Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, challenging his conviction for using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court denied his motion and Defendant appealed.The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the federal arson statute which served as the predicate for Defendant's Sec. 924(c) conviction is not categorically a crime of violence. Because the statute Defendant was convicted under criminalized the arson of property fully owned by the defendant, and not just that of the property “of another” as required by Sec. 924(c). View "US v. Cecil Davis" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense to a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for damages. Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their respective summary judgment motions based on a qualified immunity defense to a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for damages asserted by Appellee. Appellee initiated the underlying action against Appellants, and various other South Carolina state officials after his son, (“Decedent”), was struck and killed by a vehicle while he was a pedestrian on Interstate 95 (“I-95”) in South Carolina.   Appellee alleged that Appellants violated Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to ensure Decedent was transported to a hospital or jail where he could receive adequate medical attention. The district court determined that, while Decedent’s right to freedom from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, a genuine dispute of material fact barred a ruling on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.   Appellants contest the district court’s ruling that Decedent’s constitutional right was “clearly established.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care and freedom from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs was clearly established and particularly recognized by both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court at the time of the events in question. Further, the court wrote that Appellants have also not addressed the court’s “fundamental error” standard, nor have they attempted to show that they can meet it here. Thus, Appellants have not satisfied their burden of identifying a “fundamental error” warranting reversal on a ground not raised before the district court. View "Paul Tarashuk v. Jamie Givens" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, Virginia. After exhausting direct appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court, Petitioner filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in the Newport News Circuit Court. That court dismissed the petition. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal to the Virginia Supreme Court. After that, Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court ordered the state to file a responsive pleading to show cause why the writ should not be granted. It also instructed the state to treat the order as a “request that the records of the state criminal trial and habeas corpus proceedings, if pertinent and available, be forwarded to the Clerk’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia. Petitioner appealed the denial of Rule 60(b) motion. When the district court sent its records to the Fourth Circuit, the state habeas records were not included.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court with the following instructions: (1) the state must file a Rule 5-compliant Answer; (2) the district court shall determine if it has the records it requested—those “pertinent and available”— and, in this inquiry, address the state habeas records that were missing when the file was transferred to the Fourth Circuit; and (3) finally, the district court shall reconsider the state’s motion to dismiss, considering the complete answer and the records it first requested. View "Arthur Sanford v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) after conceding removability from the United States during removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ denied both forms of relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and entered a final order of removal. In so holding the BIA found that Petitioner failed to show the necessary nexus between her asserted protected ground and the persecution she suffered.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. One necessary element for an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal is that an applicant’s claimed persecution occurred, or will occur, on account of a statutorily protected ground that applies to her. If an applicant fails to satisfy the nexus requirement, she cannot obtain asylum or withholding of removal. The Fourth Circuit held that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus based on the facts presented. View "Maira Madrid-Montoya v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of receiving and possessing child pornography found on his phone. He appealed, making six arguments. The Fourth Circuit explained that based on the totality of the circumstances of Defendant’s questioning show Defendant was not in custody, so his Miranda rights were not violated. Although admitting the cellphone report into evidence violated Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, the court found that the error was harmless. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of past wrongs, in allowing the Detective’s lay-opinion testimony, or in fashioning its restitution order. But the lifetime ban on internet and computer usage is foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s caselaw. So the court reversed as to that condition and remanded to the district court. View "US v. Augustin Arce" on Justia Law

Appellants operated for around seven years an enterprise known as “Trained to Go” (TTG) within one of West Baltimore’s neighborhoods. Appellants distributed drugs and engaged in countless acts of violence using firearms. They exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial and were convicted for their actions, including for conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They now bring numerous challenges to their convictions and sentences, including their right to a public trial, the evidence admitted at trial, and more.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Appellants’ convictions and sentences on all fronts, save one. The court reversed one Appellant’s Section 922(g)(1) conviction, vacated the judgment as to him, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. The court explained that Appellants contend that any RICO conspiracy was confined to a neighborhood in Baltimore. But the government must only prove a “de minimis” effect on interstate commerce. Appellants argue that the de minimis standard does not apply to their activity because it was purely intrastate activity. But the de minimis standard does in fact apply. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court made clear that “when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Construing all this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court found there is sufficient evidence that the conspiracy affected interstate commerce. View "US v. Montana Barronette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a transgender woman with gender dysphoria, spent six months incarcerated in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. Though prison deputies initially assigned her to women’s housing, they quickly moved her to men’s housing when they learned that she was transgender. There, she experienced delays in medical treatment for her gender dysphoria, harassment by other inmates, and persistent and intentional misgendering and harassment by prison deputies. Following her release from the detention center, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action against the Sheriff of Fairfax County, a prison deputy, and a prison nurse alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Constitution, and state common law. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the complaint failed to state grounds for relief with respect to some claims and that the statute of limitations barred others.The Fourth Circuit reversed the remanded the district court’s ruling. The court held that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does not fall within the ADA’s exclusion for “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.” In addition, the court held that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to her Original Complaint and that she has stated claims of gross negligence against the Sheriff and Deputy. View "Kesha Williams v. Stacey Kincaid" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During his state post-conviction relief (PCR) and federal habeas proceedings, Petitioner argued that the State of South Carolina’s failure to produce three pieces of evidence violated his due process rights because he could have used that evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses. Considering the entire record and the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, every court to address this argument has deemed the undisclosed evidence not material.The Fourth Circuit agreed and denied Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus. The court explained that having granted every permissible assumption in Petitioner’s favor and having carefully considered all the undisclosed evidence in light of the entire record at trial, the court concluded that Petitioner has not carried his burden to prove a reasonable probability that, had he received the undisclosed evidence, the jury would not have convicted him of murder or recommended a sentence of death. View "Marion Bowman, Jr. v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. The court held that the BIA failed to address whether Petitioner’s case should be remanded to a new immigration judge (“IJ”) under Matter of Y-S-L-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 2015).The court explained that while Petitioner’s s brief to the BIA makes clear that his primary focus was to persuade the BIA to reverse the IJ’s decision, the court noted that it also shows he presented an alternative argument seeking remand before a new IJ under Matter of Y-S-L-C-. Accordingly the court found that Petitioner sufficiently exhausted his claim that this case should be remanded to a new IJ under Matter of Y-S-L-C-.The court further found that the government’s analysis glosses over one key point: the BIA in Matter of Y-S-L-C- never definitively concluded that—or fully analyzed whether— the IJ’s actions constituted a due process violation. Therefore, the BIA’s decision not to state that the IJ’s conduct prejudiced the fifteen-year-old applicant supports Petitioner’s interpretation of the Matter of Y-S-L-C- holding as independent of a due process violation. View "Rodolfo Tinoco Acevedo v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law