Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On appeal, prisoner Plaintiff raised constitutional and state-law claims against numerous prison officials arising from a physical altercation at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia. As part of his evidentiary showing, Plaintiff repeatedly sought the production of videos recording the encounter. When he learned that some of the videos were not preserved, Plaintiff moved for spoliation sanctions.   After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s spoliation motion and recommended entering judgment against him on all claims and counterclaims. The district court substantially adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations without explicitly addressing Plaintiff’s objections to the order denying spoliation sanctions.The Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the district court entering judgment to Defendants and remand for a hearing on Plaintiff’s objections to the denial of spoliation sanctions, and for any other proceedings, the district court deems appropriate. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by implicitly overruling Plaintiff’s spoliation objections when several critical issues were left unresolved by the magistrate judge.   Specifically, the court explained that the magistrate judge erred in requiring Plaintiff to produce evidence that “the defendants purposefully disposed of any video recordings in an effort to prevent their use at trial.” Under Rule 37(e), when “electronically stored information that should have been preserved . . . is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it,” then “upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information,” the court “may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” Accordingly, only a finding of prejudice is required for such not-greater-than-necessary sanctions. View "Gary Wall v. E. Rasnick" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the admissibility of a handgun found in a rental car he had been driving that was parked outside of his hotel. Finding that Defendant had abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy in the Charger, that Enterprise had given valid third-party consent to the search, and that the Government would have inevitably discovered the gun in the Charger, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in suppression hearings, criminal defendants have the burden of putting forward evidence to support all elements of their reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, Defendant did not introduce any evidence to support his lawful possession of the Charger. View "US v. Derrick Daniels, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was paid to drive a car with over $100,000 in drug-tainted cash hidden in a secret dashboard compartment. When police pulled him over, he acted suspiciously: He quickly shut down the GPS application running on his smartphone and struggled to answer where he was going with the money. His odd behavior continued when he arrived at the station: When police found five SD cards wrapped in a $100 bill in Defendant’s shoe, Defendant tried to destroy them by eating them. When police got a warrant to search the phone and SD cards, things went from bad to worse for Defendant—both the phone and the chips contained graphic and heinous child pornography. Defendant contends that the search warrant for the phone and SD cards should not have been issued.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress was proper. The court explained that this case presents a model example of a proper investigation under the Fourth Amendment. The officers submitted a comprehensive affidavit with detailed facts showing drug trafficking. The magistrate combined those facts with commonsense inferences and determined that probable cause existed. And when the officers discovered evidence of other crimes, they immediately went back and obtained additional warrants to search and seize those files. View "US v. David Orozco" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff sought to pursue a civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia against several Commonwealth officials, alleging that the Old Dominion’s 2021 House of Delegates election contravened the federal and state constitutions. More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Virginia was constitutionally required to use 2020 U.S. Census data to draw the legislative districts for the 2021 House of Delegates election. On October 12, 2021, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor of Virginia and the State Board of Elections on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.   On remand, the three-judge district court dismissed the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint, ruling that he lacks Article III standing to sue. The court later reviewed the Standing to Sue Ruling, and found that the court possesses jurisdiction to review the Standing to Sue Ruling. The court then rendered an opinion to resolve both the Plaintiff’s Appeal and the Commonwealth’s Appeal.   The Fourth Circuit held that the three-judge district court properly ruled that Plaintiff does not possess the Article III standing to sue that is required to pursue this civil action. In making that determination, the court adopted the well-crafted and reasoned analysis of the Standing to Sue Ruling. Plaintiff cannot satisfy Article III’s injury in fact requirement, either as a voter or as a candidate for public office. However, the court modified the judgment of the three-judge district court to reflect that its dismissal of Plaintiff’s civil action is without prejudice. The court further, dismissed the Commonwealth’s Appeal as moot. View "Paul Goldman v. Robert Brink" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of thousands of West Virginia’s foster children challenging the State’s administration of child welfare services. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court abstained from hearing the case in deference to parallel state-court proceedings. Plaintiffs alleged that a federal class action is the most—if not the only—effective way to achieve the kind of systemic relief they seek.The Fourth Circuit reversed holding that principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Plaintiffs bring federal claims, and federal courts “are obliged to decide” them in all but “exceptional” circumstances. The court explained that Younger’s narrow scope safeguards Plaintiffs’ rights, bestowed on them by Congress in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, to present their claims to a federal tribunal. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. The court further wrote For years, West 4 Virginia’s response to any foster-care orders entered as part of the individual state hearings seems to have been to shuffle its money and staff around until the orders run out, entrenching rather than excising structural failures. Thus, forcing Plaintiffs to once more litigate their claims piecemeal would get federalism exactly backward. View "Jonathan R. v. Jim Justice" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and eight counts of mail or wire fraud. He argued that his trial was constitutionally defective, his indictment was constructively amended, his jury instructions prejudiced him, and his conviction for conspiracy to launder money must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that his arguments—most of which were not properly preserved—are meritless. The court held that Defendant’s right-to-compel challenge falters, at minimum, at the third step of the plain error inquiry because he fails to show how the district court’s alleged Fifth Amendment error affected the outcome of his proceedings. 
 Further, even if the probable-cause finding for Count 2 were flawed, the Government would still have been well within its rights to seize Defendant’s properties based on the underlying and unchallenged probable-cause findings for these other counts.   Next, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that his indictment contained an error, much less a plain error. It is well established that “[t]he allegation in a single count of conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.” United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2003).   Moreover, the court explained that even if it assumed that the district court’s concealment-money-laundering instructions were flawed, that error did not affect the outcome of Defendant’s proceedings because he was nevertheless convicted of conspiring to commit transactional money laundering. View "US v. David Miller" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to transmit national defense information to Chinese agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 794(c), and making materially false statements to FBI agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s application during trial of the “silent witness rule” — under which sensitive evidence is disclosed to the jury and the trial’s other participants but not to the public — contending that it violated his right to a public trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and his right to present a complete defense, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He also mounted two distinct challenges to the district court’s instruction of the jury.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s challenges and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote it does not suggest that the use of the silent witness rule could never implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as reliance on the silent witness rule has the potential to interfere meaningfully with the public’s ability to understand what is happening in the proceedings, despite their physical presence in the courtroom. But it doubts that the limited use of the silent witness rule as it was applied in this case amounted to a sanctionable closure of the courtroom.   Further, in response to Defendant’s argument that the district court “watered down” the mens rea requirement for the conspiracy offense, the court found Defendant’s reasoning unpersuasive, as he focuses too narrowly on one small segment of the instructions without context. View "US v. Kevin Mallory" on Justia Law

Defendants led a violent street gang known as the Black Mob Gangstas, which was responsible for two murders. Several gang members were indicted, most of which entered guilty pleas and then testified against Defendants. Defendants were convicted of various offenses including murder in aid of racketeering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana. Each defendant received multiple consecutive life sentences.Defendants appealed on several issues, each of which was rejected by the Fourth Circuit. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to support each of Defendants' convictions. The court also rejected Defendants' claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes their convictions for drug conspiracy, firearms murder, and VICAR murder because they constituted the "same offense." The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court did not err in severing Defendants' trials, finding that Defendants did not suffer a miscarriage of justice as a result of the joint trial. Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not err in imposing consecutive life sentences.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentences in full. View "US v. Demetrice Devine" on Justia Law

A former coal miner s filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. An administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Benefits Review Board both determined that Petitioner, Edd Potter Coal Company, would be responsible in the event that the coal miner was entitled to benefits. Once the Board remanded the case to determine if benefits were in fact appropriate, Edd Potter decided to raise an Appointments Clause challenge. Both the ALJ and the Board concluded that Edd Potter had forfeited this issue by failing to timely raise it.    Given Edd Potter’s double forfeiture, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the Department of Labor’s regulations requires issue exhaustion both before the ALJ and before the Board. The court wrote that it is firmly established that, before an agency, parties must raise all issues they seek to maintain on appeal “at the time appropriate under its practice.” United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952). The court explained the Department’s regulations, the Board’s consistent practice, and the mandate rule’s application all point in the same direction as logic. On remand, parties may not raise whatever new issues they would like if they have previously failed to bring those issues to the attention of the ALJ and the Board. The mere fact of a remand does not wipe the whole slate clean. Further, the court found that Edd Potter forfeited its Appointments Clause claim not once but twice. View "Edd Potter Coal Company, Inc. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted several constitutional and procedural claims related to his inclusion in the Terrorism Screening Database and its subclassification, the No Fly List. These are two governmental, interagency tools used to share information about suspected terrorists. The district court determined that Petitioner’s as-applied claims fell within 49 U.S.C. Section 46110’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal appellate courts over challenges to final Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) orders. So it transferred those claims to us under 28 U.S.C. Section 1631.   Petitioner moved to remand his claims to the district court, arguing it erred in finding that the Fourth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 46110. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the government that a portion of Petitioner’s claims—those challenging his status on the No Fly List—is moot. But the court wrote it thinks it’s unclear which of Petitioner’s claims the district court intended to transfer under Section 1631. Thus the court vacated the transfer order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss as moot Petitioner’s challenges to his status on the No Fly List; decide whether it has jurisdiction over the rest of Petitioner’s claims; and, if not, transfer them to the proper Circuit. View "Saadiq Long v. David Pekoske" on Justia Law