Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff’s estate sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (“Department”) and several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Virginia law, alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment and state law by failing to provide Plaintiff treatment for his chronic hepatitis C until it was too late.   Defendants in this appeal are Dr. A and Dr. W. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. A designed treatment guidelines for inmates with hepatitis C that unconstitutionally excluded Plaintiff from receiving treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. W failed to follow those guidelines and committed both medical malpractice and Eighth Amendment violations in denying him appropriate treatment. Defendants unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, alleging that they were protected by qualified immunity and, on Dr. W’s part, derivative sovereign immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Dr. W and denial of qualified immunity to Dr. A but affirm its denial of qualified immunity to Dr. W. The court declined to hold that Dr. A was clearly on notice that he should have ordered the Department’s primary care providers to prescribe this novel treatment rather than referring patients to specialists for treatment.  Further, the court explained a prisoner’s purported right not to be subjected to a treatment regimen that prioritized antiviral treatment to prisoners with the most advanced levels of fibrosis was not clearly established when Dr. A designed the Guidelines in 2015. Moreover, three of the four factors strongly weigh in favor of sovereign immunity, and one only moderately weighs against it. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred by rejecting Dr. W’s sovereign-immunity defense. View "Jacob Pfaller v. Mark Amonette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at U.S. Penitentiary Lee in western Virginia, commenced this action pro se against officials and employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, seeking monetary damages and other relief against Defendants, based on the manner in which he was treated in prison and the conditions of his confinement. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, as relevant here, that Plaintiff’s claims were not cognizable under Bivens. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s action.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the inmate’s claim is, under the applicable standard, different from any Supreme Court decision finding a Bivens cause of action and that the relief he seeks in this new context should be provided by Congress, if at all. The court wrote its conclusion is based on the broad nature of the inmate’s claim and the separation-of-powers implications of recognizing a Bivens cause of action in the new context of his claim. View "Raymond Tate v. D. J. Harmon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of various offenses relating to his leadership of a drug-trafficking ring, including a charge of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. On appeal, Defendant advanced three main arguments. First, he contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. Section 3161. Second, he argued the government failed to prove that fentanyl was the but-for cause of the victim’s death and that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction on but-for causation. Finally, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the eight-month period between the filing of the indictment and the appearance of Defendant’s codefendant was a “reasonable period of delay” that the district court properly excluded under the Act. Next, the court wrote that on balance, the four constitutional speedy-trial factors weigh in the government’s favor. Thus the court held that the district court didn’t err in denying Defendant’s motion. Further, the court concluded that the jury could have found that “the [fentanyl] was not only a necessary, but-for cause of the death, but it was also independently sufficient, by itself, to cause the victim’s death, even without the influence of any other factors.” As such, while this case may have been more appropriately tried under a but-for causation theory, the court found no reversible error on Count Ten. View "US v. Terrick Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals the district court’s order denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. Defendant claimed that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress information obtained from a search warrant that relied, in part, on the Government’s warrantless procurement of certain data from her cell phone service provider.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the Government relied in good faith on court orders issued in accordance with the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 2703 et. seq., did not request the data in its subpoenas, and the use of a subpoena to obtain the data was lawful at the time; the court held the district court’s admission of the challenged evidence must be sustained. Thus, any motion to suppress filed before Defendant’s trial would not have been meritorious. View "US v. Gloria Taylor" on Justia Law

Respondent has long struggled with mental illness and a proclivity to violent outbursts. In 2017, Williams assaulted a security guard in Portland, Oregon—a federal crime because it happened at a Social Security office. Respondent pleaded guilty and was sentenced to just over four years in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Federal prisoners on the cusp of being released may be civilly committed if they are “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which [their] release would create a substantial risk” to the person or property of others. Here, the primary question is whether—in making such a risk assessment—a court must consider any terms of supervision that would govern the prisoner’s conduct post-release.   The Fourth Circuit held that a court must consider any terms of supervision that would govern the prisoner’s conduct post-release. Thus, because the record offers no assurances the district court appropriately considered the terms of Respondent’s supervised release before ordering him committed, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "US v. Nathaniel Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, challenging his conviction for using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court denied his motion and Defendant appealed.The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the federal arson statute which served as the predicate for Defendant's Sec. 924(c) conviction is not categorically a crime of violence. Because the statute Defendant was convicted under criminalized the arson of property fully owned by the defendant, and not just that of the property “of another” as required by Sec. 924(c). View "US v. Cecil Davis" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense to a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for damages. Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their respective summary judgment motions based on a qualified immunity defense to a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for damages asserted by Appellee. Appellee initiated the underlying action against Appellants, and various other South Carolina state officials after his son, (“Decedent”), was struck and killed by a vehicle while he was a pedestrian on Interstate 95 (“I-95”) in South Carolina.   Appellee alleged that Appellants violated Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to ensure Decedent was transported to a hospital or jail where he could receive adequate medical attention. The district court determined that, while Decedent’s right to freedom from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, a genuine dispute of material fact barred a ruling on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.   Appellants contest the district court’s ruling that Decedent’s constitutional right was “clearly established.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care and freedom from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs was clearly established and particularly recognized by both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court at the time of the events in question. Further, the court wrote that Appellants have also not addressed the court’s “fundamental error” standard, nor have they attempted to show that they can meet it here. Thus, Appellants have not satisfied their burden of identifying a “fundamental error” warranting reversal on a ground not raised before the district court. View "Paul Tarashuk v. Jamie Givens" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, Virginia. After exhausting direct appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court, Petitioner filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in the Newport News Circuit Court. That court dismissed the petition. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal to the Virginia Supreme Court. After that, Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court ordered the state to file a responsive pleading to show cause why the writ should not be granted. It also instructed the state to treat the order as a “request that the records of the state criminal trial and habeas corpus proceedings, if pertinent and available, be forwarded to the Clerk’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia. Petitioner appealed the denial of Rule 60(b) motion. When the district court sent its records to the Fourth Circuit, the state habeas records were not included.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court with the following instructions: (1) the state must file a Rule 5-compliant Answer; (2) the district court shall determine if it has the records it requested—those “pertinent and available”— and, in this inquiry, address the state habeas records that were missing when the file was transferred to the Fourth Circuit; and (3) finally, the district court shall reconsider the state’s motion to dismiss, considering the complete answer and the records it first requested. View "Arthur Sanford v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) after conceding removability from the United States during removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ denied both forms of relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and entered a final order of removal. In so holding the BIA found that Petitioner failed to show the necessary nexus between her asserted protected ground and the persecution she suffered.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. One necessary element for an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal is that an applicant’s claimed persecution occurred, or will occur, on account of a statutorily protected ground that applies to her. If an applicant fails to satisfy the nexus requirement, she cannot obtain asylum or withholding of removal. The Fourth Circuit held that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus based on the facts presented. View "Maira Madrid-Montoya v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of receiving and possessing child pornography found on his phone. He appealed, making six arguments. The Fourth Circuit explained that based on the totality of the circumstances of Defendant’s questioning show Defendant was not in custody, so his Miranda rights were not violated. Although admitting the cellphone report into evidence violated Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, the court found that the error was harmless. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of past wrongs, in allowing the Detective’s lay-opinion testimony, or in fashioning its restitution order. But the lifetime ban on internet and computer usage is foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s caselaw. So the court reversed as to that condition and remanded to the district court. View "US v. Augustin Arce" on Justia Law