Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case asks whether a town’s alleged policy that bans video livestreaming certain interactions with law enforcement violates the First Amendment. It also asks whether a police officer who, during a traffic stop, attempted to stop a passenger from livestreaming the encounter may be successfully sued under Section 1983. Plaintiff sued under Section 1983. He sued the officers in their official capacities—effectively suing the Town of Winterville—for allegedly having a policy that prohibits recording and livestreaming public police interactions in violation of the First Amendment. He also sued an Officer in his individual capacity. The district court awarded Defendants judgment on the pleadings after finding that the policy did not violate the First Amendment. The court dismissed the individual-capacity claim.   The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs seeking redress under Section 1983 for a violation of their constitutional rights must walk through a narrow gate. The doctrines of qualified immunity and Monell liability for local governments substantially diminish their chances. Here, faithful application of the doctrines leads to divergent results. Plaintiff’s has sufficiently alleged that the Town has a policy barring livestreaming one’s own traffic stop that violates the First Amendment. He must now show this policy exists. And, if it does, the Town will have the chance to prove that it does not violate the First Amendment. On the other hand, although the Officer was allegedly acting under the policy that plausibly violates the First Amendment, Plaintiff’s claim against him in his personal capacity fails. View "Dijon Sharpe v. Winterville Police Department" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with numerous child pornography crimes. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. After a jury later convicted Defendant on all counts, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months imprisonment and to a life term of supervised release. As part of Defendant’s supervised release, the court imposed special conditions, including prohibitions against (1) viewing sexually explicit images of minors, (2) engaging in employment or volunteer activities with access to computers, (3) viewing adult pornography, and (4) using any video game system that would allow communication with other people. On appeal, Defendant argued that the initial warrant authorizing a search of his residence was overbroad and that, therefore, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He also contends that the court procedurally and substantively erred by imposing a 240-month term of imprisonment and the above-stated special conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, his term of imprisonment, and the special condition of supervised release that prohibits Defendant from viewing sexually explicit images of minors. However, the court held that the district court erred by failing to explain the other challenged special conditions of supervised release. The court, therefore, vacated these conditions as procedurally unreasonable, and remand that portion of Defendant’s sentence to the district court for further consideration. View "US v. Christopher Sueiro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate at Sussex I State Prison (SISP) in 2017. A female correctional officer at SISP charged Plaintiff with a disciplinary offense, alleging that he directed lewd behavior toward her in the prison showers. Plaintiff denied the allegation, contending that security-camera footage would vindicate him. Subsequent to what Plaintiff alleged was a defective disciplinary-hearing process, prison officials found that he committed the offense and transferred him to a maximum-security facility. Based on the defects that Plaintiff perceived in the hearing process and subsequent transfer, he commenced a pro se civil action, levying a procedural due process claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants collectively, the “Prison Officials”). The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, then granted summary judgment—pre-discovery—in favor of the Prison Officials on the remaining First Amendment retaliation claim. Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment pre-discovery. Plaintiff properly received a Roseboro notice, explaining his rights to file competing affidavits and other evidence in response to the Prison Officials’ pre-discovery summary judgment motion. Plaintiff failed to respond with such evidentiary filings—or with a Rule 56(d) affidavit. But the district court was on fair notice of potential disputes as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record. Accordingly, the court wrote that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of his procedural due process rights such that dismissal at the pleading stage was inappropriate. Pre-discovery summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim was likewise inappropriate. View "Emmanuel Shaw v. T. Foreman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. (the “Church”) purchased 17 acres of land — zoned primarily for agricultural use — on which the Church sought to conduct religious assemblies. After Defendant Prince William County, Virginia (the “County”), denied the Church’s request to worship on its property before the Church complied with the zoning requirements, the Church initiated a lawsuit in district court. By its Complaint, the Church has alleged six claims against the County — three claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and three federal constitutional claims. For reasons explained in its Memorandum Opinion of November 2021, the district court dismissed those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that allowing religious institutions to conduct worship services does not further the purpose of the Agricultural Zoning Ordinance — that is, to promote farming. Specific to the Church, allowing services would not increase its ability to continue farming its land. Accordingly, the court wrote it cannot agree with the Church that it is similarly situated to farm wineries and limited-license breweries with regard to the Ordinance. The Church has failed to meet its initial burden of proof by providing a similarly situated comparator with which it has been treated unequally, and has thereby failed to state an RLUIPA equal terms claim. View "Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own a beach house in Dare County, North Carolina. In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dare County banned nonresident property owners from entering the county. As a result, Plaintiffs could not reach their beach house for forty-five days. In response, they sued Dare County, alleging that their property was taken without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. After the district court found that the ban was not a Fifth Amendment taking and dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ban did not physically appropriate Plaintiffs’ beach house. And though it restricted their ability to use the house, compensation is not required under the ad hoc balancing test that determines the constitutionality of most use restrictions. The court further explained that Dare County’s order is neither a physical appropriation, a use restriction that renders the property valueless, nor a taking under Penn Central. The effects of the order were temporary, Plaintiffs had a chance to occupy their property before it took effect, and while the order was operative they could still exercise significant ownership rights over their property. View "Joseph Blackburn, Jr. v. Dare County" on Justia Law

When the ACA’s mandate and SRP were still in effect, a husband and wife (“Taxpayers”) did not maintain the minimum insurance coverage required by the ACA. The taxpayers did not include their $2409 SRP when they filed their 2018 federal tax return. The Taxpayers filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The IRS filed a proof of claim for the unpaid SRP and asserted that its claim was entitled to priority as an income or excise tax under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Taxpayers objected to the government’s claim of priority. The bankruptcy court granted the objection, concluding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the SRP is a penalty, not a tax, and therefore is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(8). The government appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that even if the SRP was generally a tax, it did not qualify as a tax measured by income or an excise tax and thus was not entitled to priority. The government thereafter appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that that the SRP qualifies as a tax under the functional approach that has consistently been applied in bankruptcy cases and that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB requires the court to abandon that functional approach. Because the SRP is a tax that is measured by income, the government’s claim is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(8)(A). View "US v. Fabio Alicea" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s father died of carbon monoxide poisoning in his apartment at Allen Benedict Court Apartments, a housing complex owned and maintained by the City of Columbia Housing Authority. The city police and fire chiefs concluded that the cause of the man’s death was a faulty, thirty-year-old furnace that had caused carbon monoxide to leak into his apartment, as well as several others. Plaintiff and the personal representative of his estate appealed the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against the City of Columbia Housing Authority (“Housing Authority”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.   The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to plead a Section 1983 claim against the Housing Authority. The court wrote that Plaintiff has alleged enough facts at this early stage to establish that the Housing Authority recognized the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning and acted inappropriately in light of that risk. By affirmatively adopting regulations recognizing the life-threatening danger of missing carbon monoxide detectors, the Housing Authority demonstrated that it knew the risk of harm that the man faced. Specifically, the Housing Authority failed to install a single carbon monoxide detector at the man’s 244-unit complex. It provided no preventative maintenance of appliances. In sum, at this early stage, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that the Housing Authority’s policies and customs were the moving force behind the constitutional injury. View "Danielle Washington v. Housing Authority of the City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent nearly three months in Middle River Regional Jail. And he alleges that Middle River’s practices during that time substantially burdened his Islamic faith while unconstitutionally favoring the practice of Christianity. He argues that he was kept from engaging in Friday Prayer.   Plaintiff’s claims regarding Friday Prayer implicate the Free Exercise Clause. Under that clause, prisons can impose burdens on inmates’ religious practice— even substantial burdens—so long as the prison rules that do so are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Middle River had three rules in place that kept Plaintiff from attending in-person Friday Prayer: no inmate led groups; no maximum-security prisoners allowed in any in-person groups; and prisoner services and classes by volunteer or donation only.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Free Exercise decision and remanded for further proceedings on the Establishment Clause. The court explained that Middle River’s policies do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Each of the rules and regulations that combined to keep Plaintiff from engaging in communal Friday Prayer during his brief stay was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and, therefore, acceptable under Turner. Whether the challenged practices violate the Establishment Clause is a question best left to the district court to resolve in the first instance, with the benefit of intervening legal developments. View "David Firewalker-Fields v. Jack Lee" on Justia Law

Appellee a middle school teacher in Pender County, North Carolina, when she was physically attacked by a special education student in her language arts class. There is no dispute that the student was known to have been violent on prior occasions. At the time of the incident involving Appellee, Appellant was the principal of the school where the attack occurred.   Appellee asserted the following five 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims: (1) a substantive due process claim; (2) a deliberate indifference claim; (3) a supervisory liability claim against Superintendent Hill; (4) a claim seeking personal liability against Superintendent Hill; and (5) a claim seeking personal liability against Appellant. Relevant here, the personal liability claim against Appellant alleges that Appellant knew or should have known that her actions and inactions could have led to a violation of Appellee’s constitutional rights.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Appellee failed to sufficiently allege that Appellant violated her constitutional rights, thus Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that here, Appellee’s state-created danger claim centers on a series of alleged choices or inactions by Appellant which are far removed from TB’s physical attack on Appellee. Specifically, Appellee attempts to recast Appellant’s knowledge of TB’s prior acts of violence and creation of the staffing schedule which required Appellant to teach TB on the day of the incident -- without a second teacher in her classroom -- as affirmative acts. But Appellee fails to point to any action by Appellant which created the danger that resulted in Appellee’s injuries. View "Kimberly Burns-Fisher v. Anna Romero-Lehrer" on Justia Law

A bankruptcy court imposed sanctions against Defendant. The sanctions arose from an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court brought by the United States Trustee against Defendant, UpRight Law LLC, Sperro LLC and other defendants. UpRight is a Chicago-based bankruptcy legal services company that operates through a nationwide network of “local partners.” After Defendant signed a partnership agreement with UpRight, he filed more than 30 bankruptcy cases as a partner. The bankruptcy court also found that Delafield violated Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct 5.1 and 5.3. After the district court affirmed sanctions, Defendant appealed, asserting the sanctions order violated his due process rights.   The court explained that to be sure, a lawyer facing suspension or disbarment is entitled to notice of the charges for which such discipline is sought and an opportunity to be heard on those issues. The court explained that the complaint did not cite to the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct that Defendant was ultimately found to have violated. Identifying such rules is certainly preferred in an action seeking suspension or disbarment. But this omission did not violate Defendant’s due process rights. The complaint adequately notified Defendant of the conduct for which he was being accused and the sanctions that were being sought. View "U. S. Trustee v. Darren Delafield" on Justia Law