Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Virginia common law, challenging his stop, arrest, and subsequent prosecution. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the officers' motion for summary judgment on each of plaintiff's claims.The Fourth Circuit held that, when Deputy Fulford told plaintiff that he was not free to leave until he identified himself, this unambiguous restraint on plaintiff's liberty converted the previously voluntary encounter into a compelled detention—an investigatory stop. Furthermore, the district court erred in finding that Fulford's stop was supported by reasonable and particularized suspicion. In this case, it is not enough that Fulford first began to suspect criminal activity when a man that he intended to help approached him in dark clothing. The court also held that plaintiff's arrest was likewise unlawful where Stafford County Ordinance 17–7(c), which makes it a crime for any person at a public place or place open to the public to refuse to identify himself at the request of a uniformed law-enforcement officer if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety requires such identification, is unconstitutional when applied outside the context of an investigatory stop.The court further held that Fulford is not entitled to qualified immunity for his unconstitutional investigatory stop, but the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their unlawful arrest under Stafford County Ordinance 17–7(c). Until today, the court explained that no federal court has prescribed the constitutional limits of section 17-7(c)'s application and thus this right was not clearly established at the time of plaintiff's arrest. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers on plaintiff's claims under the Virginia common law. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Wingate v. Fulford" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner contends that his trial counsel failed to call any forensic experts to testify on his behalf and asserted that such failure was not a strategic decision but was made out of counsel's ignorance of the availability of funding to pay experts.Even though the district court did not restrict its review by considering only the state court record, as required in the circumstances, but instead considered an affidavit of a forensic expert that petitioner presented for the first time in the district court, the court nonetheless agreed with the district court's conclusion that the expert failed to show prejudice with evidence or a proffer of evidence "of what a defensive forensic expert would have testified to and how that could have altered the trial." The court explained that the forensic expert only identified investigatory issues that he or another forensic expert could have explored and did not test or challenge any evidence actually presented to the jury so as to support a conclusion that testimony from him or another forensic expert could have made a difference. View "Vandross v. Stirling" on Justia Law

After VA Medical Center selected Metro Health's bid on the condition that Metro Health could obtain a permit from the City to operate emergency medical services (EMS) vehicles, the City refused to grant Metro Health a permit. Metro Health then filed suit against the City and RAA, alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case with prejudice, agreeing with the district court that defendants were entitled to immunity from federal antitrust liability where they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Furthermore, federal law does not preempt their actions. The court rejected Metro Health's contention that by thwarting the VA Medical Center's competitive bidding process, the City and RAA have violated the Supremacy Clause. The court explained that, where, as here, a federal agency, of its own volition, imposes a contract condition consistent with federal law, the Supremacy Clause is not implicated. View "Western Star Hospital Authority, Inc. v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of race- and gender-based discrimination under Title VII and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her action for failure to state a claim, because plaintiff was not an "employee" of the firm she sought to sue. The court explained that plaintiff was a partner and equal owner of the firm, not an employee, and thus she is not within the scope of Title VII's coverage.In regard to plaintiff's section 1981 claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead specific factual allegations tending to corroborate her claim of eligibility for leave. In this case, plaintiff declined to indicate the nature of the medical conditions or events that allegedly qualified her for leave, despite being the individual best-positioned to do so. Furthermore, even if plaintiff's qualification for leave was assumed, plaintiff failed to allege that her race was the but-for cause of the Board's denial of her leave application as required by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009 (2020). As to plaintiff's one factually-specific, non-conclusory allegation of racially-motivated conduct, she failed to allege any facts linking it to the Board vote denying her short-term leave. View "Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A." on Justia Law

Heyer, a Deaf individual who communicates in ASL, is civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person. In prison and while civilly committed, Heyer’s access to the Deaf community has dwindled. Detainees in Heyer’s Unit can communicate with the outside by writing letters, in-person visits, the prison email system, and a TTY machine for making calls under the supervision of a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff member to preapproved numbers. BOP also installed a videophone in Heyer's unit and contracted with a provider of SecureVRS services for calls to preapproved numbers, with monitoring. SecureVRS calls do not allow Heyer to call Deaf friends. All of the available means of communication are problematic because Heyer’s English skills are “novice low. ”An expert concluded that his reading and writing skills mimic those of a seven-year-old.The district court held that the BOP’s refusal to allow Heyer to make point-to-point calls with other Deaf individuals did not violate his First Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Heyer’s constitutional rights are not defined merely by his civil detainee status or his past conduct. They are also defined by his status as a Deaf individual cut off from his community in a manner more complete than even foreign language prisoners. The district court erred by crediting BOP testimony about the risks of point-to-point calls without considering testimony about safety features that have managed those risks for other forms of communication it makes available. View "Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

A facility caring for an unaccompanied child fails to provide a constitutionally adequate level of mental health care if it substantially departs from accepted professional standards. Appellants, a class of unaccompanied immigrant children detained at Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (SVJC), filed a class action alleging that the Commission fails to provide a constitutionally adequate level of mental health care due to its punitive practices and failure to implement trauma-informed care. The district court found that the Commission provides adequate care by offering access to counseling and medication.The Fourth Circuit held that neither the Flores Settlement nor SVJC's cooperative agreement prevent appellants from addressing their alleged injuries through the relief they seek from SVJC. On the merits, the court applied the Youngberg standard for professional judgment and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. The court explained that the district court incorrectly applied a standard of deliberate indifference when it should have determined whether the Commission substantially departed from accepted standards of professional judgment. Therefore, in light of the Youngberg standard, the district court must consider evidence relevant to the professional standards of care necessary to treat appellants' serious mental health needs. The court left it to the district court to determine in the first instance to what extent, if any, the trauma-informed approach should be incorporated into the professional judgment standard in this particular case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission" on Justia Law

After Boehringer developed a drug called Pradaxa to help reduce the risk of stroke, the FDA approved the drug and its label. Betty Knight suffered complications from taking the drug and eventually died. Betty's children filed suit against Boehringer asserting a variety of state-law claims alleging Boehringer failed to adequately warn about the risks associated with taking Pradaxa. Boehringer argued that federal law preempted the claims, the district court agreed with plaintiffs, and then the jury returned a mixed verdict. Boehringer appealed, claiming that plaintiffs' fraud claim based on the physician label was preempted.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Boehringer's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that there is no bright-line, one-size-fits-all line marking the moment when an analysis reveals new information. A careful review of the record is needed to determine whether a conclusion has been reached. Applying careful review here, the court concluded that Boehringer did not have "newly acquired information" regarding an optimal Pradaxa blood concentration level which would have warranted a unilateral change to the physician label. Therefore, the state-law fraud claim is preempted. View "Knight v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prison inmate, filed suit against two correctional officers, alleging that they used excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, reasoning that even if plaintiff was handcuffed and prone when he was pepper-sprayed or beaten, a reasonable jury would have to conclude that both uses of force were necessary to protect officer safety and proportionate to the threat posed by defendant.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a reasonable jury crediting plaintiff's account could find that the officers used force not to protect themselves but to retaliate against plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court explained that the excessive force inquiry turns on motive: whether the officers used force in good faith to protect officer safety, as they contend, or whether, as plaintiff avers, they used force maliciously to punish plaintiff for his head-butts. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court did not think this question can be answered in the officers' favor as a matter of law. The court concluded that the officers were on "fair notice" of plaintiff's right not to be subjected to force in the form of pepper spray or a beating if that force was deployed to retaliate against plaintiff after he was subdued, and not to protect officer safety. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Dean v. Jones" on Justia Law

Challengers filed suit alleging that a 2018 North Carolina law requiring voters to present photographic identification is unconstitutional because it was enacted with the same discriminatory intent as the 2013 Omnibus Law. The district court found that the Challengers were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction against the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a legislature's past acts do not condemn the acts of a later legislature, which the court must presume acts in good faith. In this case, the district court considered the General Assembly's discriminatory intent in passing the 2013 Omnibus Law to be effectively dispositive of its intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. In doing so, it improperly flipped the burden of proof at the first step of its analysis and failed to give effect to the Supreme Court's presumption of legislative good faith in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). Consequently, these errors fatally infected its finding of discriminatory intent.Furthermore, once the proper burden and the presumption of good faith are applied, the Challengers fail to meet their burden of showing that the General Assembly acted with discriminatory intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. The court considered the Arlington Heights factors—the sequence of events leading to enactment, legislative history, and disparate impact—and concluded that they cannot support a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Raymond" on Justia Law

Varner’was having an alcoholic drink and lunch at a restaurant. Deputy Roane approached and requested that he leave the restaurant with him. Varner complied. Roane had previously arrested Varner on drug charges. Outside, Roane asked Varner to empty his pockets. Finding nothing, Roane patted Varner down. No incriminating items were found. Roane asked him to submit to a breath test. Varner stated he would not be driving and refused. K-9 officer Johnson then approached Varner’s car with a drug-sniffing dog, Zeke. Zeke and Johnson had successfully completed Police Narcotic Detection Training. Zeke gave a positive alert. Varner alleges that Johnson manufactured this alert by smacking the side of his car and that Zeke displayed erratic behavior. Johnson contradicted those assertions. No drugs were found in the car.Varner sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Varner’s claim that he had been unlawfully seized during the pat-down, reasoning that Varner had failed to demonstrate the encounter was anything but consensual. After discovery, the court granted Roane summary judgment on the remaining Fourth Amendment claim, finding no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had manufactured Zeke’s alert. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Roane did not use or threaten force, did not restrain Varner, and did not make any misrepresentation as to a warrant. There is nothing to suggest a conspiracy to manipulate Zeke’s behavior. View "Varner v. Roane" on Justia Law