptance of responsibility statement but declined to sign a plea agreement waiving certain rights to appellate review and collateral attack. Solely because defendant would not waive these rights, the government refused to move for an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's failure to compel the government to move for the U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) reduction. The court held that the government retained discretion to refuse to move for an additional one-level reduction, but only on the basis of an interest recognized by the guidelines itself. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, if the government could not provide a valid reason for refusing to move for an additional one-level enhancement reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) and continued to refuse to move for such a reduction, the district should order the government to file the motion.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of aggravated felony theft where she posed as a bail bondsman at a North Carolina jail and secured identifying information, cash, and the title of two properties from an octogenarian attempting to post bond for his granddaughter. At issue was whether an abuse-of-trust enhancement was properly applied to defendant's sentence where defendant contended that a bail bondsman did not occupy a position of public or private trust. The court held that the Guidelines simply required that a position of trust "significantly facilitate[] the commission or concealment of the offense." The court also held that, because it was undisputed that defendant gained initial access to the octogenarian's personal information by posing as a bail bondsman and later used this information to commit her wire-fraud offenses, that standard was clearly met here. Therefore, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in imposing the enhancement for abuse of trust. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This appeal stemmed from the district court's grant of a motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In granting the motion, the district court reduced defendant's sentence for distribution of child pornography from 96 months imprisonment to one day. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) because it did not base its grant of the motion on defendant's assistance to the government, but instead grounded the reduction solely on the court's concern that defendant would not receive his preferred medication while in prison. The court held that the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) by granting the motion based on factors other than the defendant's cooperation with the government. The court also held that the mere possibility that a change in treatment of the defendant's ADHD, based on the professional judgment of a prison's medical team, simply did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court further held that, because reconsideration of the motion by the original sentencing judge would inevitably invite speculation as to whether the medical issue continued to play a role in the ultimate ruling, the court ordered the case reassigned to a new judge on remand.

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner sought habeas relief from his capital sentence for convictions of murdering a husband and wife, as well as robbing the husband. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the State of North Carolina violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those presented in the trials of his co-defendants. The court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas relief and held that, in light of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, the federal district court correctly determined that the state court's decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting; possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's convictions; whether the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence; and whether the court erred in continuing to poll the jury after one juror indicated that the verdict was not unanimous. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the government presented substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions on all three counts; that appellant's Rule 404(b) argument was without merit where there was no error in admitting the evidence of a prior arrest when the evidence was relevant to prove his knowledge and lack of mistake, as well as necessary to prove the element of intention; and that the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error where there was no objection to the continued polling, the district took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive, and the district court gave a fair and balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further.