Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the course of responding to a dispute between neighbors, a Deputy fatally shot a man while he was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The personal representative of the deceased's estate (“the Estate”), subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the Deputy used excessive force in violation of the deceased’s Fourth Amendment rights, along with various related state law claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the following claims and remand the case for further proceedings: (1) the 1983 claim against the Deputy in his individual capacity; (2) the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against the Deputy in his individual capacity; and (3) the claims under the Macon County Sheriff’s Office’s surety bond against the Deputy and Sheriff in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages.Notably, the court found that parties’ factual disputes are quintessentially “genuine” and “material.” Assuming that a jury would credit the Estate’s expert evidence over the Deputy’s competing testimony and expert evidence, leads to the conclusion that the Deputy’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.The court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the Estate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Macon County’s liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office’s governmental immunity from suit; and (3) the Estate’s claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. View "Melissa Knibbs v. Anthony Momphard, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court initially applied a 15-year enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act ("ACCA"). However, following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), the district court vacated the 15-year ACCA enhancement and sentenced Petitioner to time served.Petitioner then petitioned the district court for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513(a). The district court declined to issue the certificate, finding Petitioner failed to meet the statutory requirements.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 2513 requires a petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence to prove that his conviction was overturned because he was not guilty of the charged offense. Here, Petitioner concedes that his conviction was not overturned. Petitioner must first overturn his conviction before seeking a certificate of innocence. View "US v. Richard Moon" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a single count of cocaine distribution. He was tried for that offense in the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, South Carolina (the “trial court”). He brought federal habeas corpus proceedings in the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Concluding that the court had not unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability relative to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the stand-up order.The trial court jury was initially unable to arrive at a verdict and requested that petitioner stand beside the enlarged image. The court inquired if petitioner's counsel had any objection. The court interjected before an objection could be lodged and directed petitioner to stand as the jury wished. The circuit court found that the PCR court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of the case in finding trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. The circuit court reasoned that trial counsel cannot be found to have operated within the broad scope of Strickland’s measure of competence when she only attempted — and thereby failed — to object to the stand-up order. Thus, petitioner’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the stand-up order constituted objectively deficient performance, that her performance prejudiced the defense and that she thereby rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "Lynel Witherspoon v. Donnie Stonebreaker" on Justia Law

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officers abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and deliberately delayed their investigation so the canine unit could conduct its dog sniff. He also contends that the court clearly erred by crediting the officer’s testimony after he impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement.The circuit court found that though the stop could have been shorter (and begun more efficiently), it wasn’t impermissibly prolonged, and the officers’ actions were reasonably related to investigating an expired license plate. Reasoning that the acceptable length of a routine traffic stop can’t be stated with mathematical precision,” but the officers here were diligent enough to pass constitutional muster. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).Regarding the other officer’s testimony, the circuit court was not persuaded that the district court erred in finding him credible. The district court acknowledged that the defendant impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement yet otherwise found the officer credible. The circuit court declined to disturb the district court’s credibility assessment. As such, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Joffrey Perez" on Justia Law

The Estate filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law after Deputy Sheriff Anthony Momphard, Jr. fatally shot Michael Knibbs while Knibbs was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The district court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the Estate's section 1983 claim and that the Estate's state law claims against Deputy Momphard, Macon County Sheriff Robert Holland, and the insurance companies that issued the Sheriff's Office a liability insurance policy and a surety bond necessarily failed.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s award of summary judgment to Deputy Momphard on the Estate's section 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues of disputed material fact, and ultimately erred in finding that Deputy Momphard's use of force was reasonable as a matter of law at this stage in the proceedings. In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Knibbs never pointed his weapon at Deputy Momphard or made any furtive movements, thereby rendering unjustified the deadly force used against Knibbs. Furthermore, the court's case law demonstrates that the contours of Knibbs' constitutional right were clearly established at the time.The court also vacated the district court's summary judgment as to the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against Deputy Momphard in his individual capacity, and the claims under the Macon County Sheriff's Office's surety bond against Deputy Momphard and Sheriff Holland in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages. However, the court affirmed the district court's conclusions that the Estate's Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; Macon County's liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office's governmental immunity from suit; and the Estate's claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Knibbs v. Momphard" on Justia Law

Five adjacent Burtonsville, Maryland parcels are restricted from receiving sewer service. Several previous attempts to obtain approval of water and sewer category change requests were unsuccessful. The owners' alternative plan was to sell to a religious organization. They believed that land-use regulations must submit to “[c]hurch use [which] cannot be denied.” They entered into a contract with Canaan, contingent on the approval of the extension of a public sewer line for a new church. Such an extension required amendment of the Comprehensive Ten-Year Water Supply and Sewerage Systems Plan, which involves the Montgomery County Planning Board, the County Executive, the County Council, public hearings, and the Maryland Department of the Environment.Following denial of their requests, the owners sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. The land has been bound by decades of regulations restricting development for both religious and non-religious purposes. The parties were aware of the difficulties in developing the property when they entered into the contract; they could not have a reasonable expectation of religious land use. The restrictions are rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting the region’s watershed. View "Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his public high school suspended him in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the actions taken against him by school personnel after he engaged in a conversation with his classmates about the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas Highschool. The district court held that plaintiff's suit was barred under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the school board acted as the final policymaking authority in approving plaintiff's suspension, and thus Monell does not bar the suit. Furthermore, plaintiff's complaint plausibly alleges a First Amendment claim where the First Amendment does not permit schools to prohibit students from engaging in the factual, nonthreatening speech alleged here. In this case, plaintiff engaged in a factual conversation with his peers about a current event that is uniquely salient to the lives of American teenagers, a school shooting. The court stated that schools cannot silence such student speech on the basis that it communicates controversial or upsetting ideas. To do so would be incompatible with the very purpose of public education. However, the court concluded that the district court properly held that the complaint alleges no plausible Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City County School Board" on Justia Law

This case arose out of South Carolina's termination of Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding in relevant part that the individual plaintiff had demonstrated that she was likely to succeed on her Medicaid Act claim since the free-choice-of-provider provision conferred a private right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and South Carolina had violated that provision by terminating Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The district court then issued a permanent injunction, which South Carolina now challenges in this appeal.The Fourth Circuit first concluded that this case presents a live case or controversy and rejected South Carolina's claim of mootness. Even assuming that the court were free to reexamine its precedents, the court declined to do so in this case. Rather, the court concluded that its previous decision was handed down as a matter of law and resolved the precise legal issue upon which South Carolina now seeks review.The court reaffirmed its prior decision, concluding that the free-choice-of-provider provision confers on Medicaid recipients an individual right enforceable under section 1983. The court stated that the statute plainly reflects Congress's desire that individual Medicaid recipients be free to obtain care from any qualified provider and it implements this policy in direct and unambiguous language. In this case, all three Blessing factors in determining whether a statute creates a private right enforceable under section 1983 are met. Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not evince Congress's intent to specifically foreclose a remedy under section 1983. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), does not undermine the court's analysis. The court refused to nullify Congress's undeniable desire to extend a choice of medical providers to the less fortunate among us, individuals who experience the same medical problems as the more fortunate in society but who lack under their own means the same freedom to choose their healthcare provider. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Kerr" on Justia Law

A hung jury on one claim is a non-finding that cannot be used to conduct a consistency analysis with another finding by the jury. In this case, the jury was given a general verdict form, found defendant liable on one count and awarded plaintiff $25,000 in damages. However, the district court invalidated that verdict based on a jury deadlock for a different count, reasoning that the deadlock on excessive force was irreconcilable with a verdict on retaliation.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting a new trial and reinstated the jury verdict finding defendant liable for $25,000 based on plaintiff's retaliation claim and vacated the district court's final judgment based on the second trial. The court also vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for partial voluntary dismissal because its decision on those matters was based on the district court's ruling on the motion for a new trial. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Jordan v. Large" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire another teacher in the drama department to assist him with tech work in connection with his staging of student performances or, alternatively, in refusing to provide him with additional compensation for the tech work that he performs. Plaintiff also alleged that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race when compensating him for his "extra-duty" work in connection with other events at the high school.The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that the school board's failure to pay him a Theater Technical Director Supplement constituted race-based employment discrimination. While the court agreed that it was error for the district court to consult the School of the Arts' website in determining whether the complaint properly alleged that the School of the Arts was an appropriate comparator, the court concluded that the error was harmless. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for plaintiff on his discrimination claim based on the denial of assistance. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not provide a valid comparator for purposes of supporting this racial discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a portion of the complaint for failing to state a claim. In regard to the remaining claims, the court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. View "Tabb v. Board of Education of the Durham Public Schools" on Justia Law