Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) wishes to conduct undercover animal-cruelty investigations and publicize what they uncover. But it faces a formidable obstacle: North Carolina’s Property Protection Act (the Act), passed to punish “any person who intentionally gains access to the non-public areas of another’s premises and engages in an act that exceeds the person’s authority to enter.” The Act goes on to explain what actions “exceed” authority. Some provisions appear more narrowly focused, prohibiting capturing, removing, or photographing employer data. Even these more specific provisions, however, potentially reach anything from stealing sensitive client information to ferreting out trade secrets in hopes of starting a competing business.   The Fourth Circuit enjoined North Carolina from applying the Act to PETA’s newsgathering activities but severed and reserved all other applications for future case-by-case adjudication. Here, the Act regulates at least some non-expressive, unprotected conduct. The court wrote these more general regulations of conduct do not insulate the Act from the First Amendment’s wringer when the Act bars speech. Absent any indication that the Act “as a whole” chills First Amendment freedoms, the court explained it follows the same principles under overbreadth. View "PETA v. NC Farm Bureau" on Justia Law

South Carolina law makes it a crime for elementary and secondary school students to act “disorderly” or in a “boisterous manner,”; use “obscene or profane language”; or “interfere with,” “loiter about,” or “act in an obnoxious manner” in (or sometimes near) a school. Four students who had been referred or charged under the disorderly conduct or disturbing schools laws, and a nonprofit organization that advocates for at-risk youth filed a putative class action challenging both laws as unconstitutionally vague. After denying a motion to dismiss, the district court certified one main class and two subclasses under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The court held that both laws were unconstitutionally vague as applied to elementary and secondary school students, and it permanently enjoined future enforcement of the disorderly conduct law against those students. South Carolina’s Attorney General—appealed, lodging multiple challenges to the district court’s rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the district court committed no abuse of discretion here—not just because the challenged laws are facially invalid as applied to elementary and secondary school students but also because the subclasses demonstrated ongoing injury by the retention of existing records. A delinquency adjudication under South Carolina law may impair a minor’s future practice of law, application for military service, use of a driver’s license, and educational opportunities. Having concluded the laws may not be constitutionally enforced against South Carolina’s elementary and secondary students, the court saw no reason for allowing such continuing injuries to stand. View "Carolina Youth Action Project v. Alan Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the 2021 opinion of the district court affirming the final decision of Defendant Kijakazi, as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, which denied Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits.   The Fourth Circuit, without resolving the merits, vacated the judgment of the district court and directed a remand to the Commissioner for a new and plenary hearing on Plaintiff’s disability benefits claim, to be conducted before a different and properly appointed administrative law judge (ALJ). The court agreed with Plaintiff’s appellate contention that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the (“ALJ Bright”) who rendered the Commissioner’s final decision did so in contravention of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.   The court explained that the Supreme Court made clear that if an ALJ makes a ruling absent a proper constitutional appointment, and if the claimant interposes a timely Appointments Clause challenge, the appropriate remedy is for the claim to be reheard before a new decisionmaker. Plaintiff did not receive that remedy. The Appointments Clause violation as to Plaintiff was thus not cured, and the 2019 ALJ Decision was likewise rendered in contravention of that Clause. View "Camille Brooks v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”). In her application, she alleged major depressive disorder (“MDD”), anxiety disorder, and attention deficit disorder (“ADHD”). Following a formal hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Plaintiff suffered from severe depression with suicidal ideations, anxiety features and ADHD, but he nonetheless denied her claim based on his finding that she could perform other simple, routine jobs and was, therefore, not disabled. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) according to only little weight to the opinion of her long-time treating psychiatrist (“Dr. B”) and (2) disregarding her subjective complaints based on their alleged inconsistency with the objective medical evidence in the record.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant disability benefits. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider the requisite factors and record evidence by extending little weight to Dr. B’s opinion. The ALJ also erred by improperly disregarding Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s analysis did not account for the unique nature of the relevant mental health impairments, specifically chronic depression. The court explained that because substantial evidence in the record clearly establishes Plaintiff’s disability, remanding for a rehearing would only “delay justice.” View "Shelley C. v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Defendant Deputy Sheriff cited Plaintiff for a parking violation. In response, Plaintiff complained about Defendant on social media for issuing the citation. Listening to her police radio, Defendant heard about another Deputy’s encounter with Plaintiff. She then called that Deputy and offered to buy him lunch if he cited Plaintiff. After the Deputy cited her, Plaintiff learned of Defendant’s lunch offer. So she sued Defendant in her personal capacity under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s lunch offer violated her First Amendment rights. Defendant made this offer, Plaintiff asserted, to retaliate against Plaintiff for her earlier complaints about Defendant. But the jury found Defendant not liable, leading to Plaintiff’s appeal. She now claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the applicable standard for First Amendment retaliation and in excluding certain witness testimony during the trial’s liability phase.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff would have preferred to call additional witnesses to bolster her testimony. But the district court had to balance that interest with the fact that, under the court’s precedent, the inquiry into the second element of the test set forth in Constantine—“whether a person of ordinary firmness in the plaintiff’s position would likely be deterred by the defendant’s retaliatory conduct”—is an objective analysis. Thus, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict and the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendant. View "Rebecca Snoeyenbos v. Marcia Curtis" on Justia Law

Habeas Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for thirty years in South Carolina state court for a number of crimes he committed in 1987, including two murders. But in 2004, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (“Department”) notified Petitioner that he would never be eligible to seek parole because of an earlier armed-robbery conviction. Petitioner contends that, in reaching this conclusion, the Department violated his federal due-process rights because, in his view, a temporary change in South Carolina parole-eligibility law in 1994 permanently “vested” his parole eligibility, such that the Department could not legally determine him ineligible to ever seek parole. The district court rejected Petitioner’s contention.   The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that there is no dispute that Petitioner received a statement of reasons why he was not eligible for parole. The 2004 letter from the Department makes clear that Petitioner is ineligible because his 1992 murder convictions followed a 1979 armed-robbery conviction, and pursuant to S.C. Code Section 24-21-640, a defendant convicted of a violent crime who has previously been convicted of another violent crime is not eligible for parole. Accordingly, Petitioner received the limited process required by the Federal Constitution for a parole-eligibility determination. View "Thomas Torrence v. Scott Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts — conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for discharging a firearm during and in relation to that conspiracy. Under subsequent controlling precedent, Defendant now stands convicted of, and imprisoned for, conduct that does not violate Section 924(c) and in fact, is not criminal. Accordingly, he brought this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion asking the district court to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The district court refused to do so, and Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction. The court explained that when Defendant pled guilty in 2012 and was sentenced in 2013, the Supreme Court had implicitly approved Section 924(c)’s residual clause. Only several years later, in 2015, did the Court in Johnson cause a sea change in the law, disapproving its prior precedent upholding similar residual clauses against void-for-vagueness challenges. And it was not until 2019 that Davis dealt the final blow to Section 924(c)’s residual clause. The court wrote that Defendant’s case falls squarely within Reed’s “novelty” framework, and so he has shown cause for his procedural default. Further, Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction subjects him to imprisonment for conduct that the law does not make criminal. Because the error here worked to Defendant’s “actual and substantial disadvantage,” he has established prejudice to excuse his procedural default. View "US v. Donzell McKinney" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1951, and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c) and 924(j)(1). In a pretrial motion to suppress, Defendant argued that certain statements he made to detectives and witness identifications should be suppressed. The district court disagreed, admitting the evidence. Defendant was convicted.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's robbery and firearm convictions. While the district court erred in admitting Defendant's statements and the witness identifications, in light of the admissible evidence, any error was harmless. The court also rejected Defendant's claim that the cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly instructed the jury that a Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Demarcus Ivey" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec 922(g)(1) after he fled a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 99 months’ imprisonment, which included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds. For his procedural argument, Defendant argued that he was not given the required notice of the enhancement because the presentence report identified “another felony offense” as the basis for the enhancement. For his substantive argument, Defendant argued that he did not possess the firearm found in the vehicle in connection with the blue-light offense. The district court rejected Defendant's arguments.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's firearm conviction and sentence, finding that although the district court erred in determining Defendant was provided with the required notice, the error was harmless given the circumstances of the case. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

A 90-year-old North Carolina law makes it a crime to publish a “derogatory report” about candidates for public office where the speaker “know[s] such report to be false or” acts “in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 163-274(a)(9). Plaintiffs asserted this statute violates the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction because it determined plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the district attorney offered no examples of this Act’s “legitimate applications”—much less applications unrelated to speech—nor has she shown any such applications should mitigate the Court’s concerns about the law’s chilling effects on truthful speech during political campaigns. Second, even assuming the Act reaches only false statements and that Garrison’s seeming approval of certain criminal libel statutes remains good law, the Court would still conclude this Act fails constitutional scrutiny because it draws impermissible content-based distinctions in identifying which speech to criminalize. View "Juliette Grimmett v. Nancy Freeman" on Justia Law