Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A superseding indictment charged two defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. To address safety concerns, prior to their trial, the district court ordered Defendants to file a joint position as to whether they were vaccinated against COVID-19 or intended to be by the start of the trial. The district court further ordered the government and Defendants to inform the court as to whether they would agree to strike unvaccinated individuals from the jury. Defendants responded that they were not vaccinated and did not intend to be vaccinated. However, they agreed they would test for COVID-19 and provide the test results to the court. Defendants objected to the court’s suggestion of striking unvaccinated jurors for cause. At issue on appeal is whether a district court’s sua sponte decision to strike unvaccinated prospective jurors for cause from a properly assembled venire during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge. The court explained that the fair-cross-section requirement applies to jury venires, not petit juries. And the district court’s decision to strike unvaccinated jurors based on their perceived inability to serve without creating unnecessary safety risks affected the composition of the petit jury for this particular case, not the individuals represented in the venire from which the petit jury is selected. View "US v. Jose Colon" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

A confidential informant tipped off law enforcement that Defendant was dealing drugs out of his residence in Henderson, North Carolina. In the span of a week, officers used the informant to make two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Defendant at his residence. Officers presented the informant with a photo of Defendant following the buys, and the informant confirmed Defendant sold him the crack cocaine. A jury convicted Defendant of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing, manufacturing, or using cocaine and marijuana. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on numerous grounds.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that contrary to Defendant’s argument, probable cause did not require the officers to test the crack cocaine after the buys to confirm its illicit nature. In the warrant application, the lead officer stated that he had eight years of law enforcement experience, was assigned to investigate “the possession and sale of illegal controlled substances,” and had received training about controlled substances. The magistrate could reasonably conclude the officer visually identified the substance the informant purchased from Defendant as crack cocaine, even though the warrant application did not say whether the officer tested it.   Further, the court found that here, there was no plain error. The warrant authorized law enforcement to search the duplex and a silver Mercedes. It also authorized officers to seize “Vehicles” and “all 14 electronics.” Officers had an objectively reasonable belief that both the BMW and the cell phone fell within the warrant’s scope. View "US v. Kacey Hicks" on Justia Law

When a deputy sheriff in Lexington County, South Carolina, began to follow a vehicle because he thought the driver was behaving suspiciously, the vehicle sped away, failing to stop when the deputy activated his patrol car’s blue light and siren and leading the deputy on a high-speed chase. After the vehicle crashed, the driver, identified as Defendant, was arrested and a firearm and ammunition were recovered from the front floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the district court sentenced him to 99 months imprisonment. The 99-month sentence included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds.   The Fourth Circuit agreed. The court explained that the district court erred in relying on the blue-light offense to apply a Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement when Defendant received notice of that basis for the first time at the sentencing hearing. However, the court also concluded that the error was, in the circumstances of this case, harmless. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement when the firearm was lying at Defendant’s feet while he failed to stop for a blue light. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

On behalf of her son’s estate, Plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and North Carolina law against an officer and the City of Charlotte (“City”) in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for both Defendants after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and the City was not responsible for the officer’s conduct under federal or state law. Plaintiff appealed both aspects of the district court’s decision.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions granting summary judgment for the City on Franklin’s § 1983 and negligent training claims. The court vacated the decisions granting summary judgment for the officer on the Section 1983 and assault and battery claims and granting both defendants summary judgment on the wrongful death claim. The court explained that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s son did not pose an imminent threat to the officers or anyone else. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against her.   Moreover, Plaintiff’s son’s death is not traceable to a subordinate’s decision that may be approved as final by a city policymaker. Instead, as the district court concluded, “the City Manager’s post-facto approval of an internal shooting investigation cannot possibly have caused the constitutional violation.” Reversing the City Manager’s decision cannot undo what is done. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that the City is not liable under Section 1983 for the officer’s shooting. View "Deborah Franklin v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

This appeal is the latest installment in a series of challenges to Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC’s (“MVP”) plans to build a natural gas pipeline. Because it intends to construct a portion of the pipeline in West Virginia, MVP obtained a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) certification from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”). The certification reflected the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s activities during the pipeline’s construction would not violate the state’s water quality standards. Disagreeing with that determination, landowners and members of various environmental organizations in the state (collectively, “Petitioners”) petitioned for review of the Department’s certification.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the certification, finding the Department’s justifications for its conclusions deficient. The court found that the Department’s reasonable assurance determination suffers from four interrelated failures: It did not (1) sufficiently address MVP’s violation history, (2) include conditions requiring compliance with the O&G CGP and SWPPP, (3) provide a reasoned basis for relying on EPA’s upland CGP, or (4) articulate an adequate explanation for forgoing location-specific antidegradation review. Considering these oversights, the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s in-stream construction would be conducted in a manner that will not violate state water standards were arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. West Virginia DEP" on Justia Law

Defendant sought an award of attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment following the district court’s dismissal of the government’s criminal case against her. She argued that her prosecution satisfied the Hyde Amendment’s criteria for fee shifting because it was vexatious, frivolous, and in bad faith. She also requests discovery to support her claim. The district court denied discovery and denied attorney’s fees based on its review of the evidence available to the government when it initiated Drake’s prosecution. The appeal here challenged the district court’s exercise of discretion at every turn.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court acted within its discretion throughout. The court explained that given the significant evidence against her, Defendant was fortunate to receive a Rule 29 dismissal from the court. The court wrote that, as this case illustrates, such dismissals will not invariably result in an award of Hyde Amendment attorney’s fees. Allowing awards as a matter of course in such cases would contradict the limiting language of the statute and discourage the granting of such dismissals even when taking such action is the right thing to do. View "US v. Shannon Drake" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). That provision makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to “possess . . . any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). At the time of Defendant’s offense, anyone who “knowingly violate[d]” this provision could be imprisoned for up to ten years. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to appoint counsel and his Section 2255 motion in its entirety.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Rehaif does not apply to felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) and that Rehaif does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The court held that on remand, the district court should consider any issues related to procedural default and prejudice in addition to the merits of Defendant’s claim. Accordingly, the court wrote that in any prejudice analysis, the district court should conduct a fact-intensive inquiry under the Supreme Court’s careful guidance in the Greer decision. However, if the defendant establishes that he did not, in fact, know of his felony status, the district court would be free to award appropriate relief. View "US v. Thomas Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant and his partner conspired to ensnare drug-addicted women in debt-cycle sex trafficking. Defendant would give the women heroin and cocaine they could not afford and then insist they repay their debt by prostituting themselves for his benefit throughout Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Defendant provided fentanyl to two women who overdosed. Defendant left the women for dead and destroyed the evidence. One of the women died, but the other survived and testified against him. A jury convicted Defendant of (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) interstate transportation for the purpose of prostitution, (3) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death and (4) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury. At sentencing, the district court found that Defendant had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense, triggering a mandatory life sentence on Counts 3 and 4. The court sentenced Defendant to life in prison on Counts 1, 3, and 4 and 120 months imprisonment on Count 2, all to be served concurrently. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s speculation about positional isomers of cocaine fails to show that the district court plainly erred in not finding overbreadth on this ground. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s determination that Defendant’s Virginia conviction was for a “felony drug offense” that supports the application of Section 841(b)(1)(C) sentencing enhancement. View "US v. Kendall Wysinger" on Justia Law