Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so.   In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Association (“NC OSHA”) issued several itemized citations to Industrial Services Group (“ISG”) following the on-site deaths of two ISG employees. Soon thereafter, ISG filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against two North Carolina state officials, Josh Dobson, the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor and acting Chief Administrative Officer for the North Carolina Department of Labor (“NCDOL”), and Kevin Beauregard, the Director of NCDOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Division, (collectively “Defendants”). ISG alleged that the issued citations were unlawful because they stemmed from North Carolina’s occupational health and safety plan, which in their view, violates 29 U.S.C. Section 657(h) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on pleadings, holding that they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because ISG’s claims satisfied the Ex Parte Young exception.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity and decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ newly-raised claims. Here, ISG’s Complaint alleges that the NC State Plan has and continues to violate the OSH Act. It also claims that Dobson and Beauregard, who in their official capacities are responsible for overseeing NCDOL’s implementation of the NC State Plan and its conformity with federal law, are accountable for the unlawful employee evaluation practices. Relying on that, the Complaint does not seek action by North Carolina but rather by the named Defendants who are at the helm of the NC State Plan’s operation. Thus, the individuals were properly named as such in this suit. View "Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Josh Dobson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). In 2016, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. In the motion, he cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the motion. The court concluded that Johnson did not affect the validity of Defendant’s Section 924(j) convictions because they rested on predicate “crimes of violence”, not on the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague, recognizing the specific right Defendant asserted in his Section 2255 motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the other Section 924(j) count because the conviction is unsupported by a valid predicate offense, and the Government concedes that he is entitled to relief. The court explained that because Defendant filed his motion within one year of Johnson and Davis extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson, the court held that it was timely. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion as to one of his Section 924(j) convictions because Defendant procedurally defaulted his claim challenging the conviction and cannot establish grounds for excusing the default. View "US v. Andra Green" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Appellant. On May 20, 2009, a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Appellant’s mental condition improved with treatment. The district court ordered his conditional discharge. Appellant returned home and lived with his mother after conditional discharge. The district court revoked the term and recommitted him. This appeal presents two consequential questions. Both relate to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. A commitment wrongly perpetuated is an unwarranted restraint of liberty; a commitment errantly discontinued poses a danger to the committee and the public.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the record is unclear whether the district court’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. It also appears from the record that the district court collapsed both inquiries of Section 4246(f) into a single question, focusing only on whether Appellant violated the conditions of his release and not explaining why “in light of” those violations his continued release created a substantial risk to other persons or property. Additionally, the record would benefit from further development respecting the violations alleged and the available, recent records from the facility. Further, the court wrote that the government should take note of its evidentiary burden, develop evidence on the point, and provide the district court a sound basis for making reasoned findings on the matter of dangerousness for that particular alleged violation. View "US v. Christopher Perkins" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, Defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, an enhanced penalty that represents the mandatory minimum sentence required for such a violation when the provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) are satisfied. ACCA provides that when a defendant violates Section 922(g) and has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense . . . committed on occasions different from one another,” he shall be given the enhanced sentence. Defendant’s indictment did not allege the facts supporting the ACCA enhancement; instead, the district court found them as part of the sentencing procedure. Defendant maintained that, in light of Supreme Court cases and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, ACCA’s requirement that the defendant has committed the prior offenses on different occasions must be alleged in the indictment and found by a jury or admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea because that fact increases the penalty for his crime.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the ACCA enhancement remains a matter for sentencing. Under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the facts that support a recidivism enhancement are resolved by the district court during sentencing, and ACCA provides just such a recidivism enhancement, as the court recognized in Thompson. Despite Defendant’s arguments to the contrary, the court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps, Mathis, and Wooden have not narrowed or overruled Almendarez-Torres. And if they have done so by implication, the Supreme Court must say so, not a court of appeals. View "US v. Rico Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was originally charged with four federal offenses: (1) carjacking; (2) kidnapping; (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence; and (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The parties agreed Defendant would plead guilty to the kidnapping and Section 924(c) charges, and the government would dismiss the carjacking and felon in possession charges. Neither the indictment nor the plea agreement specified a predicate “crime of violence” for the Section 924(c) charge, and the plea agreement contained no agreed-upon factual statement. Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction based on intervening authority. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The court acknowledged it is now clear “kidnapping is not a Section 924(c) predicate offense.” But the court concluded Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction remained valid because.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate his firearm conviction and remanded him for resentencing. The court explained that the categorical approach does not deny the district court its ultimate discretion, nor does it deprive the facts of their force. Even if a statutory enhancement under Section 924(c) does not apply because of the categorical approach, as is the case here, judges may, at their discretion, calculate a guidelines range or grant upward variances based on the violent nature of the criminal activity. Even if the categorical approach renders violent predicates legally invalid, district courts are at liberty to sentence the violent character of the cases that come before them. View "US v. Elliott Graham" on Justia Law

After Defendant’s allocution, but before his attorney argued at his sentencing hearing, the district court forecast that the minimum sentence he would receive was 60 months in prison—his crime’s statutory max. Defendant’s attorney then advocated for a lower sentence. The court imposed a 60-month sentence. He claimed it was procedurally unreasonable for the court to state his term of imprisonment before his attorney argued. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because it was not adequately explained and was based on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range.The Fourth Circuit explained that because Defendant did not make this argument to the district court, the court reviewed it for plain error and found none. The court explained that the district court offered enough explanation to satisfy us that it considered Defendant’s alcohol addiction argument and had a reasoned basis for the sentence it imposed. Defendant and his defense counsel argued at sentencing that Defendant’s untreated alcohol addiction contributed to his crime and warranted a lighter sentence. In response, the district court suggested that it was Defendant’s own fault that he had not sought treatment for his addiction. The district court then discussed the nature of Defendant’s offense, the impact his actions had on his victims, and the danger he posed to the public. The record as a whole shows the district court’s rationale for discounting Defendant’s argument and why the court thought the Section 3553(a) factors outweighed it. Accordingly, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that the sentence was inadequately explained and, thus, procedurally unreasonable. View "US v. Joel Covington" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for crimes related to an armed robbery of a Circle K convenience store. He argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting liability, abused its discretion in seating a juror who expressed difficulty hearing during jury selection, and responded inadequately to his objections to several conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the jury been instructed on the intent requirement of aiding and abetting liability. Further, the court concluded that in context, it is clear the district court believed Juror Eight’s difficulty hearing was a temporary problem specific to the court’s questioning during jury selection. Even if the district court had not been clear, ambiguity alone cannot demonstrate a “manifest” abuse of discretion. Finally, reading the full transcript, it is clear the district court did not believe any of these conditions delegated too much authority to the Probation Office. Defendant does not challenge the substance of these conditions on appeal, and the court held that it is satisfied that the district court gave “specific attention” to Defendant’s objections before rejecting them. View "US v. Yakotus Odum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He appealed, arguing that the district court made four errors warranting reversal. First, the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitations. Second, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “monetary transaction.” Third, the court erred by instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. And fourth, the conviction must be vacated under Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), because there is no way to determine whether he was convicted on a legally valid theory.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here Defendant offered no affirmative evidence showing that the conspiracy was terminated or that he affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the operative July 2, 2014, limitations date. The court wrote that because some conspiratorial acts in Defendant’s case occurred before July 2, 2014, the limitations date did not mean that the district judge was required to provide a statute of limitations instruction. Declining to give one was, therefore, not an abuse of the substantial discretion the court affords district judges in fashioning jury instructions. Moreover, the court held that the government did, in fact, present evidence of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy past July 2, 2014, even though it was not needed for a non-overt act conspiracy. View "US v. Kenneth Ravenell" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of six drug-related offenses, and the district court sentenced him to 40 years in prison. The district court increased Defendant's offense level by two because it found he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” within the meaning of Guidelines Section 3B1.1(c). Second, the court increased Defendant’s offense level by four because it concluded Defendant misrepresented fentanyl as heroin. Defendant raised two challenges to the verdict. Defendant also raised two challenges to his sentence.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge and his claim that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury. The court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the government was not required to prove that the victim died from a fentanyl overdose—it was required to show that she died from using a “substance” containing fentanyl for whose distribution Defendant was legally responsible. The government introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude it had met that burden. The jury heard evidence Defendant supplied the drugs the victim consumed on the day of her death and that she died around three hours later from a drug overdose. Here, a jury could conclude a substance distributed by Defendant was the cause of the victim’s death. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying a provision that was not part of the Sentencing Guidelines when Defendant committed his offenses and that Defendant is entitled to relief even under the plain-error standard. View "US v. Rodney Coby" on Justia Law