Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

By grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States, the district court held that the Government’s provision of substitute facilities to Arlington County, Virginia (“the County”) constituted just compensation for the taking of three parcels of property. The County appealed, contesting the district court’s application of the summary judgment standard and raising several substantive arguments in support.The Fourth Circuit, finding error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment, vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court concluded that the district court circumvented the summary judgment standard when it engaged in fact-finding despite the presence of genuinely disputed material facts. The court was persuaded that the genuine disputes identified as to the nature of one of the parcels were material. It is this contested distinction of that parcel that the district court overlooked when drawing inferences in favor of the Government, effectively determining as a decision on the merits that the parcel was not a separate parcel for condemnation purposes from the rest of the take. While the district court would not have committed procedural error by making that decision under Rule 71.1, it did err as such when resolving the case in a Rule 56 proceeding. View "US v. 8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington County, Virginia" on Justia Law

White Coat Waste Project (“WCW”) tried to run an advertisement denouncing animal experimentation with the Greater Richmond Transit Company (“Richmond Transit”) the ad was denied for being impermissibly “political.” WCW sued, challenging that denial as a violation of its First Amendment rights. Richmond Transit responded that, as a private company, it is not bound by the First Amendment, and even if it were, its policy passes constitutional muster because it only restrains speech in a nonpublic forum.   The district court disagreed on both counts, concluding that Richmond Transit is a state actor subject to constitutional constraints and that its policy violates the First Amendment right to free speech. But the district court granted WCW only partial summary judgment, holding that it could not provide the facial relief WCW sought because public-transit political-advertising bans can sometimes accord with the Constitution.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly identified Richmond Transit as a state actor and held that Richmond Transit’s policy is not “capable of reasoned application” and is therefore unconstitutionally unreasonable. Further, the court held that the district court erred in denying facial relief. Even if another public-transit political-advertising ban may be constitutional, this ban is incapable of reasoned, constitutional application in all circumstances. Thus, it is facially unconstitutional and warrants facial relief. View "White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co." on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. Under those procedures, an alien is given notice and three opportunities to seek release by showing they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.   A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering, on a class-wide basis, that to continue detaining an alien under Section 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges to consider an alien’s ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that under Section 1252(f)(1), the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief that enjoined or restrained the process used to conduct Section 1226(a) bond hearings. Further, the detention procedures adopted for Section 1226(a) bond hearings provide sufficient process to satisfy constitutional requirements. The court concluded for that reason-the aliens are unable to establish a likelihood of success on their due process claims. Nor have they shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor or that an injunction is in the public interest. View "Marvin Miranda v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. The Attorney General has adopted procedures for making that discretionary decision. Under those procedures, an alien is given notice and three opportunities to seek release by showing they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering that to continue detaining an alien under 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges to consider an alien’s ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that under 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(f)(1), the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief that enjoined or restrained the process used to conduct Section 1226(a) bond hearings. Further, the court held that as for the individual relief issued by the district court, the detention procedures adopted for 1226(a) bond hearings provide sufficient process to satisfy constitutional requirements. Thus, the aliens are unable to establish a likelihood of success on their due process claims. Nor have they shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. View "Marvin Miranda v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentence. Regarding his conviction, Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about the gun involved in the felon-in-possession charge. Regarding his sentence, he argues that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement, based on its finding that Defendant used the firearm to commit a carjacking, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s Sixth Amendment violation claims and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by admitting the uncounseled statements that he made to Maryland police after he was appointed counsel in his D.C. case. The court reasoned that Defendant did not request his attorney, ask for the interview to stop or say anything that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand to be a request for an attorney.   Further, the court held that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of acquitted conduct as the basis for his Guidelines sentence enhancement is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. Finally, the district court did not err by enhancing Defendant’s sentence when it found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he used the firearm in connection with the carjacking at issue. View "US v. Jovon Medley" on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life sentence upon a South Carolina conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill. One claim in Petitioner’s state habeas petition alleged that his state appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals. The district court granted Section 2254 relief, but not on the ground Petitioner raised. Instead, the district court determined Petitioner was entitled to relief because his appellate counsel (1) failed “to timely advise him of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals on his direct appeal and of his right to seek further appellate review,” and (2) sent a letter containing counsel’s “forged signature” that “inaccurately informed Petitioner that his state court appellate rights had been exhausted.” South Carolina appealed, arguing that the district court’s judgment conflicts with the rigorous standards that apply when a state prisoner seeks to challenge the constitutionality of his state sentence in federal court.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and denied Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The court held that no ineffective assistance of counsel claim can arise based on conduct relating to discretionary, subsequent appeals. The court reasoned that the district court impermissibly altered the claim presented in Petitioner’s sec. 2254 petition. As for the claim Petitioner actually raised, the district court properly held that he had not shown that he was entitled to relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). View "Clinton Folkes v. Warden Nelsen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to Continuing a Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) and Money Laundering. During his sentencing, and under the 1994 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Defendant to 420 months’ incarceration on the CCE offense and 240 months’ incarceration for money laundering, to be served concurrently. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), which the district court denied on grounds that Defendant’s convictions were not covered offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that his CCE offense is a covered offense under the FSA because Congress amended the crack cocaine drug weight required to trigger a mandatory life sentence under Section 848(b).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision finding that Defendant’s conviction under Sections 848 (a) and (c) and pursuant to Terry is not a covered offense under the First Step Act of 2018. The court reasoned that though the Act did modify the penalties for Defendant’s predicate violations under 841(a)(1) and 846, Defendant’s statutory penalty range for violating 848(a) and (c) remained the same before and after the FSA. Thus, because Defendant is serving a sentence for violating 848(a) and (c), his offense is not a covered offense under the FSA. View "US v. Jerrell Thomas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two West Virginia attorneys and a client, contended that West Virginia’s statute regulating legal advertisements that solicit clients in litigation involving medications or medical devices violates the First Amendment by prohibiting attorneys from using certain terms or images in their advertisements and by requiring such advertisements to include certain disclosures. The district court agreed, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and upheld the statute concluding that its prohibitions survive constitutional scrutiny because the prohibitions target misleading speech. Further, West Virginia has substantial interests in protecting public health and in preventing deception, and the statute advances these interests in a narrowly tailored and reasonable way. Thus, the statute’s prohibitions and disclosures work together to protect the health of West Virginia citizens who may be misled into thinking that attorneys are reliable sources of medical advice. View "Steven Recht v. Patrick Morrisey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Federal Public Defender, was subject to sexual harassment by a supervisor. After attempting to pursue her administrative remedies, Plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged and resigned. Plaintiff then filed claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as well as under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986, against various executive and judicial officers. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims based on her failure to state a claim and Defendant's sovereign immunity.The panel held that Plaintiff's Due Process claim sufficiently plead a deprivation of her property interests, but failed to plead a deprivation of her liberty interest. The panel also held Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim adequately plead sex discrimination; however, her claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finally, the court determined that Plaintiff could only pursue back-pay benefits from all Defendant's named in their official capacity and that all Defendant's named in their individual capacity were entitled to dismissal under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Caryn Strickland v. US" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the subjects of an unconstitutional search. Relying on the fruits of that search, prosecutors obtained grand jury indictments against Plaintiffs. After a court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiffs, they sued the state trooper who conducted the search under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim, reasoning that their 1983 claim was based on an unconstitutional search and seizure of property and accrued at the time of the search. Thus, because Plaintiffs filed suit more than two years after the search the 1983 claim is time-barred.Plaintiffs argued that, even if a Fourth Amendment search claim typically accrues at the time of the search, this particular search claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed because the claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” their prosecutions. Plaintiffs argue that a favorable-termination accrual rule is required anytime a 1983 claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” a prosecution. The court disagreed, finding that the accrual date is based on the nature of the constitutional violation when it is completed. The court found the claim accrued when the trooper performed the unlawful search in 2014. And the applicable two-year statute of limitations ran out well before Plaintiff’s sued in 2019. Thus the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Fernando Smith v. Michael Travelpiece" on Justia Law