Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following an investigation by the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission and the testing of DNA evidence, a state court vacated Plaintiffs-brothers’ convictions, finding significant evidence of innocence. North Carolina Governor Patrick McCrory granted each a “Pardon of Innocence.” When they were released, they had served 31 years in prison. Through appointed guardians, the two commenced this action against six law enforcement officers, the town of Red Springs, and Robeson County under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of their due process rights. The jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $62 million in compensatory damages and $13 million in punitive damages.   On appeal, Defendants challenged (1) the district court’s conduct of the trial on several procedural grounds, arguing that they were denied a fair trial and that the district court, therefore, erred in denying their motion for a new trial; (2) the court’s refusal to reduce the jury’s verdict by the $11.5 million that the Plaintiffs had received from others as redress for their injuries prior to the verdict; (3) the court’s addition of $36 million in prejudgment interest to the jury’s award; and (4) the reasonableness of the court’s award of attorneys fees.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial; vacated its order denying Defendants’ motion to reduce the jury’s compensatory damages award, and directed that the court reduce the award by $10 million and determine whether the award should be reduced by another $1.5 million; reversed the court’s order awarding prejudgment interest; and affirmed the court’s award of attorneys fees and costs. View "J. Gilliam v. Leroy Allen" on Justia Law

In 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence”—in Petitioner’s case, attempted Hobbs Act robbery— in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction (and the associated ten-year prison sentence) is no longer valid.   Having previously sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, Petitioner now moves for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The court granted Petitioner’s authorization motion, finding that he meets the standard for filing a second or successive motion set forth in Section 2255(h)(2). The court explained that Petitioner must “make a prima facie showing that” his claim satisfies the Section 2255(h) gatekeeping test. The parties agree that Petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his Davis claim satisfies Section 2255(h)(2), which requires his second or successive motion to contain “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Petitioner and the Government contend that Thomas, wherein the Fourth Circuit has held that petitioner’s Davis claim met the Section 2255(h)(2) requirements, is on all fours with the instant case. View "In re: Kenneth Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of former federal inmate brought suit against the United States and several Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials after the decedent was allegedly beaten to death by fellow inmates. The Estate (“Appellant”) alleges that BOP officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the decedent from the attack and failing to intervene to prevent his transfer to a “violent” facility. Appellant also sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that prison officials had been negligent in their failure to intervene and protect the decedent. Appellant argues that its Eighth Amendment claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Appellant’s Bivens claims arise in a new context and that several special factors, including separation-of-power implications and an increased burden on the federal prison system, counsel against an extension of Bivens in this new context. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies to BOP officials’ decisions to transfer Bulger and place him in general population. View "William Bulger v. Hugh Hurwitz" on Justia Law

On March 20, Plaintiff, an inmate, experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was transported to an outside hospital for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and Plaintiff was returned to his home institution. Ultimately, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel obstruction and alleged permanent injury.Plaintiff brought a claim of deliberate indifference against various prison officials ("Defendants"). The district court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's “generalized, conclusory, and collective allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's complaint made collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for various sexual exploitation offenses related to photographs he took of his daughter after law enforcement executed a search warrant at his home, leading to the discovery of certain photographs. Defendant was ultimately convicted and appealed.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant affidavit lacked probable cause because the conduct described occurred five to eight years earlier and that the good faith exception did not apply. Defendant also challenged the admission of video evidence of the complaining witness. Finally, he challenged the application of a sentencing enhancement under Sec. 4B1.5(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines based on "a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct."The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Regarding Defendant's motion to suppress, the court held that the district court appropriately concluded that probable cause existed, given the nature of the allegations and the type of evidence that was the object of the search. Regarding the challenged evidence, the court explained that the videos were "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged offense. Finally, the court rejected Defendant's claim of error regarding the sentencing enhancement, finding that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant's conduct showed a "pattern of activity" of prohibited sexual conduct. View "US v. William Ebert" on Justia Law

Three months after Defendant was arrested for various child pornography offenses—his lawyer moved to have him declared mentally incompetent. The district court found Defendant incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. The government requested an involuntary medication order, and the district court set a hearing. The district court concluded an involuntary medication order was appropriate and granted the government “four months within which to” restore Defendant’s competency. Defendant appealed the involuntary medication order and his continued detention.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it understands that involuntary medication orders “carry an unsavory pedigree” and prolonged pretrial detention of a presumptively innocent person “is serious business.” However, given the deferential standards of review, the court concluded the district court committed no reversible error in deciding an involuntary medication order was warranted and found it appropriate to grant one final four-month period of confinement to attempt to restore Defendant’s competency. View "US v. Christopher Tucker" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, Defendant submitted to polygraph testing. During his polygraph exam, Defendant admitted to possessing adult pornography. In addition, his answers to other questions indicated possible deception. After the exam, Defendant’s probation officer asked him if he possessed child pornography. Linville admitted he did. Then, after he and the probation officer traveled to Defendant’s home, he turned the adult and child pornography over to probation. In addition to petitioning for the revocation of his supervised release, the government charged Defendant with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to his probation officer, admitting that he possessed child pornography and that the child pornography was at his home.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the special condition did not indicate invoking the Fifth Amendment would lead to the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release. Nor did Defendant demonstrate a reasonable belief that he would be punished for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that the government did not expressly or implicitly assert that it would revoke Defendant’s supervised release if he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. And even if Defendant believed invoking the Fifth Amendment would have risked revocation, his belief was not reasonable. View "US v. Eugene Linville" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion when they seized him. Following an evidentiary hearing, during which the two officers testified, the district court found the stop was valid and denied the suppression motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, vacated Defendant’s conviction, and remanded. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify seizing Defendant. The court reasoned that although the officers did not physically restrain Defendant until he lifted his shirt high enough for the officer to see the outline of a firearm, the officers did continue to seize Defendant without reasonable suspicion. It was only after “requesting” that Defendant lift his shirt at least fifteen times, inferring that Defendant should submit to a pat down two times, and mentioning that Defendant could be taken to jail for trespass two times that the officer observed “what appeared to be like the bulge or the outline of a muzzle of a pistol” below Defendant’s belt buckle. The court concluded that the Government’s factors—when weighed and assessed in the totality of the circumstances—do not constitute reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. View "US v. Anthony Peters" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Defendant for trading Corporate Executive Board, Inc. (“CEB”) stock using inside information. The Commission alleged that Defendant aggressively traded CEB stock after he received inside information about a potential merger from co-Defendant, Defendant’s brother-in-law and CEB’s Corporate Controller. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)1 at the conclusion of the Commission’s case. He argued the Commission failed to present evidence that co-Defendant possessed inside information about the merger at the time Defendant began the relevant trading. And if co-Defendant had no such information at that time, Defendant contended, co-Defendant could not have passed it on to Defendant The district court agreed and granted judgment for Defendant.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the right to a trial by jury is enshrined by the Seventh Amendment. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that juries, not judges, decide cases so long as there is evidence from which a reasonable decision can be made. Here, evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant engaged in prohibited insider trading beginning on December 9, 2016. View "SEC v. Christopher Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—North Carolina Wildlife Federation and No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens and Visitors Opposed to The Mid-Currituck Bridge (a community organization) sued the North Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration (together, “the agencies”) —asserting that the agencies violated the National  Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in approving a bridge project. Specifically, the NEPA provides that for an action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” the Act requires an agency to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs fault the agencies for glossing over the environmental impact of the extra 2,400 units that would be constructed under the bridge scenario. They claim that the EIS “made no attempt to evaluate the effect of the Toll Bridge’s additional development on the habitat, wildlife, and natural resources of the Outer Banks.” But the EIS does adequately account for this added development. The EIS noted that a bridge would likely lead to an increase in day visitors, which could lead to more beach driving. More beach driving may “increase the likelihood of collisions” with wild horses on the beaches, but would have “no effect on threatened and endangered species. The agencies also found no “appreciable improvement” in water quality under the no-build and existing roads scenarios. The agencies’ no-build baseline properly reflected the lower level of development that would result without the toll bridge. The agencies didn’t mislead the public about this fact. In sum, the agencies’ consideration of the no-build alternative did not violate the Act. View "No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Department of Transportation" on Justia Law