Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty in 2003 to attempted bank robbery and to carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, he was classified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 274 months’ imprisonment. Over the years, he filed several postconviction motions, including a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. After subsequent changes in Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of certain sentencing provisions, the petitioner argued that the mandatory Guidelines’ career-offender provision was unconstitutionally vague and sought habeas relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, finding that he could not proceed under § 2241 because he did not satisfy the requirements of the “saving clause” in § 2255(e). The district court determined that the petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing a second or successive § 2255 motion and that this procedural bar did not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, the inability to satisfy the procedural requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, and thus does not permit recourse to § 2241 via the saving clause. The court also held that this result does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, relying on its en banc precedent in In re Vial. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bell v. Streeval" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected that the defendant was involved in a drug trafficking operation based out of his apartment in a large, multi-unit building. To investigate further, officers, with the building management’s permission, conducted a warrantless dog sniff in the common hallway immediately outside the defendant’s apartment door. The trained dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and this information was used to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered drugs, firearms, and other evidence. The defendant was indicted on drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting his arguments that the dog sniff constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the dog sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because it only revealed the presence of contraband, and that the area outside the apartment door was not protected “curtilage” since it was a common hallway accessible to other residents and building staff. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to 150 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that a dog sniff at an apartment door in a common hallway does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established by United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, because it only reveals the presence of contraband. The court also held that the common hallway outside the apartment door is not curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had no right to exclude others from that area. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted legislation to provide financial assistance to small businesses, including relief payments on certain small business loans. PACEM Solutions International, LLC applied for a $5 million loan under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 7(a) loan program. Due to repeated missed payments, PACEM and its lender, Atlantic Union Bank, modified the loan multiple times. When the CARES Act was passed, PACEM's loan was not in "regular servicing status," a requirement for receiving relief payments under the Act. The SBA determined that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments and requested the return of previously disbursed funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA. The court found that the SBA did not violate the CARES Act, as PACEM's loan was not performing appropriately and was in default. The court also concluded that the SBA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to withhold payments and that any notification defects were harmless.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the SBA acted reasonably in determining that PACEM's loan was ineligible for relief payments under the CARES Act. The court found that the SBA provided a satisfactory explanation for its actions and did not violate the terms of the CARES Act. The court also declined to address PACEM's constitutional claim regarding the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as PACEM sought only a declaratory judgment without requesting a hearing before the SBA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the SBA. View "PACEM Solutions International, LLC v. U. S. Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Keith Moore was stopped by Richmond, Virginia police officers after they observed his vehicle displaying a temporary license tag number that matched two other vehicles they had stopped earlier that day. Moore fled from the police, leading to a chase that ended with him crashing his car. Upon his arrest, officers found a gun in his vehicle and discovered that Moore had a prior felony conviction. He was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Moore’s indictment, finding that the traffic stop was racially motivated and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court based its decision on statistical evidence showing that Black drivers were disproportionately stopped by Richmond police and historical evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond. The court concluded that Moore’s stop was part of a pattern of selective enforcement against Black drivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Moore’s stop and arrest were motivated by racial discrimination. The court noted that the officers had probable cause to stop Moore due to the fake license tag and his subsequent flight. The statistical evidence presented did not adequately demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, and the historical evidence was not contemporaneous with the events in question. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the indictment against Moore. View "US v. Moore" on Justia Law

Evy Orellana suffered serious injuries when a tactical canine bit her leg as a U.S. Marshals fugitive task force executed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Eric Trinidad. Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived in the basement of Trinidad’s mother’s home. The officers breached a sealed door to access the basement, and the dog bit Orellana during the search. Orellana sued the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, claiming a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable search and seizure.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the case was similar enough to Bivens to apply its cause of action. The court also denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that this case presented a new context for Bivens because the officers were part of a specialized federal-state task force operating under a warrant. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Bivens to new contexts, particularly when Congress is better suited to create a cause of action. The court concluded that special factors, including federalism concerns and the existence of alternative remedial procedures, counseled against extending Bivens in this situation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, denying Orellana a Bivens remedy. View "Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Godec" on Justia Law

James Gould was involuntarily committed to mental health facilities four times between May 2016 and July 2019. In February 2022, police found him in his West Virginia home with a twelve-gauge shotgun. A grand jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for anyone who has been committed to a mental institution to possess a firearm. Gould pleaded guilty but appealed, arguing that the Second Amendment renders the statute facially unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia rejected Gould’s challenge, concluding that there is a historical basis for disarming individuals determined to be dangerous to themselves or the public. The court found that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional on its face. Gould then changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(4) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court noted that historically, legislatures incapacitated those suffering from mental illness when they posed a danger to themselves or others. Additionally, the court found that legislatures had the authority to disarm groups of people considered dangerous. The court emphasized that disarmament under § 922(g)(4) is not categorically permanent, as individuals can petition for relief to restore their firearm rights. The court concluded that § 922(g)(4) is facially constitutional because it can be applied in situations consistent with the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Gould’s conviction. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

Andrew David Krueger was convicted of receipt and possession of child sexual abuse material and sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. Krueger appealed his conviction, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered on his electronic devices pursuant to a search warrant. He argued that the search of his devices violated the Fourth Amendment due to alleged delays by law enforcement.The case began in January 2019 when Virginia state police observed illicit online activity at Krueger’s residence. Based on this activity, a state magistrate judge issued a search warrant in November 2019, leading to the seizure of Krueger’s electronic devices. The state police made forensic copies of the devices, which revealed hundreds of images depicting the sexual abuse of minors. Krueger was charged under Virginia law, but the charges were dismissed due to a missing affidavit in the warrant application. Federal officials then took up the prosecution, obtaining a federal search warrant in September 2022 to search the forensic copies of Krueger’s devices.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Krueger’s motion to suppress, finding that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the evidence from January 2019 was not stale by November 2019 and that the delay in obtaining the federal warrant was not unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the federal warrant was supported by probable cause, as the nature of child sexual abuse material and the use of the BitTorrent network indicated that Krueger was likely to retain such material. The court also found that the delay in obtaining the federal warrant did not affect the length of the seizure, as the devices remained in state custody throughout the proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed Krueger’s conviction. View "United States v. Krueger" on Justia Law

Zachary Hebb challenged a municipal ordinance in Asheville, North Carolina, that prohibited the use of amplified sound within 150 feet of a medical clinic during its operating hours. Hebb, who regularly protested outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, argued that the ordinance infringed on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He preferred using a sound amplifier to communicate his message without yelling. After being cited for violating the ordinance, Hebb filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially granted Hebb a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance likely violated his First Amendment rights and was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied Asheville's motions to dismiss and later granted Hebb's motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining the ordinance and awarding nominal damages for the due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Asheville's motions to dismiss Hebb's First Amendment claim but reversed the summary judgment in Hebb's favor, finding that there were disputed factual and legal questions that warranted further consideration. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and served a significant government interest in protecting patients from harmful noise. However, it concluded that the entry of summary judgment was premature.Regarding Hebb's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the 2021 version of the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to prevent Hebb from using a plastic cone. The court found that the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited and included sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Hebb v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

Terrence Hammock, a detainee at the Baltimore County Detention Center (BCDC), filed a lawsuit alleging severe violations of his constitutional rights. He claimed that BCDC served him rotten and unsafe food, causing him to get sick multiple times and lose weight. Additionally, Hammock, a practicing Muslim, alleged that he was denied the ability to attend Jum’ah services, a central practice of Islam, throughout his detention from September 2019 to at least March 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Hammock’s claims. The court found that his allegations regarding the food did not meet the standard of a “serious deprivation of a basic human need” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It also held that the denial of Jum’ah services was justified by legitimate penological interests, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied Hammock’s motion for appointed counsel, stating that the case had not yet proceeded to discovery or trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Hammock’s claims. The appellate court held that Hammock sufficiently pleaded a claim of deliberate indifference based on the conditions of confinement, specifically the provision of rotten and mice-bitten food. The court also found that Hammock adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim, as the defendants did not present a penological interest to justify the denial of Jum’ah services for the entire period in question. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Hammock’s claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the appointment of counsel for Hammock. View "Hammock v. Watts" on Justia Law